Moveable Feast Cafe 2023/01/27 … Open Thread

Mr P Interesting question-How was the Admiral Gorshkov able to jam over such distances? I would venture a companion sub capable of most disruptions. The Gorshkov is a valuable ship but is it more valuable than one that sets up listening devices among other talents?

As one commentor said this is too much for one navel vessel! Okay, so how about two and perhaps help from above?

And thank you for going out of the realm of those who abide only by the thoughts of others whether google or the pros.

“Russian Navy ship in the Atlantic Ocean near Bermuda, conducted a simulated launch of a ZIRCON Hypersonic Missile against a “nautical target 900km away.” The Simulated launch involved the use of Electronic Warfare that actually JAMMED U.S. radar, cellular phones in the Mid-Atlantic USA, and even disrupted digital internet traffic for 34 seconds!”

A few candidates….
Oceanographic research vessel “Evgeny Gorigledzhan”, built in the interests of the Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI) of the Ministry of Defense, is being prepared for transfer to the fleet. This was reported by a source in the Russian defense industry.
The main purpose is “carrying out underwater technical works”. The OIS is capable of taking on board underwater and rescue vehicles. The Evengy, obviously more advanced, is the third sister ship of the Oceanographic research vessel Yantar.

https://en.topwar.ru/209167-istochnik-nazval-sroki-peredachi-v-sostav-vmf-rf-okeanograficheskogo-issledovatelskogo-sudna-evgenij-gorigledzhan.html

In fact, it’s possible that Russia’s true target are the Pentagon’s secret DoDIN cable network distinct from the publicly accessible civilian system. These would have less redundancy than civilian cables and could disable key communication capabilities during a crisis. Already, an accidental cable outage in 2008 crippled U.S. drone operations over Iraq for several days.

The Yantar carries two three person mini-submarines Rus and Consul, which can dive down to six thousand meters—allowing them to reach very deep cables—and may store additional submarines or unmanned submersibles in its huge hangar. Submarine expert HI Sutton at Covert Shores has helpfully mapped out how the Yantar’s activities clearly follow undersea cables near Cuba, Turkey, and the U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine base at King’s Baby, Georgia (likely scouting for secret U.S. military cables). A second Yantar-class vessel is scheduled to enter service in 2020.

Another one of Russia’s one-of-a-kind Special Operations subs is the sixty or seventy-four-meter long Losharik (named after a cartoon horse) which is powered by a nuclear reactor and can reportedly dive as deep as twenty-five hundred meters under the sea. Most military submarines can only safely dive between two hundred to five hundred meters. Appearing more conventional from the outside, Losharik’s interior is built out of seven six-meter diameter spherical compartments to better withstand pressure. The short-range Losharik is hauled into position by the much larger Podmovskovye mothership submarine converted from the Delta-class nuclear-powered attack submarine K-64. The converted Delta-class Orenburg is also capable of deploying mini-submarines, and an additional Oscar-class submarine is being converted to this purpose.

Nonetheless, the extensive Russian military activity around the submarine cables surely reveals that they are perceived as a valuable avenue for asymmetric attack and intelligence gathering, and a capacity to launch a more targeted attack against selected cables could cause significant disruptions.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-spy-submarines-are-tampering-undersea-cables-make-internet-work-should-we-be

In general, the process by which intelligence agencies tap into cables is highly secretive. There are some indications, however, as to how it is done. Some reports indicate states use specially designed submarines equipped with devices to splice into cables. In this “splicing method,” the submarine, having broken through the protective coating, installs listening devices within the fiber optic cable to collect transmitted data.28 Some commentators, however, cast doubt on this method due to the possibility of a cable operator detecting a break in data transmission through the cable.29 Some reports nevertheless indicate the techniques are sophisticated enough to not alert cable operators even when external damage to the cable is already done.30 The possibility of damage to the cable or service interruption through splicing is important in the global regulatory regime for cable protections, as will be discussed at length in Section VI.
https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/how-hackers-submarine-cables-may-be-held-liable-under-law-sea#:~:text=More%20insidiously%2C%20however%2C%20these%20cables,much%20data%20flows%20through%20them.