By Pepe Escobar and cross posted with insideover.com
You don’t argue with the Tatmadaw – the Myanmar Armed Forces. It’s always their way, or the highway. Since the mid-20th century, the Chinese have come to understand it quite well.
How Beijing approaches the Myanmar maze is conditioned by four variables: natural gas; water; the drug trade; and the fractious clashes between the Tatmadaw and a dizzying patchwork of over 135 ethnic minorities.
Each Myanmar ethnic group exhibits its own peculiar history, culture and language. They control vast territories, whole industries and serious militias. Myanmar’s two-third majority is represented by the Bamar – also known as the Lowland Burmese. The Tatmadaw is largely a Lowland Burmese army – in perennial conflict with that large ethnic jigsaw puzzle.
The ethnic minorities live mostly in the hills and along Myanmar’s porous jungle borders. Myanmar is divided into seven states – named after the seven largest ethnic groups: Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Shan and Rakhine. Alliances tend to be quite fragile, but historically the Chinese have been inclined to support a few of them in their fight against the Tatmadaw.
Drug trade in Myanmar is a virtually impenetrable matryoshka – with most of these groups connected across the Golden Triangle to partners in China, Thailand and Laos, and on top of it competing against each other.
The Shan traditionally have used huge profits in the drug trade to buy an array of weapons. There is a wealth of competing Shan groups, among them the army of the late, notoriously flamboyant drug lord Khun Sa, known as “The Opium King of Burma”; the former headhunters that compose the Wa tribe; and a bunch of Kokang Chinese who form the eastern Shan State army.
The opium/heroin business – and much of the ya ba (amphetamine) trafficking – in the Golden Triangle is now largely controlled by the much feared United Wa State Army: a 20,000-strong ultra-hardcore militia, one of the most powerful on the planet, complete with their private collection of surface-to-air missiles.
And that brings us to the Chinese angle – because many of these ethnic potentates, from Khun Sa to Kyi Myint, a.k.a. Zhang Zhiming, a former head of the Communist Party of Burma, have forged very close relations with Chinese Triads.
Yet what does the central government in Myanmar have to do with the heart of the action in the Golden Triangle? Not much. The Tatmadaw may strike the odd peace deal with these unruly actors, but they usually don’t last long.
What the Tatmadaw did over these past decades was a crash course on business – learning the ropes about post-Mao China. That’s how they evolved into a major corporate empire – much more than an army.
Myanmar was already on the front line when sections of the People’s Liberation Army (PL) in China got into business. For instance, Yunnan province in southern China was the operating base for the top three heroin Triad families. So the first step was Burma linked to the Chinese triads as the logistical arm of the Golden Triangle drug trade. The next step featured China building railways to link Yunnan to Burma/Myanmar.
Oil and gas star as the next piece of the puzzle. As France’s Total started to expand their initial oil and gas exploits off Rakhine – formerly known as Arakan state – the Chinese had the foresight to invest in a long oil and gas pipeline linking it to Yunnan. From Beijing’s point of view, what really matters is this Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal to southern China – with the Tatmadaw in charge of security.
While China invests in copper mines and dams, but arguably its key investment in Myanmar is a new deep-water port on the Bay of Bengal, with the accompanying Kyaukphyu Special Free Trade Zone. The port and the pipeline interconnect, representing the Myanmar backbone of the vitally important Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Southeast Asia corridor.
And that brings us to the intractable Rohingya problem.
China’s absolute priority is to protect the new port plus the Special Free Trade Zone being built in Rakhine.
For quite a while the Myanmar government’s income – now controlled by the Tatmadaw – has depended on the oil/gas from onshore and offshore operations in Rakhine as well as the rail/road connectivity.
The Chinese for their part are in close touch with the Kachin Army and the Kokang ethnic group. If the going gets tough, the plan is to use them as well as the Arakan Army, active in the region, to manage the Tatmadaw in case they start having funny ideas. The only thing that matters for the Chinese is the BRI corridor and the Rohingya find themselves caught in the middle of this serious power play.
The Myanmar puzzle is made even more complex by the issue of water. The Beijing leadership knows very well how strategic Myanmar is in terms of solving China’s critical water imbalance. China, with 20% of the world’s population, can count on only 7% of the world’s fresh water. And 80% of China’s water is in the south, while over 700 million Chinese and two-thirds of its farmland are in the north.
The solution has been to build 11 of the world’s largest hydroelectric dams on the key rivers which flow towards China’s neighbors. And this has given rise to dramatic problems, especially in the case of the Mekong, where every region below the dams, in Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, has been extremely handicapped. And the issue is far from over: 11 more dams will be built in the lower Mekong, in Laos and Cambodia.
The relationship between Beijing and the Tatmadaw was never a bed of roses. Overall, the Chinese were seen with much suspicion at the Ministry of Foreign Relations level during the NLD years, while most Tatmadaw Generals admire China’s economic power. Beijing’s immutable diplomatic law amounts to non-interference in the domestic policies of its partners – so it has refrained from weighing in on whether the military coup earlier this year was actually not really a coup, as the Tadmadaw argues.
Facts on the ground spell out the Tatdadaw making a lot of money over the years by collecting fees and owning shares in Chinese deals struck in the ethnic regions. At the same time the Tatmadaw know that the Chinese, even indirectly, provide military support to quite a few militias. And drug kingpins are only able to operate smoothly across the Golden Triangle because the Chinese allow it.
So, the relationship is undoubtedly an uneasy one. A great deal of Chinese influence in Myanmar was somewhat restricted during the NLD government. Now the whole situation is in limbo. Yet Beijing never takes its eyes off the Big Prize: BRI corridor projects should never be in danger, and Myanmar will always be an inextricable part of the New Silk Roads.
With the progress being made on BRI’s Kunming-Vientiane rail project, which parallels the nearby Myanmar north-south projects, the grid is shaping up nicely. The logistical planning by China is a work of art.
As always, thanks to Pepe for reporting on BRI from the beginning, and updating as it progresses..
Stark reality. Drugs, Golden Triangle, Triads and the New Silk Road/Maritime Silk Road/BRI.
What is unspoken is this was CIA/OSS turf for many decades. The drug traffic goes back a century or more shared in serial by the empires that controlled the turf os SE Asia (UK, France, the US).
With China and the PLA now roaming the region, the US is blocked from regaining access and control of the drug traffic. Perhaps, this, as much as Freedom of Navigation, is reason for the Pivot to Asia and assigning China #1 position as Threat to the US hegemony.
Certainly, it isn’t democracy that motivates the Empire. Military weapon sales and drugs are the stables for the US trade interests, as well as deprivation of the region’s oil and gas reserves which abide in the contested South China Sea.
unofrtunately for historical reasons and personality egoist motivation/profit, Myanmar is a crack-pot-case. even when one take serious effort and lenghty patience to untangle one string from the century tangle mess, some one will always tie another thousand node, of which, there is but one solution – burn them all. fortunately, RCEP is coming up, that will change everyone, as the tide floats all boats, even if one that has too many holes and not exactly a boast, but pieces of woods left.
bwbs
Thanks for a detailed summary of the make up of Myanmar allows for proper discussion!
Those US+Aust 2010-2011 “war games” to “choke China” in the Malacca Straits don’t look so clever now, do they?
Some of Khun Sa’s ‘product’ was smuggled into San Francisco via the ‘Flying Tigers’. Their duffle bags had diplomatic immunity. From there it went to the Fairmont Hotel, one of the priciest in the city, to be divvied up to the local dealers and out to the streets. China White. Thai 4 it was called. Excellent stuff. Far superior to the W. era Afghani white, cut with meth.
Thanks for bringing us up to speed on BRI and Myanmar, Pepe.
Looks like Myanmar — providing it doesn’t get into a debt trap/s — is going to enjoy a bonanza in ports. The PRC one as you mention, plus the Indian project in Sittwe, a mere 100 km to the north of PRC’s Kyaukpyu port, both in Rakhine state, as well as the Japanese-backed ports project in the Yangon region. The Indian project is now mired in problems, security, financial, bankruptcy, etc — not surprising when we consider India’s lack of experience in undertaking big international development projects coupled with the Modi government’s mega aspirations but short attention span.
Myanmar is being actively wooed by East and West — which may or may not be a good thing. Something akin to a deer walking between two elephants. One wrong turn and it might get trampled.
The Chinese bailed out the Sinhalese in the 25-year civil way with the Tamils.
The pay back was the deep water port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka.
India is a overly too complex 2nd best option.
errata — “25-year civil war”
@Anonymous
As a Sri Lankan, I tell you that what you say is a blatant lie. China gave a loan to the SL govt. only with the aim of using the port as a logistics hub. The first phase of the port had been completed by 2013. While the project was underway, the liberal opposition spread the narrative that the port had no real use and that it was not a suitable location for a port. It was ridiculous because if you look at a map, Hambantota is located right at the center of the maritime route between the East and the West.
However, there was a dramatic shift with the collapse of the nationalist govt. in 2015 through a US/India-supported color revolution. The liberal opposition who grabbed power in 2015 further promoted their narrative about the port and ultimately they leased it to China for 99 years citing difficulties to pay back the loans. However, Sri Lanka Ports Authority had been paying back the loan without any difficulty and they still do, while there are 20 more years left to completely pay back the loan.
The reason put forward by the liberal govt. was that it was unable to pay back the loan but it was just hoodwinking the public. What they really wanted was to deprive the nation of that strategic asset that could’ve pumped a huge revenue into the country. But due to their treason, SL not only lost a strategic port but also got in the middle of a power struggle between China and the US. The US and India are seeking access to the Trincomalee port on the eastern coast because China owns a port in a strategic location in the Indian Ocean.
Well, calling people liars is a classic aggressive defence tactic.
As a non-Sri Lankan who has visited the country, known several SL people (domicile locals and expats) over decades and read reasonably well of the topic — including the excellent book “Elephant Complex: Travels in Sri Lanka” by John Gimlette (2016) — I take a very strong precautionary position in regard to any aspect of that country (including its people) so mired in its own ex-colonial follies.
It is a generally known fact in well researched circles that the systemic balance that the 25-year civil war had stalled into was tipped in favor of the Sinhalese gangs by shipments of military equipment and funding – at least $37.6 million in Chinese artillery and ordnance mentioned by Gimlette. This led to an eventual routing of the northern Tamils and a blood-bath or three. And the “pay back” was not hard to see.
Here, without too much effort, are a few spot quotes from John Gimlette’s (2016) “Elephant Complex: Travels in Sri Lanka” Quercus Publishing Ltd.
(quote)
‘A lie well told,’ as the old Sinhalese adage goes, ‘is worth a thousand facts.’
The final stages and aftermath of the war in Sri Lanka were characterised by a wide range of violations by both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, some even amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity . . . UN report, March 2011
Part of the problem was mines, but it was also the way the army fought. Its special forces were nimble enough, but its great body of regulars would only move forward under a gale of missiles. In the previous year, the government had invested $37.6 million in Chinese artillery and ordnance, and now it laid down a storm. Everything fled before it: farmers, nuns, fishermen and elephants. Nothing was spared, and – like a carpet – the jungle would be rolled up, with everyone inside. Already, by the time the army reached Mulankavil, twenty thousand Vanniyas had been displaced, most of them running north, ahead of the barrage.
Nothing about this harbour was natural. Hambantota’s lagoon had been barely deeper than a garden pond, and yet the new bulk carriers would draw water up to five storeys deep. The Chinese were now digging a hole big enough for thirty such ships, together with a credible chunk of the People’s navy. They’d pay a high price for their toehold – $1 billion a year in soft loans, weaponry and holes – but it was something they’d wanted for centuries. Now here they were, at the heart of the Indian Ocean, straddling the traffic. More puzzling was what Sri Lanka got from its Chinese city.
The Rajapaksas were finally ousted in January 2015. When the president saw the way the votes were going, he asked the army to stage a coup. To everyone’s surprise, the generals refused. Much to Sunethra Bandaranaike’s regret, her sister has remained in politics. Former president Chandrika Kumaratunga was instrumental in the defeat of the Rajapaksas, putting together a coalition of defectors, ex-ministers, Tamils and Muslims. The outgoing minister of defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, now stands publicly accused of the murder of Lasantha Wickrematunga, editor of the Sunday Leader. He and his brother, Basil, have also been remanded on allegations of corruption.
Without the Rajapaksas, Hambantota’s airport finally emptied of planes. Although built at a cost of $210 million, its monthly revenue was down to $125, or slightly less than that of a corner shop.
(end quotes)
I think John Gimlette has pointed to the problem.
But then one could add the views of the (now ex) SL auditor general in 2018: Newsfirst Sri Lanka. 2018 (August, 17). “Sri Lanka’s Public Sector is the Most Corrupt in the World – Auditor General.” http://www.newsfirst.lk (Video) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=An11BkbBKBE
Or, of course, one can just internet search and read all about it in the New York Times (2018):
“Mr. Rajapaksa and his family consolidated their hold. At the height of Mr. Rajapaksa’s tenure, the president and his three brothers controlled many government ministries and around 80 percent of total government spending.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html
My comment stands. Generally a confused socialist culture of subaltern sentiments in a sea of capitalism well described in ancient Indian myths as untrustworthy and still dancing around old stautes of Queen Victoria while dreaming of being the next Singapore. Complex does not even start to describe the mess. And China is moving in — as the Indians and the USA well understand. It will be interesting what the next round of hybid breeding turns out — the small Eurasian Burgher ethnic group are concerned their niche will have Mandarin speaking competition.
Sad really. I wouldn’t go back. Too muchy in the 21st century to see before I leave the planet.
China is the only foreign country that could provide tangible benefits to the Myanmar economy. India tried to woo Myanmar just for modi’s imperialist intentions. They can’t really make investments of the calibre of the BRI.
A really superb analysis.
Some minor points; the Kokang Chinese are really a Burmese ethnic minority, having been separated from China for centuries (although their distinctive culture is now sadly doomed).
A combination of Kachins, Kokang and Arakanese really has zero chance of prevailing against the Tatmadaw (about as much chance as China has of damming the Salween) and I don’t believe China can ever ‘manage the Tatmadaw’.
Imperial Britain at the height of its global power nearly collapsed after taking on the ill equipped but impossibly determined Bamar royal army. No outsider can control Myanmar, any more than an outsider can control Afghanistan.
In my view, the coup was orchestrated to give the Tatmadaw space to attack the US/Saudi sponsored Rohingya (almost all of whom are Bangladeshi economic migrants). Aung San Suu Kyi tried her best in an impossible situation. Unfortunately, while engaged in careful diplomacy with the West (who of course assasinated her father), Bangladeshi terrorists continued to provoke the Tatmadaw, which of course has only one outcome in Myanmar.
and how does the CIA fit into the drug armies of Myanmar. ?
This article wheezes through Heroin, Triads, Militias, Drug Kingpins, Dams, Rohinaga, and BRI. All very grim and complex with no variables or equation emerging that I can fathom.