By Aram Mirzaei
Described by the Western media as a “shadowy organization” involved in “clandestine activity” across the Middle East, not much is truly known about the “Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps” (IRGC) in the West as Western governments and media outlets are having an increasingly difficult time figuring out the IRGC and the role it plays in both the domestic and foreign relations of Iran. You can’t understand Iran and its politics without understanding the IRGC, why it was formed and what role it plays in Iranian politics.
Guardians of the revolution- The Pasdaran and other armed revolutionary organizations
Formed on May 5 1979 following the Islamic Revolution, the Sepah Pasdaran-e Enghelabe Eslami (Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, in Iran more commonly referred to simply as ‘Pasdaran’, meaning Guardians) was created to unite the different paramilitary forces that were present in the post-revolutionary Iran, to form a single force, loyal to the revolutionary government and to function as a counter balance to the influence and power of the regular military (Artesh) which was seen as untrustworthy because of its traditional loyalty to the Shah.
When the Pasdaran was created by decree from Ayatollah Khomeini in May 1979, its original members consisted of some 6,000 militia men who had fought the Pahlavi regime even before 1978, many of which had received guerrilla training with Palestinian and Lebanese groups, most notably the Shia Amal militia in Lebanon.
Many of the forces that had helped topple the Shah’s Pahlavi regime, like the Fedayeen-e Khalq and Mujahedin-e Khalq, had formed their own organized militias in the struggle, and many more armed groups were created more or less spontaneously during the chaos of the Revolution, as the raiding of armouries and army barracks made weapons widely available to opposition groups. The existence of many independent armed groupings certainly represented a potential threat to any one political faction trying to impose its authority over the post-revolutionary Iranian state. Although eventually growing to become the most important of the paramilitary organizations, the Pasdaran did face its fair share of competitors in enforcing revolutionary ideals. A particular challenge to the Pasdaran’s authority was posed by the plethora of komitehs (committees), makeshift, freelance bands of local Islamists that took control and allocated to themselves the powers of justice and administration over assorted neighbourhoods throughout the major cities of the Islamic Republic as the Pahlavi regime’s authority began to collapse. The triumph of the Pasdaran over these other organizations and centres of power was never preordained, but ultimately derived from the Pasdaran’s superior effectiveness as a guard for the emerging revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Pasdaran was from its inception an ideologically driven force that recruited heavily from the faithful supporters of the revolution’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Drawing lessons from the US and UK backed 1953 coup d’etat which saw the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in favour of the young Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the revolution needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous Pahlavi regime’s units. Being one of the first revolutionary institutions, the Pasdaran legitimized the revolution and gave the government an armed basis of support to defend itself. Despite this move to counter the regular army of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini decided not to disband the army altogether since he realized the dangers of doing this, as thousands of servicemen becoming unemployed would turn into potential enemies of the revolutionary government. Rather Khomeini replaced the Army’s commanders and wanted the Army and the Pasdaran to not view each other as rivals, but rather as two branches of the armed forces working towards a common goal.
The Basij – The people’s militia
On November 25 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the creation of a youth militia which according to him should be a 20-million-man strong force. Article 151 of the constitution obliges the government to “provide a program of military training, with all requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Formed through a merger of the komitehs (committees) and other various youth movements, the Sazman- Basij-e Mostazafin (The organization for mobilization of the oppressed), commonly known as simply Basij (the organized) was created in April 1980.
The Basij was to serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security, law enforcement, organizing religious activities and ceremonies, and to help the revolutionary government in fighting against Baluchi, Kurdish and Turkmen separatists in the remote regions of Iran. While the Pasdaran was mainly open for men older than the age of 18, the Basij was intended to be for the youth, however people of all walks of life were eligible to join this organization. The Basij came to open local offices in almost every corner of Iranian cities, with every neighbourhood in every Iranian city having a local Basij office to both recruit people and to defend the Islamic Revolution during its first unstable years.
In time, the Basij, along with the Pasdaran were to become an integral part of the revolutionary government’s ability to resist its enemies, both internal and external ones.
The Nojeh coup plot of 1980
In 1980, the Basij helped to prevent a coup planned to overthrow the newly established revolutionary government when several officers and servicemen from the Iranian Army and former secret service loyal to the Shah were arrested at the Nojeh Air Base near Hamedan in western Iran. The plan was organized by Colonel Mohammad Baqer Bani Amiri, with the help of Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister of the Pahlavi regime who provided financial support. The plan was also said to have been supported by Iran’s future arch-enemy, Saddam Hussein who had developed a deep animosity towards the revolutionary government. According to then-Iranian President Abolhassan Banisadr, the government discovered eight major cells, and exposed the plotters’ plan, leading to the arrests: “their plan was to give the appearance of a coup d’etat to restore the Shah, while the real aim was to provide a pretext to cover the Iraqi invasion. According to the information we received, the conspirators had set up a military camp in [the Iraqi city of] Solimanieh and planned to ignite a Kurdish revolt and organize demonstrations throughout Iran. Their strategy was simple: internal disorders would first disperse Iranian military forces, so that on the very first day of the Iraqi attack Saddam could occupy the whole Western part of the country.” According to the Basij themselves, a Basij member was planted inside the conspirators’ group and kept the revolutionary government informed of the activities of the counterrevolutionaries. This enabled them to swiftly act and prevent the coup attempt.
The Iran-Iraq War
As a result of the revolutionary government’s attempt to neutralize the potential threat of the Army acting as a counter-revolutionary force, the Army went down from 285,000 to around 150,000 troops at the outbreak the Iran-Iraq war. Perhaps even more damaging for the Iranian Army’s ability to conduct military operations was the forced removal of some 12,000 skilled and trained officers, constituting between 30 and 50 percent of the Iranian officer corps from the rank of major to colonel. Despite these difficulties on the Iranian side however, Saddam Hussein’s gamble that the time was ripe to strike a blow to his neighbouring country was proven to be a major miscalculation. For the revolutionary government, the war was treated as the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the resilience and vitality of the Iranian Revolution to the world. The Iranian people quickly mobilized and rallied to the defence of their country with great patriotic zeal, the Pasdaran developed to take on the size and shape of a full-fledged conventional army to counter the Iraqi threat posed against the gains of the Islamic Revolution.
The Pasdaran’s role was largely focused on internal threats to the Islamic Republic, as opposed to the strictly external focus of the regular Army, however this was to quickly change with the Iraqi invasion as the revolutionary government advocated the rise and expansion of the Pasdaran to conduct large-scale military combat operations, unwilling to leave the fate of the Islamic Republic in the hands of the still strongly distrusted remnants of the professional and modernized Army of the Shah
The war which came to be known in Iran as the Holy Defence thus became a defining moment for the Pasdaran, greatly expanding its responsibilities and importance within the emerging revolutionary Iranian state-structure. Relations between the Pasdaran and the regular Army throughout the war remained strained by mutual suspicions, historical grievances and resentments, political differences and uncertainty. A particularly recurring point of contention between the two organizations concerned the reliance on different military tactics,with the professional military insisting on well-planned and well-organized operations, while the ideologically driven Pasdaran argued that religious and nationalistic zeal, determination and superiority in manpower were enough. Pasdaran commander Mohsen Rezaei once asserted that:
“Unlike the army […] the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps is in charge of safeguarding the revolution and its gains […]. we in the Revolutionary Guards give primary importance to the ideological and political dimensions more than the military ones.”
The Pasdaran came to see itself as embodying the spirit of the Islamic Revolution, where the will and dedication of the Iranian people had won out over the professional, modernized and “culturally contaminated” security organizations of the Shah’s Pahlavi regime, and sought to wage the war against Iraq along the same lines. This in practice meant a heavy reliance on lightly armed and manpower-intensive infantry attacks, with the ultimate goal of attaining Martyrdom, while the regular Army stressed the importance of conventional tactics incorporating modern, mechanized means of warfare. This constant rivalry severely complicated the ability of the Pasdaran and the Army to perform joint combat operations, and with the Revolutionary government tightening its grip over Iranian society, the favoured Pasdaran increasingly got the last say in the planning and execution of the Iranian war effort.
The already close relationship between the Pasdaran and the Clerical establishment (Ulema) became even more apparent during the course of the Iran-Iraq War with several members of the Ulema joining the Pasdaran on the frontlines as part of a morale boost campaign, among them a young Ayatollah Khamenei dressed in a Pasdaran uniform.
The Pasdaran enjoyed numerous privileges over the Army during the war, including superior pay and benefits and first call upon available arms and spare parts. With the Iranian population rushing to the defence of their country, the Pasdaran, soon developed from a revolutionary militia into an organized armed force outnumbering and rivalling the structure of the regular Iranian Army by absorbing and organising the thousands of highly motivated volunteers that flocked to the warfront. The extensive numerical increase in Pasdaran forces alone testify to their rise in power and influence during the war, doubling from some 20,000 – 30,000 in 1980 to around 50,000 during the first year of warfare, this number further increasing nine-fold by 1987, with the total forces of the Pasdaran consisting of close to 450,000 men as the war entered its final year.
The Pasdaran’s manpower was mobilized through local-level branches of the Pasdaran offices that were established throughout Iran in parallel with the development of the Pasdaran’s national command structure. Many of the lower-level branches grew out of the komitehs or other groups that had seized power in their respective areas in the course of the Revolution, and above the local level the Pasdaran was organized into ten administrative regions, largely corresponding to the then-Iranian provinces. On top of these were the Supreme Council of the Sepah Pasdaran and the Pasdaran Commander.
Of the Pasdaran’s original members many belonged to the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution (MIR), a group loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini that was established in the course of the Revolution. Many MIR-members had left the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) because of the MEK’s emphasis on what they perceived to be Marxist over Islamic ideology (the latter became an archenemy of the Islamic Republic in later years), the MIR strongly supported the Islamic character of the revolution. MIR members formed the leadership and the core of the Pasdaran, and this first group generally tended to be better educated and more politically sophisticated than the zealous volunteers that later flocked to the Pasdaran.
Although relying heavily on ideologically zealous manpower in massive infantry attacks at first, the Pasdaran came to incorporate more sophisticated armed services during the course of the Iran-Iraq War. The Pasdaran soon developed its own armoured and artillery units to reduce its reliance on the regular Army within these fields, and from September 1986 the Pasdaran also started with advanced artillery training. The Pasdaran further rivalled the structure of the Army by creating its own Air Force and Naval Forces, thus expanding into many areas that had previously been the sole domain of the Iranian Army inherited from the Shah’s days. The creation of the Sepah Pasdaran Air Force did however not play a significant role in the war due to the international arms embargo preventing Iran from importing new weapons or spare parts for the aircrafts left behind by the former Shah’s Air Force.
The Sepah Pasdaran Air Force (later Aerospace forces) did however develop several missile units for air defence against Iraqi aircraft, and managed to fire several surface-to-surface SCUD missiles against military and civilian installations in Iraq. Despite its moderate participation in the war effort, the establishment of the Pasdaran Air Force nevertheless served as a symbol of the Pasdaran’s increased responsibilities and influence. The Sepah Pasdaran Navy however saw more direct action in the Iran-Iraq War. Unofficially in existence since 1982, it participated in the successful 1986 Faw offensive, and was formally inaugurated in 1987 to retaliate against Iraqi attacks on Iranian ships. In the last year of the war, from 1987-88, the Pasdaran Navy was given resources and publicity for its challenge to the US naval build-up in the Gulf, employing hit-and-run tactics from small naval crafts armed with RPG-7’s and missile units armed with Chinese Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles to harass US ships and reflagged tankers.
Basij during the war
Another important component of the Pasdaran’s military forces was provided by the Basij-e Mostazafan. The Basij was as previously explained a mass mobilising popular volunteer militia, created following the call from Ayatollah Khomeini to establish a “20 million-man army” to defend the Islamic Republic from both internal and external enemies following the Iraqi invasion. Although the Basij as an organization was officially separate from the Pasdaran during the war and had its own commander, in practice it has always been part of the Pasdaran. The Basij was formally placed under Pasdaran control on January 1 1981, and the Pasdaran recruited, organized, trained and commanded all Basij units during the war, although it was not until 2009 that the control structure of the Basij was officially merged with that of the Pasdaran. The Basij served as a reserve pool of manpower for the Pasdaran, and military training for basijis generally consisted of a two week instruction program in the use of grenades and automatic rifles, heavily imbued with religious and ideological indoctrination with a focus on martyrdom and the promise of heaven for those killed in the war. The Basij was originally a volunteer and not a fixed force, whose members usually served a brief three month tour before returning to their homes, jobs or studies, and seasonal fluctuations made it hard to contemplate the exact capabilities of the basijis. The Basij nevertheless played an integral part in the Iranian war effort, and although the number of readily available basijis probably seldom exceeded 100,000 at any one time, by 1987 some 3 million Iranians had received Basij training, adding substantially to the potential power of the Pasdaran in a scenario of all-out mobilization. The creation of the Basij was thus another development strongly contributing to the rise of the Pasdaran in the course of the Iran-Iraq war.
According to an Iranian source personally close to me and speaking on the condition of anonymity, the creation of the Basij played an instrumental role in mobilizing the Iranian people to defend Iran from the Iraqi invasion. Every local Basij office was flocked with boys as young as 12 years old who wanted to join what became known as the Holy Defence in Iran. Mothers were proud of sending their sons to the front and according to the same Iranian source, young boys used to run away from home to join the Basij, often leaving behind them letters where they would apologize to their parents for running away but that they were proud to defend their homeland. These boys would often assume non-combat roles on the frontlines, such as cleaning weapons for the Pasdaran, cooking food for the soldiers at the front, helping to spread propaganda across restive regions such as Kurdistan and participating in mine-clearing operations. On some occasions however, these boys did partake in Iran’s infamous human-wave attacks which resulted in devastating losses for the Iranian side.
Sepah Pasdaran after the war – building upon a legacy
Much like Ayatollah Khomeini, the Pasdaran opposed the ending of the conflict with Saddam Hussein, and continued to dedicate itself to the slogan of “war until victory”, referring to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and the export of the Islamic Revolution to the Shia majority Iraq. By 1988 however, there was a broad political consensus forming in the country around the need to end the war due to Iraqi counterattacks, American assaults in the Gulf and the exhaustion caused by the so called “war of the cities” phase of the war. Political leaders like Khamenei started to emphasise that Iran’s endurance, sacrifices and national solidarity throughout the long war had proven that Iran had already fulfilled its divine mission irrespective of obtaining a final victory, thus the need for further hostilities was no longer needed.
In their book Iran and Iraq at War by Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, they assess that “If Iraq succeeds in holding out for a return to the status quo ante bellum, it will have withstood a siege from a country three times its size. Iran, by contrast, can take little glory from a peace that takes it back to the pre-war settlement.”
This assessment fails to take into account several crucial facts. Firstly, with Iraq being the aggressor in this conflict and their return to the status quo ante bellum represented a triumph for Iran and the Sepah Pasdaran as they managed to deny Saddam Hussein his ambitions, thus costing him a lot of prestige and financial damage that the eight year long war had caused Iraq. Secondly, Iraq might have fought a country three times its size, but Iran had withstood the attack of a country that enjoyed massive superiority in terms of advanced weaponry, financial aid and international support while itself being under a heavy arms embargo. To shed some light on the “balance” in heavy military equipment, in 1987 estimates put Iraq’s capacities in battle tanks and combat aircrafts at 4,800 and 400-500 respectively, while the corresponding numbers for Iran at the time were approximated at 900-1,250 and 80-105. Against these odds, the Iranian achievement of obtaining a peace based on the pre-war settlement must be seen as a victory for Iran and the Sepah Pasdaran. Although not being able to claim a military victory from the conflict, the Pasdaran could none the less derive a huge amount of prestige from having managed to put up a formidable fight in what Pasdaran Commander Mohsen Rezaei characterized as “the war against the whole world”.
During the war, the Pasdaran grew to become a national actor, defending not just politically likeminded people but also the whole country against the Iraqi invaders. Iranians that were initially not positively inclined towards the Pasdaran or their ideology came to find themselves fighting for the same basic values of Iranian independence in the face of external danger and had to acknowledge the Pasdaran’s crucial role in defending the Iranian nation. By the end of the war, the Pasdaran had become a symbol of national resistance and represented the Iranian people to a much larger degree than before the war, thus adding to its legitimacy as one of the Iranian state’s most powerful institution.
From its early beginnings, the Sepah Pasdaran were involved in the struggle to control the outcome of the Islamic revolution, after the war, the Pasdaran however became to wield substantial political influence on its own merits. Pasdaran minister Mohsen Rafiqdoost justified the politicization of the Pasdaran, arguing that the Pasdaran was meant to defend the revolution also from within. Unlike the Army, the Pasdaran’s mission was to defend the purity of the revolution; this meant that it was not only a military task but also a political one. There has been a debate as to whether the Pasdaran should engage in politics or not, what however is clear is that their institutional strength has given them the political influence to have a say in Iran’s internal affairs.
With the huge expansion of the Pasdarans’s organization in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, the Pasdaran greatly increased its importance and power, making it able to determine and influence the appointment of officials in many other institutions, including the civilian leadership and even the regular Iranian Army. This was seen in the Pasdaran’s successful pressure to reinsert and promote Ali Seyyed Shirazi as commander of the Army’s ground forces in March 1981, and later the promotion of Ali Shamkhani, one of the Pasdaran’s most prominent figures after Rezaei, to become commander of the Navy in October 1989.
Many former and current Pasdaran members also rose to prominent positions within the post-revolutionary Iranian government. Early examples include Hasan Abedi-Jafari, a former member of the Pasdaran Supreme Council who served as Minister of Commerce until 1988, and Ali Mohammad Besharati, an anti-Shah guerrilla member, former director of the Pasdaran’s Intelligence Unit, and former member of the Pasdaran Supreme Council, who became Deputy Foreign Minister in 1984.
It should however be said that the Pasdaran personnel did not necessarily remain a united and coherent group when they entered into politics, as factional disputes did indeed exist within the Pasdaran itself, with some former members distancing themselves from earlier hardliner policies. One such example is the current Iranian Defence Minister Hossein Dehqan, who himself is a Pasdaran member yet part of the Reformist cabinet of President Hassan Rouhani.
Shortly after the war, at the time of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, Pasdaran members, and associates held 5 out of 25 Cabinet positions in the Iranian government, setting a strong precursor for the Pasdaran’s later substantial involvements in civilian politics, not least experienced with the former Pasdaran member Mahmoud Ahmedinejad ascending to the presidency in 2005 through the Principlist Abadgaran alliance platform, widely believed to be a political front for the Pasdaran. The Pasdaran also got involved in other civilian spheres by establishing schools, research facilities and engaging in the procurement and distribution of goods. This has turned the Pasdaran into an independent business empire in addition to its role as the principal guarantor for the Islamic Republics survival.
Two organizations closely affiliated with the Pasdaran were the Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan, the “Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled”, and the Bonyad-e Shahidan, the “Martyr’s Foundation”. The Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan received the fortunes left by the former Shah’s Pahlavi Foundation and other properties confiscated in the course of the Revolution, including hundreds of companies, factories, housing units, agricultural lands and substantial holdings in the West. These massive assets were then used to reward the loyal supporters of the Islamic Republic and the Pasdaran. When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, the Bonyad-e Shahidan was created and given large funds dedicated to the war effort, especially to take care of the families of martyrs and wounded personnel from the Pasdaran and the Basij. Basically it served as a guarantee for those who lost family members in the war, that their beloved one’s efforts did not go in vain. The families of martyrs received a grant of 2 million rials (roughly $ 30,000 at the time), while those crippled and long-service volunteers were given priority in acquiring scarce goods, job, housing and medical care.
The close relationship between the Pasdaran and the above mentioned foundations were cemented by the large degree to which Pasdaran members rotated in and out of or served simultaneously in these organizations, with one example being Pasdaran Minister Mohsen Rafiqdoost becoming head of the Bonyad-e Mostazafan after the war’s end in 1988.
(For more information on Iran’s domestic political landscape, please read my previous article on Iranian politics)
Qods Force – Sepah Pasdaran’s foreign wing
The Pasdaran also developed a foreign wing called the Qods Forces (Sepah-e Qods) dedicated to spreading the ideology of the revolution outside the country and to the wider Middle East region. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Sepah-e Qods provided support to the Kurds in Iraq that were fighting Saddam Hussein but it was also active in other parts of the world. Furthermore, the Sepah-e Qods also oversaw the formation and arming of the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shia Iraqi political party and a staunch opponent of the Baathist regime in Iraq. The Badr Organization consisted of several thousand Iraqi exiles, refugees and defectors who fought alongside Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq war. The Badr Organization and other Shia paramilitary organizations in Iraq are still very much aligned with the Islamic Republic and the Sepah Pasdaran whom they view as a role model for their future.
Since 1979 the Revolutionary government had supported the Shia Hezbe Wahdat in Afghanistan against the Afghan government of Mohammad Najibullah and the Soviet forces backing his regime. The Sepah-e Qods were sent to train and arm the Hezbe Wahdat militia in an effort to counter both the Saudi backed Wahhabi Afghan militia groups and the Soviet backed government.
Connections with foreign organizations and militias with the aim of exporting the Islamic Revolution, was to become a hallmark of the Sepah-e Qods who were also instrumental in creating the Lebanese Resistance movement Hezbollah in the midst of Lebanon’s civil war. This cooperation is still ongoing and Hezbollah heavily relies on the Pasdaran for weapons and ideological influences. Heading this special unit of Pasdaran members is the famous General Qassem Soleimani.
Sepah-e Qods in Syria
On September 16 2012, Sepah Pasdaran commander Mohammad Ali-Aziz Jafari announced that the Sepah-e Qods were present in Syria, however he added that “this does not mean that Iran has a military presence” and that the aid was limited. According to Iranian sources and security experts, the presence of Sepah-e Qods personnel in Syria rose to several hundred military specialists including several senior commanders with the primary task to gather intelligence and manage the logistics of battle for the Syrian Arab Army forces. Since the Russian intervention in Syria starting from September 30 2015, the presence of Sepah-e Qods personnel has also been boosted with General Qassem Soleimani having been seen on several occasions near the Aleppo frontlines, taking charge of several offensives in the area, most notably the 2015 South Aleppo offensive which saw joint Sepah-e Qods forces, Hezbollah and Iraqi paramilitaries capturing swathes of territory in the southern Aleppo countryside from the US-backed Jihadist militants of Jaysh Al-Fateh. During this time, several Sepah-e Qods commanders and officers have been martyred, most notably the famous General Hossein Hamedani who was killed on October 7 2015.
Furthermore, it was reported on Sputnik News that in November 2015, the Sepah-e Qods conducted a successful rescue mission of the Russian pilot who was shot down by Turkey over the Latakia province. The commander of the Sepah-e Qods Major General Qassem Soleimani got reportedly in touch with his Russian counterparts and said that a special unit had been formed and was ready for the rescue operation. He also explained that the squad was made up of men from the Lebanese Hezbollah and soldiers from the Syrian Special Forces, who had undergone special training under the guidance of Iranian instructors. Apart from this fact, the Syrian soldiers were familiar with the terrain.
General Soleimani assumed command of the ground operation and Russian aircraft had to carry out air cover and enable satellite surveillance. Once the location of the Russian pilot was determined via satellite through the built-in GPS device, it became clear that the pilot was located six kilometers behind the front line between the Syrian army forces and the opposition forces. The Special squad that entered the territory controlled by militants was not only able to save the Russian pilot, but also destroy all of the remaining terrorists there who had the most modern weapons in their possession. All of the 24 fighters not only survived, but also returned to their base without injuries. [1]
Another important mission of the Sepah-e Qods was to establish, train and arm various militias commonly known in Iran as the “Modafean-e Haram” (Defenders of the Holy Shrines). These groups include the Afghan dominated Liwaa Fatemiyyoun and the Pakistani dominated Liwaa Zeynabiyyon that fight alongside government troops battling the Jihadist militants. The Sepah-e Qods mainly recruit these personnel from the Shia Afghan and Pakistani populations that have vowed to defend the holy shrines of Shia Islam from attacks by the Takfiri militants of ISIL and Jabhat Al-Nusra who on several occasions have threatened to destroy these shrines.
Born as a small militia in the midst of the revolutionary chaos of Iran in 1979, the Sepah Pasdaran has come to grow into the spine of the current political structure and a major player in the Iranian economy while achieving the status of self-sufficiency in the military field. With its rise to become a national power during the Iran-Iraq war, the Syrian war may very well prove to turn the Sepah Pasdaran into one of the most powerful regional forces to be reckoned with.
Fascinating history, thanks for sharing.
Agreed totally.
My relationship with Iran is complicated, and a good example of a post-modern position where I have to balance a range of competing truths. Firstly, I oppose Theocracy in all its forms, it is probably one of the worst and most dangerous of all political systems (as there is only a tenuous link to rationality). At the same time, I could understand this reaction to living under a US puppet installed after a brutal coup. The same as I can understand why Socialist countries last century moved towards totalitarianism; we have seen since the effect of Colour Revolutions on regimes unpopular with the US, and this has been going on since the War. What sealed the deal was Iran’s open opposition to Israel; once I became aware of the Little Satan the enemy of my enemy became my friend. How I balance these competing truths is I have asked myself; what is the greatest evil, the one that begets all others? The US Empire is my answer. So Iran, as one of the few brave enough to oppose the Evil Empire, moves on balance into my good column.
I am watching closely how they are setting up these armed popular movements. I have spoken elsewhere about how devolving power down to the lowest practical level (grassroots democracy) is the best foil to centralised power. This model as demonstrated by Hezbollah or the YPG (where the organisation is both popular militia and a provider of social services) is the future in our defence against the ruling class. And unlike the utopian dreams of my Leftward comrades, this is working on the ground right now. This model beat Israel in 2006, and is rolling back the best the US can do in Syria.
This model is being carried out by the IRGC in a number of countries around the ME; look at what Yemen has been able to achieve! This as you know is why the Saudis are so anti-Iranian; Iran is exposing the sham of the House of Saud’s guardianship over Islam’s sacred sites. Ever since the Islamic Revolution the Gulf Monarchies have been dead-man-walking. My Sunni sisters and brothers are going to hate me for saying this, but Iran is a much more deserving guardian of Islam than the corrupt, decrepit Saudis who are right now commercialising Mecca and turning into a theme park.
Once the US retreats from the ME and Iran comes to dominate, my opinion will shift. Once Israel retreats to the pre-67 borders I will change sides. Until then, Iran has proven its honour in my eyes and I will continue to support it.
Dear Earthrise
Thank you for your comment. I agree with what you say about the Iranian reaction to living under a US backed puppet. However it is also important to acknowledge the role that the Clerical establishment has played in Iranian politics.
Looking at the historical truth of the situation that Iran has been in for the past two centuries, it is easy to understand why Iran moved towards a theocracy. The rise of the clerical establishment occurred long before the Islamic revolution of 1979; during a time when the previous royal government of the Qajar dynasty was in a state of decline and the British colonialists were encroaching upon Iranian sovereignty, the Clerical establishment was the only force to defend Iranian sovereignty and was seen as a guarantor of Iran’s continued independence.
The clerical establishment who had already proven themselves to be an effective force in fighting colonialism in the 19th century, were also the ones who led the fight against what Iranians percieved to be “cultural colonialism”.
The Pahlavi regime’s excessive emphasis on Western culture and lawmaking angered a lot of Iranians who were living in a completely different world than the royal court did. For example, 68% of the Iranian population were illiterate during the 1970’s and a vast majority of the people did not have any access to the lavish western lifestyle promoted by the Pahlavi regime. This of course pushed the people into the arms of the clerical establishment who was seen as an authority close to the people with their simple lifestyles and simple slogans.
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the Shia theology is very much centered around the idea of martyrdom and struggle against oppression as the tale of Imam Hussein and his struggle against Yazid literally shapes the population’s mind. The theocratic government heavily draws it’s legitimacy from this exact tale; as long as there exists a Yazid (Oppressor, in this case the US and Israel) the Islamic Republic will find legitimacy for its continued existance.
The Islamic Republic thus is a result of almost 200 years of British/US aggression to colonize, partition and subdue a very proud people with a very long legacy in the region and beyond.
As-salāmu alaykum Aram,
Thank you for you wisdom. I suspected that the Mullahs didn’t just appear out of nowhere in 1979, but modern Iranian history is largely suppressed in the West. I will take your lead and look into it a lot deeper. The Theocracy in Iran seems more political than spiritual, and compared to the liver-eating, child-raping Takfiris the Sunnis have foisted on us, downright progressive. All I need to see are those beautiful Persian women with their headscarfes pulled back with a cheeky lock of hair poking out and I know everything I need to know about Iran.
Speaking for myself, I owe Iran a debt that cannot be repaid. Without their leadership in the Resistance Block, Zionism would have succeeded. All these ancient and beautiful cultures would have been smashed and erased, replaced with an evil that I would be responsible for. Iran is saving the West from itself. The war is not over, there are still tears to be shed. But the victory that seemed impossible is now visible in the distance. One of the reasons that Western troops are not patrolling your streets is too many of us reject the Empire and refuse to feed our babies into it’s war machine. It may not seem like it on a clear day, but we love you, are sorry for what we have done and one day we will help rebuild what we have broken. Or better still, leave you to it.
Safar khosh azizam
Dear Earthrise
Indeed the Iranian theocracy differs alot from the Takfiris and their interpretation of an “Islamic” state. The Iranian clergy is as you say very much political rather than spiritual and have been so for more than a century. In a previous article I wrote earlier this year I explain this connection between the clergy and Iranian politics (/the-iranian-political-system-the-2016-elections-consequences/)
Also, the Iranian theocracy is contrary to what is said in the West very tolerant of different religions. For example, many people do not know that Christians and Jews are allocated seats in the parliament, reserved for them alone and that these minority religious groups enjoy alot of religious freedom in the country. Furthermore, contrary to the Wahhabi interpretation, crimes such as rape and domestic violence are punishable by law, with rape actually resulting in execution for the perpetrator. Something that is completely in contrast to the Wahhabi interpretation as we have seen in the tragic cases of Syria and Iraq.
I hope that one day as you mentioned, the West can be saved from itself and that the people can take back what is rightfully theirs and stop this support for one of the most evil ideologies humanity has ever seen.
Aram, can you please tell more about Iran’s involvement in Bosnia during the 90’s?
Wonderful glimpse into a normally closed world for us westerners.
Thank you.
Dear Dragan
A very interesting question. I will try to answer you as thoroughly as I can.
During the Bosnian war, several foreign forces became involved on the Bosnian side. Aside from the Wahhabi “mujahideen*, Iran became one of the first Muslim countries to offer its support for the besieged Bosniaks, most notably in Srebrenica. It is believed that Iran supplied the Bosniaks with over 5000 ton of weapons during the course of the war. Furthermore the IRGC also supplied a few hundred fighters, with reports of Hezbollah fighters also present to defend the Muslim population during the various massacres committed by all sides during the war (my own opinion).
Interestingly, I read an article from 2013 that told of a man named Robert Baer, CIA agent stationed in Sarajevo during the war claimed that “In Sarajevo, the Bosnian Muslim government is a client of the Iranians . . . If it’s a choice between the CIA and the Iranians, they’ll take the Iranians any day.”
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/iran-balkans-history-and-forecast
By war’s end, public opinion polls showed some eighty-six percent of the Bosnian Muslim population expressed a positive attitude toward Iran.
It should also be noted that all IRGC and Hezbollah foreign advisors and fighters withdrew from Bosnia at the end of conflict. What should also be noted is that Iran’s presence in Bosnia was in my opinion more of a way to disrupt the CIA influence in the region rather than actually fighting a Christian-Muslim war. Iran has tended to form good relations with several Christian groupings and nations for decades now, even Serbia for that matter. Same can be said about Hezbollah who has a very good relation with Christians in both Lebanon and Syria.
As the aforementioned CIA agent also hinted at, Iran’s true mission was to lead the Bosniaks away from CIA influence and they seem to have succeeded in doing that, at least during those years.
I hope this answered your question somewhat fairly.
Iran’s involvement in Bosnia was motivated by cynical self-interest, under the guise of assisting a muslim populace in distress. Iran actively collaborated with the CIA in this endeavour & most certainly had nothing whatsoever to do with limiting US influence in the region, in fact, Iran’s actions actually helped in establishing & solidifying that influence. The Iranian regime however also believed it would improve its relations with the US by playing this dirty game. In fact, they were just utilised by the US & then neatly expelled after Dayton (1995) whilst Turkey & Saudi Arabia came in to fill the vacume. Now, those Iran assisted are their de facto mortal enemies, whilst the Serbs of Bosnia have no sympathy for Iran whatsoever & would gladly see that regime obliterated.
Iran was absolutely instrumental in arming the Bosnian muslim forces in the war (1992-95) with US/CIA oversight & logistical support by providing Tuzla airbase as a drop point for arms shipments as well as Wahabbite terrorists. Very clever. Iran assisted those who they are now their arch enemies in Syria in Iraq, considering that Bosnian muslims constitute one of the main foreign contingents within ISIS, as well as Jahbat al Nusra. This went through the old Iran-Contra network, elements within the Iranian military that continue to maintain contacts with the Pentagon & CIA, & actively work together on areas of mutual interest, such as the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Things are not always what they seem. Personally, as a Serb, the Iranian regime is an arch enemy.
There are some flaws in your arguments, the first one being that Iran never has had any connection to Wahhabi terrorists as wahhabi terrorists consider Shias to be apostates and enemies. Secondly, I would very much like to see some evidence to the claim that Iran “continues to remain in contact with the Pentagon and CIA” since this is a rather bold claim.
I imagine your animosity towards Iran is more based on personal motives rather than political and factual arguments it would seem as I have have a hard time imagining why you “as a Serb” would consider Iran the arch enemy when you clearly said that Bosniaks join Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS, two Saudi funded and inspired organizations who you also mentioned that Iran is fighting.
But maybe I’m missing something here..
For example, salafi jihadists on route to fight in the Bosnian war often flew through the Croatian capital Zagreb, place of origin – Tehran. This was exposed during the one year muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia & western Herzegovina, flight tickets were leaked by the Croatian authorities of the day to the media because this was organised by the CIA – who were supporting Croatia – in conjunction with Iranian military intelligence. Croatia wanted this stopped because large numbers f Croatian civillians were being massacred by Salafists in central Bosnia, but they could not openly oppose this CIA/Iranian operation. Iran provided logistical support, if you want sources I can dig them out from my own archive, I’ll post another comment as soon as I collect some examples. Iran’s history of involvement with Salafi jihadists is quite complex, you forget that the hostility towards Iran from this group has only become severe in more recent years, back in the 90s these groups were not openly opposed to Iran. Even more recently, you have the break between Ayman al Zawarhiri & Abu Musab al Zarqawi over the latters attacks on Shias in Iraq, which the former apparently opposed, like the bombing at Najaf – so this is a complex matter & not a simple Sunni/Shia conflict the way the Western MSM would have us all believe. During the 90s,Abu Musab al Zarqawi – founder of AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq, forunner to ISIS) became as ‘asset’ of Iranian intel for a time, right up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Iran supported the Bosnian muslims who are Sunni, back then the Sunni/Shia conflict was not so pronounced, as it became following the US occupation of Iraq. Why the Iranian regime believed they could establish allies amongst the Sunni Bosnian muslims is something you would have to ask them. Evidence enough exists that Iran supported them to the end of the war in 1995, despite full knowledge that the main foreign contingent fighting on their side was made up of Salafist/Wahabbite jihadists. Go figure. Now these people executed Serbian civilians en mass, ritual beheading etc. everything we now see in Syria. The fact that Iran supported these aggressors in a Serbian land made Iran a mortal enemy of all the Serbian people, they remain so until this day until (if) they ever apologize – which they will not – & offer some form of compensation – which they will definitely not. So I, as a Serb, did not make Iran my enemy, they made themselves an enemy of my people – which is unfortunate, because on a tactical & moral level, I/we support the Syrian legitimate government under Bashar al Assad, as does Iran, & the current Iraqi government (irrespective of its problems), & preservation of Syrian & Iraqi sovereignty. That does not get Iran of the hook however, they are guilty as sin – the Iranian government that is – this has nothing to do with the people. One thing you did not mention in your excellent & highly informative essay is the extent of executions carried out following the Iranian revolution in 1980, it may not be entirely relevant to your focus on the development of Iranian revolutionary military forces, but I would imagine it would deserve some commentary for the sake of balance & objectivity. It may seem odd to you that I have tactical sympathies with Iran whilst opposing the regime, well that’s the complexity of the world my friend. At the moment its an enemy of my enemy is my friend scenario, but the Iranian regime was, is & remains an enemy of the Serbian people – until they decide otherwise & make amends for what was a huge mistake on their part.
For a commentary on how misguided Iran’s supposed “friendship” – I would say criminal support – for Bosnia’s muslims – against Bosnia’s indigenous Serbs, see this Guardian piece below:
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/irans-ungrateful-european-friend
Iran’s Ungrateful European Friend
6 Aug 10
Wartime assistance that Bosnia received from Tehran counted for nothing when it came to crucial UN vote.
By Ebrahim Gilani
The Bosnian decision to back the latest round of United Nations sanctions against Tehran in June has caused some irritation in Iran, where many see it as poor reward for years of support.
As well as feeling let down by Bosnia’s policy of pro-western pragmatism, some Iranians are pointing the finger of blame at their own government, saying the debacle is a result of mismanaged foreign policy.
The sanctions approved by the United Nations Security Council on June 9 place restrictions on banking and other financial transactions that might contribute to Iran’s nuclear plans.
This time, Bosnia and Hercegovina, whose Muslim administration received support from Iran throughout the 1992-95 war, was set to play a critical role in the vote because it had been elected as one of the Security Council’s ten non-permanent members at the beginning of this year.
Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Sarajevo in late April to lobby Bosnian officials, telling them that his country’s nuclear programme was entirely peaceful.
But even at this early stage, it was already clear which way things were going. At the end of Mottaki’s visit, Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Bosnian presidency, issued a statement indicating that the country would vote for sanctions and linking this to its aspirations to join the European Union and NATO.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attempted to lower expectations, telling the Sarajevo newspaper Dnevni Avaz in early May that Tehran did not expect Bosnia to vote against the Security Council resolution, despite all the assistance his country had provided in the past.
Davud Vafayi, a Balkans expert based in Tehran, says the Iranian authorities have recognised that “for Bosnia, EU accession is a strategic priority, and they have decided to accept this reality”.
On the day, the UN resolution was carried by 12 out of the 15 votes, including Bosnia’s. Yet there were other alternatives – non-permanent members Turkey and Brazil voted against, Lebanon abstained.
While the Tehran government has not made an issue of its disappointment, there is a sense among some Iranians that in a situation where Bosnia might have acted otherwise, it displayed ingratitude.
As Abbas Abdi, a journalist and social affairs analyst, put it, “Bosnia could have made recompense for a fraction of the Iranian aid provided to it during the war.”
According to Abbas Heidari, head of the Iranian-Bosnian Friendship Association, Sarajevo has issued a verbal apology to Tehran for the stance it took. He made the claim in an interview he gave to the Mehr News Agency in the presence of Bosnia’s ambassador in Tehran.
Heidari expressed a sense that Iran had somehow lost its way in the relationship with Sarajevo, saying, “If we Iranians still had the same influence in Bosnia as we did before, this wouldn’t have happened.”
Others agree that Iran’s Bosnia policy has not brought the right rewards.
“Iran’s policy of supporting Bosnia has not been conducive to helping the national interest when that’s been needed,” Abdi said.
A former Iranian diplomat in Europe said the experience was “just one more example of the Islamic Republic’s numerous foreign policy failures.”
A professor of political science in Tehran described how the post-war years had seen Bosnia gradually distancing itself from Iran and moving closer to the US and the EU. The now imminent plans to join NATO and the EU could only speed that process, he said.
It is all a far cry from the days when the embattled Bosnian state was short of friends, weapons and other kinds of support.
Iran saw an opportunity to gain a foothold in Europe, and invested significant efforts to achieve this.
The foreign minister at that time, Ali Akbar Velayati, has since described how Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asked him and Revolutionary Guards chief Mohsen Rezayi to do all they could to assist the Bosnian Muslims resist the “crusade” being waged against them.
Khamenei named a senior regime figure, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, as his special envoy on Bosnia, with responsibility for delivering military, medical and financial assistance. In the face of a UN arms embargo on all warring parties in the former Yugoslavia, Iran sent arms shipments to the Bosnians, and a number of junior Revolutionary Guards commanders were dispatched to Bosnia.
Near the end of the conflict, the UN Security Council lifted the arms ban at Washington’s behest. Some US officials have made it clear the policy was reversed in order to curb Iranian influence in Bosnia.
In 1995, Iran was among the first states to recognise Bosnia and Hercegovina; it had opened an embassy the previous year.
But during the Dayton peace talks that brought the war to an end, Bosnian diplomats were already telling their Iranian counterparts that their government was under strong US pressure to curb Tehran’s presence.
According to a Bosnian diplomat in London, who asked to remain anonymous, “Iran’s strident policies during the war scared the West and made Bosnia keep its distance.”
Thus, as peace and stability gradually returned, Iran found its position being eroded in Bosnia. Another sign of the weakening relationship came when Iran began requiring entry visas from Bosnian nationals and ended direct flights between Tehran and Sarajevo.
Despite its reduced role, Iran still retains a presence in Bosnia, with a TV channel, a radio station, and cultural programmes such as a branch of the Mullah Sadra Foundation that are designed to promote its particular brand of Islamic ideology.
Srpska Republika, the Bosnian Serb entity within the state, has naturally shown little warmth towards Iran in the years since the war. But perhaps surprisingly, Tehran has drawn closer to Serbia itself. The value of Iranian trade with Serbia last year was more than triple that with Bosnia. At a political level, Iran has offered support by refusing to recognise Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.
As the latest UN sanctions began taking shape earlier this year, Iran made a concerted attempt to court Bosnia with economic incentives. The first ever joint commission on economic cooperation convened, leading to the two countries’ finance ministers signing preliminary agreements on trade, transport, communications, banking, insurance and tourism. Iran’s export bank agreed to underwrite sales of goods to Bosnia, initially to the tune of 150 million euro, and the Iranian embassy in Sarajevo was given two million euro to be spent on construction and industrial projects.
None of this was enough to change Bosnia’s overriding strategy of moving closer to western institutions. As the presidency statement issued in April put it, Bosnia did not have a short memory and would always be grateful for past Iranian help, but it had to look after its own strategic interests when it made decisions at an international level, including at the Security Council.
Ebrahim Gilani is the pseudonym of an Iranian journalist and foreign policy analyst based in London.
For Iranian links to Al Qaeda, see below:
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/09/25/Iran-s-relationship-with-al-Qaeda-It-s-complicated.html
Iran’s relationship with al-Qaeda : It’s complicated
Thursday, 25 September 2014
A striking commonality between two al-Qaeda figures that made headlines this week is that they both lived in Iran. Muhsin al-Fadhli, targeted by a U.S. airstrike in Syria on Monday night, is a reported al-Qaeda figure who was reportedly placed under house arrest in Iran, while Sulaiman Abu Ghaith (Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law), slapped with a life sentence in a New York court, had spent more than 10 years in Iran. According to U.S. officials, he was in confinement, however.
The juxtaposition of al-Qaeda as in theory an arch-foe of the Iranian regime while at the same time having senior members inside Iran, underscores a very complex relationship that Tehran has with the terrorist organization. In approaching its ties with al-Qaeda, Iran perhaps seeks to gain leverage over the group, use it as a card in promoting regional interest and in worst case scenarios perhaps seeks to utilize it operationally against the West or Israel or Arab neighbors in an event Tehran is attacked.
Al-Qaeda figures in Iran
According to the U.S. Department of State, al-Fadhli was al-Qaeda’s senior facilitator and financier in Iran, with a bounty on his head of $7 million. He is believed to have relocated to Iran from Afghanistan in 2009, where he was under “house arrest” but later ran a group to “move fighters and money through Turkey to support al-Qaeda-affiliated elements in Syria” before moving there himself in 2013. His transfer to Syria was based on orders from al-Qaeda central in Pakistan to lead the “Khorasan” group and help bridge differences between ISIS and the al-Nusra Front. Many alleged Nusra followers on twitter have declared that al-Fadhli was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Northern Syria on Monday, while the Pentagon is still investigating.
At a time when extremism is engulfing the Middle East and brutality is unleashed in its ugliest forms in Syria, the region needs to collectively reject this narrative rather than exploit it
Joyce Karam
Bin Laden’s son-in-law, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, followed a similar trajectory to al-Fadhli’s, where, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, “he was successfully smuggled from Afghanistan into Iran in 2002” where he spent at least 10 years before his arrest during a stopover in Jordan in March, 2013. Abu Ghaith was labeled as the “spokesperson” for al-Qaeda, editing videos of Bin Laden and expanding the recruiting efforts of the organization.
Abu Ghaith and al-Fadhli are not the only al-Qaeda figures who have history with or still reside in Iran. Following the collapse of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 2001, and the escape of al-Qaeda leaders to Pakistan, many figures reportedly sought shelter in Iran in what appeared as a win-win gamble. Iran is relatively safe since it is not subjected to U.S. airstrikes the way that Somalia or Pakistan or now Iraq and Syria are, and some believe there is common ground in distrusting America and Israel and the Sunni Arab states. It is a convergence that has led, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, al-Qaeda members Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi and Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (better known as Yasin al-Suri) and five others to Iran.
Dancing with the devil
The supposed relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran is full of distrust and is bound with limitations and operational boundaries that both sides adhere to. In 2008, al-Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat in Pakistan and negotiated his release in exchange of freeing some of its members in Iran including a former colonel in the Egyptian army Saif al-Adel.
It was a swap that granted al-Qaeda members operational freedom that they don’t fully enjoy in Iran, while proving to Tehran that hosting those members provides leverage in such crisis. In that same context, al-Qaeda, unlike ISIS, is more cognizant of appeasing Tehran and not embracing what some of its offshoots have started in 2003 in massacring Shiites. In 2004, both Bin Laden and Zawahiri did not condone Abu Musaab Zarqawi’s “total war” on Shiites in Iraq, and eight years later it is the same divide that al-Qaeda has with ISIS.
The al-Qaeda operatives that were or still reportedly reside in Iran are, in my view, some of the most atrocious in the organization. Saif al-Adel was indicted by the United States for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya, while al-Suri has a $10 million reward for his capture and is involved in moving money and fighters into Syria. Al-Fadhli on the other hand is reportedly heading Khorasan, which according to U.S. officials is more of a threat than ISIS to American security, plotting attacks from inside Syria.
The apparent al-Qaeda arrangement with Iran, despite the operational limitations, is very alarming for regional security. At a time when extremism is engulfing the Middle East and brutality is unleashed in its ugliest forms in Syria, the region needs to collectively reject this narrative rather than exploit it. History is not kind to those who have played with al-Qaeda fire and there is no reason to believe why Iran would be any different.
________________________
Joyce Karam is the Washington Correspondent for Al-Hayat Newspaper, an International Arabic Daily based in London. She has covered American politics extensively since 2004 with focus on U.S. policy towards the Middle East. Prior to that, she worked as a Journalist in Lebanon, covering the Post-war situation. Joyce holds a B.A. in Journalism and an M.A. in International Peace and Conflict Resolution. Twitter: @Joyce_Karam
For Iranian links with Abu Musab al Zarqawi, see below:
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/irans-ties-with-al-qaeda-in-iraqs-abu.html
MUSINGS ON IRAQ
Iraq News, Politics, Economics, Society
Tuesday, February 2, 2016
Iran’s Ties With Al Qaeda In Iraq’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
The history of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq has largely been written. He grew up as a petty criminal in Jordan, travelled to Afghanistan twice after the war with the Soviets was over and set up his own camp with the help of Al Qaeda, was imprisoned in Jordan, and eventually went to Iraq to fight the Americans. The one part of his life that has not been written about much was his two stints in Iran in 2001 and 2003 and his ties with the government there. Zarqawi originally began running his supply lines through Iran to his camp in Afghanistan, and later received direct support from Tehran when he was building up his terrorist network in Germany and Iraq.
When Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was organizing his jihadist organization in Afghanistan called Jund al-Sham it included cells and routes through Iran. In 1999, Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan for the second time after he was amnestied from prison in Jordan. When he arrived in the country he stayed in an area under the control of the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Zarqawi then met with Osama bin Laden in Kandahar. The two did not get along as they had different views on jihad, but prominent Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel thought that the group should maintain contacts with Zarqawi That led Al Qaeda to provide Zarqawi with $200,000 to help him set up his own camp in Herat along the Afghanistan-Iranian border in 2000. There he went about creating his own network that stretched to Europe and Iran. The Iranian city of Mashhad for example, became an important way station for men and material to enter Zarqawi’s camp. His top operative in Iran was a man named Abu Ali who ran and coordinated a cell in Germany. Afghanistan had become a failed state controlled by various factions and warlords after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Zarqawi had missed out on the war against the communists in the country, but like many other jihadists felt it provided a perfect setting to start his own organization. This was probably where Tehran first became aware of his activities as it supported both Hekmatyar and Al Qaeda. It also did nothing about him establishing his supply lines through Iran.
Zarqawi would become more involved with Iran after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In October 2001 the Americans began their campaign to overthrow the Taliban. Zarqawi and his men fought alongside Al Qaeda in Herat and Kandahar, during which time he was wounded by a U.S. airstrike. The war drove Zarqawi and 300 of his men to flee to Iran in December. He then went to Tehran for medical treatment on his injury. Zarqawi ended up staying in Iran until April 2002, and was initially hosted by a follower of Hekmatyar who he’d met from his time in Afghanistan. Zarqawi then set about rebuilding his organization, setting up camps and safe houses in Zahedan, Isfahan, and Tehran. He also established ties with Ansar al-Islam in Iraq’s Kurdistan, and travelled to Lebanon, Syria and the rest of Iraq to recruit. Germany’s Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) in an investigation that ended in the arrest of a Zarqawi cell found evidence that Iran was actively supporting him at this time. According to the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Iranian Revolutionary Guard provided Zarqawi with phone numbers he could use. Jordanian intelligence seconded the Germans, and claimed that Iran provided weapons, uniforms, and equipment to the terrorist. When Zarqawi was based in Afghanistan, the Iranian authorities turned a blind eye to his activities in their country. When he relocated there in 2001, they became more actively involved in his operations. As long as he was focused upon striking the west and Arab governments Tehran didn’t appear to have any problems with him being in the country.
During this time Zarqawi met back up with Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel in Iran, and the two decided that Iraq should be their next focus due to the impending U.S. invasion. Adel would later write that Iraq would be the perfect opportunity to create an Islamic State. The American intervention could be used as a rallying cry for the Islamic masses to be radicalized and turned towards jihad. Zarqawi then decided upon a two-part plan. First, most of his men would move to Kurdistan and work with Ansar al-Islam in preparation for the American arrival. Other would go to Germany where they were to carry out terrorist attacks upon Jewish targets. Zarqawi and Adel were right, Iraq did provide a turning point for jihadists, and turned the former into an international terrorist that would rival even bin Laden. His activities in Germany would also hasten his move into Iraq.
In April 2002 Zarqawi’s cell in Germany was arrested leading to the West to put pressure on Iran to crackdown on his group. The detention of Zarqawi’s men in Germany alerted the western authorities to his presence in Iran and how his network was working. Both Germany and the United States complained to Tehran about it harboring the terrorist. The Iranians responded by arresting Zarqawi and almost all of his operatives in the country. They were released after a few weeks. That led Zarqawi to leave the country for Syria, and then Iraqi Kurdistan. By May 2002 Zarqawi was in Baghdad organizing for the U.S. invasion. Zarqawi was still a rather minor jihadist leader at the time. While Tehran had supported him to keep tabs on the radical Islamist community, he was not important enough to be protected. Zarqawi could see that and he was already planning on moving to Iraq, so these events simply moved forward his timetable.
The Iraq war actually made Zarqawi turn to Iran one more time. Zarqawi and his allies in Ansar al-Islam had their camps wiped out in Kurdistan during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Both ended up going to Iran as a result as both had ties with Tehran. There, Zarqawi met up with Saif al-Adel once again who asked for help getting Al Qaeda operatives into Iraq. Zarqawi agreed to funnel them via his networks in Syria, and many of them joined his organization Tawhid wal Jihad, which would later become known as Al Qaeda in Iraq.
The major question that comes to mind when reading these reports of ties between Iran and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was why would they work together when Zarqawi was so vehemently anti-Shiite? There are many possible answers. First, many governments in the Middle East maintained ties to jihadist organizations even ones they didn’t agree with to surveil them. Second, Tehran saw that Zarqawi could further its foreign policy goals. This started in Afghanistan as Zarqawi was setting up his first camp. The Iranian government might have thought they could use him later on if he made anything out of himself. That happened when Zarqawi decided to move to Iraq as both he and Iran were interested in fighting the Americans and undermining their plans for a post-Saddam nation. For Zarqawi he apparently found Tehran a marriage of convenience. He could use Iran as a way station for his men that did not rely upon routes through Pakistan, which were dominated by the established jihadist groups in Afghanistan. After Zarqawi returned to Iraq for good after the U.S. invasion there was little on his ties with Tehran. What is clear is that he established relations with the Iranian government that lasted from 2000 to at least 2003. They both benefited as Zarqawi found a base and safe haven to work out of, while Iran ended up backing the deadliest insurgent faction against the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Tawhid wal Jihad’s bombings in Baghdad in 2003 drove off many foreign countries, companies, and international organizations that might have helped the Americans, thus immediately undermining reconstruction. Today, Iran is fighting Zarqawi’s successor the Islamic State, but at one time the two worked together. Such is the Byzantine nature of Middle Eastern politics.
SOURCES
Brisard, Jean-Charles Martinez, Damien, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005
Bunzel, Cole, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, March 2015
Darling, Dan, “The Cicero Articles,” Long War Journal, 10/30/05
Debat, Alexis, “Vivisecting the Jihad,” National Interest, 6/23/04
Gambill, Gary, “Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” Jamestown Foundation, 12/15/04
Isikoff, Michael, “Distorted Intelligence?” Newsweek, 6/25/03
Kirdar, M.J., “Al Qaeda In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011
Leiken, Robert and Brooke, Steven, “Who Is Abu Zarqawi?” Weekly Standard, 5/18/04
Napoleoni, Loretta, Insurgent Iraq, Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005
New York Times, “Militants linked to al Qaeda rallying in Iraq, Bremer says,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8/10/03
Roggio, Bill, “Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi, al Qaeda and Iran,” Long War Journal, 6/16/05
Schanzer, Jonathan, “Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004
Symon, Fiona, “The devil America knows,” Financial Times, 9/24/04
Weaver, Mary Anne, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, July/August 2006
Weiss, Michael Hassan, Hassan, ISIS, Inside the Army of Terror, New York: Regan Arts, 2015
Sir, with all due respect for your devotion to addressing your perception of the Iranian involvement in the West’s destruction of Yugoslavia, the few recent posts of (a) articles in western “news”papers like the Guardian, and (b) far more eggregiously citation to such western propaganda outlets and presstitutes as the Brookings Inst., the Jamestown Inst., Long War Journal, Michael Isikoff, Michael friggin Weiss and, not to be forgotten, neocon par excellence’ Bill Kristol’s Weekly Standard, is most distressing.
As if that wasn’t enough to discredit your position, you also cite work product of one of the key (as in top 2 or 3) organizations at the heart of of the AZ Empire in the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Accordingly, with your reliance upon such sources, I find your position entirely lacking in credibility, and therefore not trustworthy.
Signed, A Friend of The Saker
Yep, untenable. OK, so tell me this then, did – or did not – Iran arm the Bosnian muslims using Tuzla airbase as a drop point which was controlled by the US? Can you actually provide a contra argument rather than a denunciation of sources? As if we’re engaging in academic paper writing here, what is in those articles is pretty much truth, what you think of the sources is irrelevant. Friend of the Saker? Fantastic.removed . Try arguing the facts. You can not – & you will not. But try, you won’t get anywhere.
This conversation needs to be closed down. Any further comment will go to the trash.Mod
Sir, I regret that in the 1990’s I was not as consciously aware of the evil nature of the ruling elites of what Saker calls the AZ empire in general, and how ( as I later learned) the deep state assets of the AZ empire consciously destroyed your nation. Instead, I was keeping my head down, working to feed and raise my family, and found my news information in the pages of major US metropolitan newspapers, Business Week, CNN, etc.
Hopefully, by the very fact that you are posting at an alternative source like the Saker’s blog and not on CNN or something, the above helps you understand why I was not then aware of the truth of the West’s conscious use of jihadi terrorists to savagely butcher Serbians; do not have any first hand knowledge of the events in the destruction of Yugoslavia; and do not have a cache of articles to call upon, or citations to properly refute your posts.
Frankly, it has only been in the past few years that my eyes have been opened to the Machiavellian evil of our western ruling elites; they weren’t open in the 1990’s. In fact, I was a victim of lies, falsehoods and fabrications – of calculated disinformation campaigns. Frankly, I thought Serbs were the bad guys. After all, that’s what the news sources I relied upon led me to think.
I now know better.
Since my eyes have been opened I have learned a lot, and am always desirous of learning more. It is for that reason that I read your posts with interest. I have not encountered enough reliable information to counter what I know are false perceptions of Iranian involvement in the Balkan Wars. In fact, I previously posted to Saker for more information on that very topic when Hezbollah leader Abu Alla al-Bosni was killed in Syria by the IDF Air Force last year.
Based upon my reading over the recent years, I will most confidently reassert that virtually each and every one of the sources you list above is an entirely bought and paid presstitute of the same AZ empire. The exact same type – in fact some the exact same people – who I erroneously relied upon in the 1990’s.
Really, do I need to explain who Bill Kristol, a neocon architect of the PNAC war on humanity, really is? Do I need to explain why you can’t trust anything written by the The Long War Journal, or, the Jamestown Foundation, or the Brookings Inst, or the CSIS.? You must know that the Brookings is a major mouthpiece of the AZ empire and its vassals, as best exemplified by jihadi wannabe Charles Lister and his work on behalf of al Qaeda and assorted other Salafists in Syria. Do you not know who Michael Issikoff is? Of the tag team AZ fanboys of Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan? And the role they all play in spreading western lies, falsehood and fabrications to this day, now focused on Syria? Finally, do you not know that Alexis Debat was exposed almost a decade ago as, literally, a complete fraud, as opposed to the rest of the bunch who are still purportedly “reliable” MSM sources, but frauds nonetheless?
My questioning of your sources is not done in hostility, or in distrust of your motives or of your experience and suffering. The time I invested in this response should, hopefully, demonstrate my sincerity.
Yes, I know that Iran aided the Itzegobevic government and the Bosniak army. Yes, I know that they sent advisers and fighters. What I do not understand very well is why.
I can logically surmise that there were several reasons; the easy one of following the faith’s call to aid fellow Muslims in war to the complex ones of attempting to compete with the Salafists of Saudi Arabia and GCC states and Islamists of Turkey for influence in the Islamic world in general and Bosnia in particular, or for some elements of Iranian ruling elites to attempt to curry favor with the AZ empire by doing the CIA’s bidding as it, as you state, played both sides off as pawns on their chessboard.
I note that after the Dayton Accords it appears that Iran “went home”; whatever good will they may have procured through their involvement in the wars has withered and died. Bosnia and Kosovo are now Salafist strongholds thanks to Saudi and Qatari funding and exporting of Wahhabi & Salafist clerics.
Observing conflicts since the Balkan Wars in which the AZ empire pits its Salafist terrorists against the next targets for destruction, I can’t help but see that Bosnia Muslims overwhelmingly rally to the side of the AZ puppet terror groups, from Chechnya to Iraq to Libya and now Syria. In Syria they now fight against Iran and its proxy militias who are helping the Syrian people fend of the AZ armed, backed and trained jihadi terrorists that are called by most of the above authors you relied upon as “moderate Syrian rebels.”
So, my friend, my questioning of your sources is really intended to suggest that perhaps you have been victimized a second time by believing the same disinformation that I, and millions of other naive westerners, have been victims of.
I respectfully suggest that there is even a motive – a theatrical theme – for the disinformation. It goes something like this… We are told, ad nauseum, that Iran is the “largest exporter of terrorism.” Iran helped the Islamists in the Balkans, but our friends the Saudi’s and Qatari’s and Turks helped the “moderate Balkan rebels” who valiantly fought off the “brutal Serbs.” Any terror caused from the Balkans must therefore be caused by the Iranian’ influenced terrorists, not our “freedom fighters.” If I recall correctly, that is exactly what happened in several terrorist incidents in the late 90’s, early 2000’s – until 9/11 changed the theme.
Those who frequent this blog almost universally know that the above is nothing but disinformation. Saudi Arabia is the largest propagator and exporter of radial jihadi terrorism, in the service of the AZ empire, occasional Frankenstein-like “blowback” notwithstanding.
I hope that my response, without even a single citation, helps you open your eyes to the probability that your animosity to Iran is, perhaps, the result of disinformation by the western masters of psychological warfare who continue to target that nation for destruction.
Signed, A Friend of the Saker Blog
So they are saying that Iran “arrested” and “imprisoned” al-Qaeda leaders coming into Iran. And dealt with them to get Iranian diplomats kidnapped by al-Qaeda released. And to get them to not massacre innocent Shia believers. And that is the “basis” of the “claims” that Iran “supports and works with al-Qaeda” That there are “al-Qaeda” in Iran (in cells) . It appears to me that the US must think we are pure morons if we believe that rubbish.I don’t doubt that during the Soviet days in Alghanistan,and during the Bosnian War ,that Iran “may” have had “wary” dealings with al-Qaeda. At that time there was a common interest between the two (being anti-Soviet and anti-US). And al-Qaeda,though a Sunni organization wasn’t advertising itself as an “anti-Shia” group. Slaughtering Shia whenever they could.But since its well known now what they plan for the Shia (hence Iranians). Its more than “unlikely” that the Iranians work with them as allies.
We would have to be pure morons to believe that Iran did not deal with what is called Al Qaeda, or the Salafi Jihadist network, quite intimately in the past. The main evidence of this is Bosnia, it was Iranian intel organising & transporting these terrorists to Bosnia from the Mid East, only for these psychopaths to turn on them later. Now, those sympathetic & hence biased toward the Iranian regime, the so-called self-described “axis of resistance” can deny this all they want, what do I care? I don’t, I know who the enemy is & who the enemy is not, what others think of this is their problem. It is amusing, slightly amusing, to see how supposed Russophiles jump at critique of Iran, buying into their “axis of resistance” BS. Some of the most prestigious members of the Iraqi Shia clerical establishment don’t buy it, Moqtada al Sadr doesn’t buy it, & is extremely wary & suspicious of Iran’s involvement & influence in Iraq. And Iran is no friend of Russia, the regime that is, again, the people have nothing to do with this, given the choice, I am sure they would eliminate the regime themselves & create an authentic Islamic Repucblic & genuine axis of resistance. I am no fan of one Igor Girkin Strelkov particularly, but his criticism of Iran with regards to Syria is absolutely apt, & he is right to be skeptical about the potential for Russia to be drawn in to fighting Iran’s wars on their behalf. The Iranian regime is not at all what it appears to be & it is not what it presents itself to be either, & that is my main point in all of this. But, people out there can think what they want, makes no difference to me one way or the other.
How do you explain the high cost of that resistance then?
Iran has faced sanctions for close on two decades (correct me on this, if need be). Sanctions which have been accompanied by relentless anti/Iranian propaganda in the West – nowhere moreso than the US.
It has been forced to back room deals with Turkey to bypass the worst effects.
You seriously believe the regime paid that price so it woujd later ‘partner’ with the CIA – the wellspring of the hated Shah’s support – to gain some kind of foothold in the former Yugoslavia?
For what?
I can well believe jihadis from poor, rural parts of Iran joined the Bosnian ‘resistance’, fooled like so many in the West by the alleged ‘slaughter’ by the Serbs.
But I simply do not find it credible there was a state-level collusion with the CIA in Bosnia.
I find it far more credible that the presence of Iranian, along with other jihadis from the Middle East, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan were subsequently exploited as political capital by the real architects of the breakup of Yuhoslavia – NATO.
By the way, since the Muslims were victorious, acquiring a brand-new ‘state’ – Kosovo – how come it was NATO that got the prize? Is Bondsteel an Iranian military base? Are Wesley Clark and Mad Albright ( who now control it’s goldmines) Iranian?
Al-Arabiya is owned by Middle East Broadcasting, a Saudi operation.
This looks like an attempt to exploit the factionalism within the numerous takfiri non-Iranian groups to insinuate State-level support by Iran for them.
Yet it concedes the ‘relationship’ is characterized by ‘distrust’.
Again, little or no real evidence of state-level support, and from a source owned by an implacable enemy, sustained by the US.
If you would genuinely like to see evidence of Iran’s connections to the Pentagon & CIA – & note that I said elements within the Iranian military – then I would suggest you look into the hearings on Iran-Contra, it is all there. I am not going to do your work for you, if you really want to know – assuming you don’t – then start with that & do some serious research into the logistical aspects of Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian muslims, via Tuzla airbase, controlled by the US during the war, not only after Dayton (1995). If you want to know that is. I doubt it though, no offence, I really respect your essay, but what I do not respect is obvious bias, with regard to your commentary on Bosnia. I would be curious to know what you would have to say about Iran-Contra once you have the facts, for essentially the US was arming Iran, as well as Iraq, just as the US is today arming Shia militias in Iraq via the Iraqi military, whilst arming ISIS at the same time. They are playing both sides off against one another.
I admit was bamboozled by the Bosnian conflict, it didn’t fit into any pattern I could see at the time. I was thrown off by the historical grievances of the Yugoslavs, and bought into the narrative of inter-ethnic tensions. Though since we can see it as the beginning of the R2P playbook, brutally perfected in Libya. But as the smoke cleared it became obvious that what was really at stake was the last Socialist country in Europe. Poor Serbia was brutalised for daring to spend her wealth on her people. The Evil Empire was very easily able to provoke latent tensions in the Balkans, and as usual pit people against each other despite their common interest. I did hear yesterday though that the Kosovo interim government is very worried about the rise of Trump, their window for UN legitimacy may have finally closed.
I was not aware of the Iranian involvement at the time, though it doesn’t surprise me. I doubt Iran had a stake in dividing Yugoslavia, at worst was moved to defend fellow Muslims from genocide. The CIA will use anyone regardless of their motivations, so no surprise there. It is a real shame that the Yugos allow the US to mislead them and break up one of the most successful Socialist countries last century. Milosevic’s death in prison was a sad footnote to another brutal American regime change operations. Spit whatever bile you like at Iran, but save the bulk of your righteous vomit for the US.
Had Iran really cared about the Bosnian muslims, who incidentally lost about 50,000 people (including soldiers) our of a population of around 2 million which can not reasonably be described as “genocide” by anyone remotely normal or sane – if Iran cared, they would have used their influence constructively & not destructively. Instead they – the Iranian regime at the time, which is the same regime today, & it is a “regime” – they poured oil on the fire, thus inflaming & prolonging the war. Idiots. Thought they could establish a base of influence in Europe, now they are being scolded in house for making such a tactical mistake & alienating the Serbs, who were their natural allies had they cared to see beyond their own religious chauvinism. Well, they couldn’t, & made enemies of the Serbs for all time. I don’t claim to speak for all Serbian people, but I challenge anyone to find a Serb who is not a 5th columnist who will argue that it was OK by them for Iran to support Bosnia’s muslims, who destroyed the country in which they lived.
Are you saying that Iran was trying to setup a Hezbollah-style Bosnian enclave? To what end?
Earthrise, both of your questions are spot on. Aram, Vor and anonymous above are all telling about the pieces of the puzzle.
We had head choppers in Bosnia, on that we agree i presume. Aram mentioned ~5000 tonns of weapons supplied to the muslims in Bosnia. Note that those supplies were brought at the times of weapons embargo of the UN. Brought thru ports and airports controlled by NATO/CIA.
Another piece is the Srebrenica. Enclave there was to be demilitarised. UN resolutions or something. Peace keeping battalion from Netherlands was stationed there during the 2 years of the existence of the enclave. It would be interesting to hear their side of the story. Of the atrocities of Naser Oric, military commander of Bosnian muslims at the time, i will not speak now. But during the Hague trials we found out that more than 20.000 armed muslim soldiers were there of different variety, including mujahadeens. Therefore not disarmed.
My personal experience tells me that large number of Bosnian muslims favor Turkish influence, though certainly not all, yearning for the return of Ottoman rule. Of that rule Sheikh Imran Hossein said much. And i agree with him. Just as Christianity has its divide so does Islam. Those perversion have much in common and have cooperated before. I agree with his warning to them. What they endorse as true Islam is a perversion. Ottoman custom of slavery, forced conversions and forced acceptance of Islam, add to that Jihad as a tool for conquest. Bosnian vote on sanctions tell us whose side is favored there. And that is not Iran.
Eimar’s comment “It has been forced to back room deals with Turkey to bypass the worst effects” is telling also. Some form of cooperation existed in Bosnia also. In what form and at what price? Who cooperated with whom and why? I can see the reasoning of influencing the developments in Bosnia to stem the influence of wahabism. But actions speak louder. Wahabists and Iran both supported the same side.
That is the question now.
To be fair, Iran not recognizing Kosovo is a good sign of cooperation and we should build upon that.
I personally see Serbs and Iranians as natural allies as we are attacked by the same enemy/enemies and beside that i find that we have much more in common. We either stand united or we fall separately. I would rather not go down, if given choice. But i would like to know with who i stand together. And if we have any grievances and misunderstanding we should resolve them.
Now, we have both and the choice how shall we approach them is before us. We should do that truthfully and in good faith is my opinion.
For the forces arrayed against us use deceit as their weapon. If i remember correctly, Saker stated that Bashar’s Syria hosted illegal American prison/torture camps on its soil. Yet, we see that same America destroying Syria now. Things are not black and white, aside from few absolutes. Add to that “Connections with foreign organizations and militias with the aim of exporting the Islamic Revolution, was to become a hallmark of the Sepah-e Qods who were also instrumental in creating the Lebanese Resistance movement Hezbollah in the midst of Lebanon’s civil war” from the Aram’s text. To me personally it is close to America exporting color revolutions. Supporting someone is one thing but exporting your way of life is cutting too close for my taste. Although it depends largely, not upon my opinion but on their definition of that mission and diligence on that path. Hezbollah is doing excellent job in keeping their home and Syria safe although they had their grievances and misunderstandings in the past. Therefore i see no reason for Serbia and Iran not to do also.
Men are not perfect. Men make mistakes. Men change. Men make governments. Hiding a mistake is very bad. Secrets are the bread and butter of our enemy/enemies.
We should speak openly, for if we do not, our enemy will exploit our misunderstandings and grievances. So let us reach understanding and accord and not look away from them. Old wounds fester if not tended properly. it is a lesson that should guide us here.
There is a Bosnian muslim enclave, it is called the muslim-Croat Federation, only Iranian influence has been all but extinguished to the benefit of Turkey & the GCC, after the war the US basically kicked them out. That is what happened, I can see from the responses people don’t like it, but what can I do? Don’t blame me by shooting the messenger, ask the Iranian regime what the hell they thought they were doing collaborating in a CIA op.
“ask the Iranian regime what the hell they thought they were doing collaborating in a CIA op”
Sadly, you are correct. Iran did follow into the same trap as the rest of the Muslim world. Simply put – either they got it wrong or they could not resist the pressure to get involved. Or a combo of both. Either way, the Iranians were just as wrong as all the other Muslims on the war in Bosnia. Sad, but true.
Still, this is the only major mistake the Islamic Republic of Iran made in its history – not many nations have had a wiser foreign policy than Iran and their diplomats and analysts are still world class.
The Saker
Absolutely, & this is my point – just to be clear- this may seem contradictory to some fellow commentators here – my sympathies are with Iran, geopolitically, principally (I even like the principle of a theocratic state, contrary to many in the West that claim to support Iran but then slam its theocracy, personally I think they are on the right track) absolutely, but – & it is a big but & that is that the Serbian people can not overlook the Iranian government’s actions. Iran is a natural ally of the Serbian people, & that is why I take so much issue with them, I understand their sympathies with Bosnia’s muslims, fair enough, I get it, but what is stunning is that it was NOT in Iran’s own national interest to arm them & send them mercenaries. Look at how that has backfired, have any of Bosnia’s muslims volunteered to fight on the side of the Syrian or Iraqi government, or join any affiliated militias? Not that I know of, but they have joined ISIS & Nusra in droves. That says everything about them, talk about biting the hand that feeds you. I won’t say anything more on this topic, I know it is contentious & I respect those who disagree, fine, disagree, but lets stick to facts, to evidence. Iran, in my opinion, if it was going to get involved in Bosnia at all, it could have done so in a constructive manner, without alienating anyone, especially Serbs, who like I said, & I will say it again & again, are natural allies. I am of the view that Iran should do everything in its power to amend this, I know it will not be a national security priority for them, but they should make amends, because I can say this – just like numerous Serbs went to fight voluntarily in Donbass for Novorossia, there are professional Serbian soldiers who would fight for the Syrian government alongside or even directly affiliated to Iranian backed militias. That is the kind of alliance Iran could have, unfortunately the situation is that many Serbian nationalists overwhelmingly sympathize with Israel, especially Bosnia’s Serbs, including the current President Milorad Dodik who does not hide the fact that after Russia, his closest ally is Israel.
Mr. Mirzaei,
Your account is very interesting and informative, but it has the same kind of flow as any militaristic boasting.
I also admire the martial achievements of the Revolutionary Guard, but have met many Persians who left the place, not supporters of the Pahlavi, but they left because of the status of women, or because they were Communists (not the al-Kakh cult, or however it is spelt) who were integral parts of the rising at the time.
An Islamic revolution is a contradiction in terms.
Sure, the former imperial power Persia does a great job of anti-imperialism now, except that they force Islam on people who don’t want to accept it.
Dear Che Guevara
Thank you for your comment.
I was requested to write an informative article on the IRGC, and my aim was only to show what they are and what they have achieved regardless of what people think of the Islamic Republic. However I must also add that the Islamic Republic was also chosen by the Iranian people in a vote that overwhelmingly favored the creation of a theocratic republic.
Many among the Iranian diaspora tend to omit this fact, especially the Communist Tudeh Party who were staunch advocates of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC. The fate of the communists came as a result of their own fallacies first hand, rather than placing all the blame on the Islamists.
Please note that I am not in any way in favor of a theocracy, however I believe that the Iranian diaspora in general tend to be hypocritical since many of them welcomed the revolution at first, despite knowing exactly what the result would be. Ayatollah Khomeini did not exactly hide his intent to create the Velayat-e Faghih(Rule of the Guardianship) system which equals theocracy.
My point is that these people lay all the blame on the same Islamic Republic which they helped to create and bring to power. They should perhaps also take a look in the mirror, especially the Communist parties who betrayed one another on multiple occasions. (Tudeh Party)
Agree, especially about communists in Iran and the imposing of certain religion and dressing way in women.
To those who consider wearing an scarve 24/7/365 becuatiful , I would wish they can pass, at least, one month in the mid of the summer there, especially in the southeast, and then I would ask them again if they have reconsidered their position ( prefearably if this is tasted by men with quite a bunch of hair in their heads, since it would not be the same for a bald headed ). All can be beatiful when seen from the distance.
Of course, Iran have my support on the Syria issue and its resistance against US Imperialism but, till there.
There was a time when another religion much more ancient than Islam was spreaded over Persia, Zoroastrianism, which in a very sumarized way, commended “talk well, think well, behave well” and since does not seen that was imposed over all the people.
Removed. Mod
I was finishing saying that, most probably, Zoroastrianism have taken its good influence in Persia, since I can asses that everybody I have met there, even mullahs and religious people, talk to you in an amazingly polite and kind way.
Well they are so sweet even to hit you with the duster if you lose your chador in a religious shrine that….to be honest, if it not were for the scarf, I could stay for ever….Love the Middle East!
My opinion is that Iraq had no reason to antagonize Iran.
The Islamic regime was hostile to the Iraqi Baath from the outset. Not much mention here of Khomeini’s calls for the overthrow of the Baath regime prior to the outbreak of the I-I War. They were a serious threat to the stability of the Baath.
Still, Iraq was unjustified to invade Iran in September of 1980. The war was a huge tragedy that never should have happened, but both sides had their responsibilities for it.
Also, Iran had an opportunity to negotiate a settlement to end the war once Iraqi troops were expelled from its territory in 1983. Instead it invaded Iraq. Some criticism is due of that.
Surely it is important to add that Saddam Hussein, as a vassal dictator of the USA, was set upon Iraq by his hegemon, the USA. The US hegemon does not take well to acts of lese majeste but also disposes of vassals once he is done with them. No matter that millions of innocents die in the process.
The Anglo-Zionist Empire can be said to regularly out-Herod Herod.
Fascinating stuff, thank you. The comments, too, are enlightening.
The early emphasis on martyrdom makes me wonder, though, how much of the Pasdaran-Basij system was borrowed and perverted to form today’s DAESH militia systems.
Saddam seems to have been impressed, moving from Baathism to his own Islamic brand. The Basij are in no way the Fedayeen Saddam, but quantitative tactics can be adopted without the qualitative meaning.
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/28/saddams-faith-campaign-and-the-islamic-state/
If Saddam adopted religious cues that worked, so did Saudi and Western intel agencies. There seems to be no shortage of willing volunteers to Sunni Wahhabism and martyrdom.
Offers excellent insight. A force any power fighting imperialism would want on its side.
SSM