The latest Israeli airstrikes are now the clear proof that the US/NATO/al-Qaeda insurgency is currently losing the war against Syria. I submit that the purpose of these strikes is rather obvious: to trigger a Syrian response which would give Israel a pretext to wage what Pepe Escobar aptly called a “mini shock and awe” campaign against Syria, tipping the balance in favor of the US/NATO/al-Qaeda insurgency. Here is how that plan would play out:
If the Syrians reply by shooting a number of missiles at Israel, the Israelis will then claim “self-defense” and hit key government installations, command and control nodes, ammunition dumps, command centers, air bases, etc all as part of their “legitimate right of self defense” (nevermind that Israel is already clearly guilty of undeniable acts of war and aggression). If needed, the Israelis could also initiate an air campaign aimed at restricting the mobility of Syrian troops and armor (by claiming that anything moving on a Syrian road is a “convoy of terror weapons destined to Hezbollah” or something equally predictable).
If the Syrians refrain from any retaliation, then these airstrikes would at least give the Israelis a sense of satisfaction: having failed to take on the Big Guy (Iran) they at least had the “guts” to attack Syria. This is not a pleasant option – believe me, I wish to see the Israelis pay for what they did as much as the next guy – but it is absolutely imperative for Assad not to fall into this trap. He needs to stay put and ride out the Israeli attacks.
The sad reality is that Syria is in no position to confront Israel militarily while at the same time fighting a US/NATO/al-Qaeda insurgency.
I have said it many many many times over on this blog, the way to defeat US/Israeli style air force or cruise missile attacks is not to shoot down their aircraft or to retaliate with your own strikes, but to deny them a lucrative target. This is what the Serbs did to perfection in Bosnia, and this is what Hezbollah did to perfection in Lebanon.
If the Syrians learned the lessons from the Hezbollah victory against Israel during the “Divine Victory” war, then their military should be ready to fight in a very decentralized manner, their means of communications should be extremely redundant, and their forces dispersed in a way to deny the Israelis a lucrative target. Of course, such a posture has the disadvantage of dramatically reducing the mobility of the Syrian army, in particular at the operational level, but as long as most of the war effort is carried by tactical subunits this should not be too much of a handicap.
Also, unless the Syrians respond and fire back the Israelis will not have a pretext to do much more than what they are doing right now: provoking. Their provocations are extremely offensive and morally repugnant, but they are much preferable to a real Israeli close air support campaign which the Israelis could launch in support of the US/NATO/al-Qaeda insurgency with thousands of sorties.
The Israeli involvement also have a beneficial side effect: it goes to prove a very simple but fundamental thesis: anybody supporting the Syrian insurgency is a “useful idiot” who, whether he understands that or nor, supports the US Empire, NATO, al-Qaeda and the Zionists. Yes, if you support the “FSA” you are in bed with Netanyahu.
What the Syrians need to do now is press on their advantage on the ground. If possible, they should deny the US/NATO/al-Qaeda coalition the possibility of using any part of the Syrian territory as a conduit to bring in more weapons. This can be best done by sending in numerous special forces groups inside”FSA” controlled territory to disrupt their operations and strike at their forces.
Just as the Russian only defeated the Chechen insurgency when the Russian commanders convinced the Kremlin of the importance of sending Spetsnaz forces deep inside the forests and mountains of Chechnia, the Syrians will only defeat this insurgency if they deny the Wahabis any type sanctuary.
This type of operation are very counter-intuitive for regular army officers who are used to think in terms of “fronts” or “terrain held” and who loathe the idea of sending a tiny force deep behind enemy lines. And yet, these tactics are crucial to deny the insurgency the big advantage that it enjoys when engaging regular forces: in a typical “insurgency versus regular forces” the insurgents always have the initiative, they choose when and where to engage, and they can withdraw to areas in which regular forces either cannot penetrate, or can only do that at a huge cost. Only autonomous special forces have the training needed to turn the tables on the insurgency and hunt it down in its own lairs.
Spetsnaz GRU in the mountains of Chechnia |
In Chechnia the insurgency mistakenly believed that it was invulnerable to Russian attacks in the forests covered hills and mountains. However, instead of sending big bulky and very vulnerable armored forces into these mountains the Russians covertly send numerous Spetsnaz units deep inside these forests and mountains. These units attacked the Chechens mostly at night, usually destroying their hidden camps and weapons caches. Such night raids created a sense of panic amongst the Chechen insurgents who had never expected to be attacked deep inside “their own” territory. They tried to flee to Georgia and other neighboring republics only to be blocked by covertly inserted Russian Airborne troops. In a relatively short time the insurgency was crushed.
Something similar needs to happen in Syria now. The Syrian military must absolutely deny the “FSA” any kind of “safe territory”. Furthermore, by sending in special forces teams they deny the Israelis the option to engage in close air support: special forces teams are undetectable and their strikes are too short and too devastating to call in close air support. By multiplying such “hit and run” operations the Syrian military could capitalize on its recent more conventional successes.
I don’t know if the Syrian military does have the type of units needed to conduct such operations, but if not I am sure that Iran and Russia can send enough qualified advisers to provide them with the basic training to prepare and execute such a campaign.
The Israeli aggression against Syria is a clear sign that the war is now entering into a qualitatively new phase. The Syrian armed forces have proven that they had what it take to very skillfully adapt to a conflict which turned out to be very different from the one they had trained for, and I hope that they will now again show the flexibility and skills needed to adapt to this new phase which will be decided by the correct use of special operation forces.
The Saker
Could not the Russians supply Syria with an air defence system that might put a stop to this kind of Israeli aggression?
@Robert: yes, in theory, yes. In practice, this is much harder and not practical. First, modern air defense system require highly trained personnel. Second, to be effective, air defense systems must be integrated. Third, this would mean sending a lot of hardware to Syria, which is hard, if not impossible, to do covertly. Fourth, this is time consuming. Fifth, this is also very expensive.
But the main reason is that the assumption for that kind of plan is that the Syrians accept to fight exactly the kind of war the Israelis are good at: air and missiles strikes on well defended targets. It is always a bad idea to fight the kind of war you enemy likes. It is much better to DENY him “his type of war” whatever that may be.
Think of it: the Serbs in Kosovo completely denied a victory to the combined air might of all the NATO air forces not being shooting down hundreds of NATO aircraft, but simply by not offering them a lucrative target. That is cheap, highly effective, deeply frustrating for your enemy, and can be done rapidly and it can be sustained for much longer than any air campaign. The same can be said of Hezbollah in Lebanon which even managed to defeat the Israeli ground forces while dodging their Israeli air war.
I say that this is the best model for Syria.
My 2cts. Cheers!
The Saker
Dear Saker,
I fully concur with your excellent analysis wall to wall.
What I can add is that Hezbollah and Iran are doing most of the training for the special units who are producing the successes you have spoken about…
In fact, in some parts near the Lebanese borders, Hezbollah has been spearheading the major successes with hands on… and fully engaged on the ground…
Moreover, SHN has said repeatedly over the years since the resounding success of 2006, that the Syrian army has adopted all the tactics of Hezbollah and implemented a defensive posture on the ground… but obviously they had not predicted the kind of war that they are facing now…hence it took them time to adapt and respond…
Best,
Joe
Hi Saker,
concealing and protecting targets of value is certainly the best strategy in the absence of a real air defense system. But it has enormous limitations, since the enemies will then turn their rage on civilian infrastructure, as they have time and again. This may not yield a strategic victory, but it certainly is painful for the defender and thus constrains his response.
Therefore, Syria should, if at all possible obtain whatever air defense it can. The beauty of it is that it need not be perfect. The mere risk of loosing a few aircraft will be a potent deterrent. Both Israel and NATO need to cultivate an aura of invincibility. Loosing even a handful of aircraft makes them look beatable.
Off topic, but I believe Syria’s biggest strategic error was in not responding to the 2007 attack on their “nuclear facility.” IMHO, it would have been FAR preferable for Syria to, for example, launch a number of missiles at an Israeli airbase, even if it had to absorb Israel’s subsequent attack in silence. It would have put the Syrian government in a much stronger ideological position today, and it would have made Israel more cautious about other attacks.
Obviously, at this point any open retaliation is no longer an option.
Another question Saker,
what do you think the prospects for Syria in a defensive war against Israel at this point? It is hard to tell what the State of Syria’s army is now, but it seems to me they could still employ a Hezbollah like strategy if the Israelis decide to up the anti with full scale strikes. They have plenty of missiles that can make life very miserable for Israel for a very long time. They have plenty of militia that can hold ground against the NATO terrorists and it would look awesome if after a month Israel decides overthrowing Assad isn’t worth all that. This not only would make amply clear that the ‘rebels’ are nothing but the west’s cats paw and would demonstrate that Syria is the true core of resistance and very effective at that.
But maybe that is just wishful thinking. Still, if the west is absolutely determined to bring down Assad, then he should make sure they pay a price for it.
@Lysander: what do you think the prospects for Syria in a defensive war against Israel at this point?
Honestly, I simply don’t know. I have never studied the Syrian Army and I don’t know enough about it to have an opinion.
Joe, who often posts here, knows a lot about Hezbollah and Syria and he is of the opinion that the Syrians are trained by Iran and Hezbollah. I know some Russian officers who trained the Syrians during the days of the Soviet Union and they where of a very good opinion of their Syrian trainees.
The Syrians have a reputation for being skilled and tough, but Baathist regimes have a terrible military record. So I honestly don’t know. Finally, putting old Soviet equipment against the latest generation US/Israeli gear is asking for trouble.
if the west is absolutely determined to bring down Assad, then he should make sure they pay a price for it.
I am not so sure that the West is absolutely dead set to get Assad at all cost in particular if the costs become prohibitive. I think that it is well worth trying to avoid a full-scale intervention if that is at all possible.
Dear Saker,
It is all going to rest on Putin’s choices from here going forward…?
There are a lot of issues at stake here, and you both know them quite well…
I do agree with your descrition of the Syrian army though…
Based on what I know, they do have a good defensive posture…but offense I do not know…the only theat is the missiles inventory…
I am sorry to say lastly that supposedly the Russians did reprogram Syria’s air defense systems after the 2007 IDF attack on the so called nuclear reactor in Syria…but my feeling is that Putin gave the codes again to Israel, otherwise the IDF would not be that effective everytime in such a war environment in Syria, where the syrian top brass expect the IDf to show up every night over Damascus???
Best,
Joe
The real achievement here – the suppression of the Syrian SA-10 Grumble anti aircraft system while blinding it’s Radar to the point the IAF airplanes attacked 9 different targets around Damascus – sends a loud signal through Putin’s shenanigans with the codes… and the reward is Mediterranean Gaz/Pipes etc etc etc
Best,
Joe
@Joe: It’s not that simple. S-300 were deployed in 1978 and have been modernized since. Yes, this is a very effective system, but it is also an EXTREMELY well-known system to US/NATO and Israeli Air Forces who train a lot against it. They know the specs very well. There were even reports that the CIA managed to purchase a full S-300 battery in the early 1990s, probably from the Ukrainians. I don’t think anybody knows what kind of S-300 the Syrians really have. BTW – they also have a much more recent system, the 96K6 Pantsir S1 (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-96K6-Pantsir-2K22-Tunguska.html) but again, we don’t know how the Syrian air defenses are organized and integrated.
Civilians often think of air defense systems as “stand alone” super-weapons. They are not. To be really effective, air defenses must be highly integrated into a complex multi-layered system covering the battlefield or even the entire country. Just like the US Patriots could not pull off any miracles by themselves in 1991 against Saddam, the Syrian S-300 and Pantsir S1 alone will not simply stop the Israeli Air Force. There are many many many factors influencing the effectiveness of an air defense system: the technical and tactical proficiency of the crews, the early warning system, the integration of the air defense systems, the enemy’s use of jamming or anti-radiation missiles, the number and flight profile of the incoming missiles, etc. etc. etc. This is why I always caution against over-optimistic hopes about air defenses: it takes *years* to build up a solid network of air defenses.
Keep in mind that the Israelis are *VERY* good at that kind of stuff, that their signal/telemetry intelligence capabilities are very strong, that they have 100% USAF support, and that they are amongst the world leaders in electronic warfare.
The only reasons the Americans lost an F-117A over Kosovo was because they were reckless and lazy, whereas the Israelis are very cautious and careful.
Bottom line: the repeated successes of the Israeli strikes on Syria do not at all prove, or even suggest, that “Putin gave them the codes”. This is what newspapers can write to explain away the Israeli successes, but the reality is far more complex. What we saw here is a FIRST rate air force defeating a THIRD rate air defense system, over targets which might not even have been protected (at least one included a poultry factory). It is even possible that the entire Syrian air defense network is down just to avoid being analyzed and that Assad will keep it off until a full-scale Israeli attack is clearly in the making. That actually would make sense. You do not simply keep the full air defense network up and radiating 24/7 unless, of course, you want to reveal it all to the enemy.
to be continued…
… continuation:
I can tell you this: the Iranian air defense network (which I know better than the Syrian one) is considered as a WEAK one, with a lot of poorly protected airspace and it is basically a no-brainer for the USA or Israel to penetrated it if they wanted to. What keeps them from doing so are other reasons, but not at all their “fear” of the Iranian air defenses. And I very much doubt that the Syrian air defense capabilities are much better than the Iranian ones.
Again, I am sorry my friend, but a few S-300 or Pantsir S1 by themselves are simply not enough to tip the balance between (again, I repeat this because this is important) a FIRST rate air force and a THIRD rate air defense network. Nor would a few SU-27 (even modern ones) or even MiG-31s. There is a very good reason why the Russian military has spend a lot of money on a multi-layered, highly integrated and highly redundant air defense network ranging from man portable units at the company level to strategic systems at the Front level, and such a network comprises not only missile systems, but AWACs, satellites, interceptors, electronic warfare systems (including airborne ones), encrypted datalinks between the various components, etc. etc. etc. Finally, this entire strucure us supported by dedicated military academies, research institutes, and the full power of the intelligence community. Syria and Iran are a million years away from having such a capability which even a superpower like China is only now slowly developing.
Blaming Putin for what happened is simple and convenient, but simply wrong. Sorry!
Cheers,
The Saker
Saker, what would you say is more achievable: An effective air defense system, or an air force with capable fighters and interceptors?
Or can Syria, at least hypothetically, develop powerful and accurate missiles that can significantly interfere with air base operations?
Lastly, what about a missile system that at least can deter heavy airstrikes through counter value targeting. In other words, a means to target the most valuable economic nodes in Israel, to the point where Israel would wish to avoid serious damage to Syrian infrastructure?
@Lysander:what would you say is more achievable: An effective air defense system, or an air force with capable fighters and interceptors?
It all depends on *specific* scenarios, with *specific* enemy forces. And what does “capable” mean? Its much more than systems and humans, its also geography and, crucially, which side attacks, whether tactical surprise can be achieved, what specific engagement tactics are chosen and many more things. There are so many variables that it is impossible to answer this question without many more specifics.
Or can Syria, at least hypothetically, develop powerful and accurate missiles that can significantly interfere with air base operations?
The Syrians do not have the technological instrastructure to do what the Iranians have been doing and develop their own missiles, but they have a very powerful missile in their inventory: the Soviet Tochka (http://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2013/01/05/9k79-tochka-tactical-ballistic-missiles-in-syria/) of which they reportedly have 1 brigade plus at least 36 missiles (according to Wikipedia). If that is true, then this is a far more capable missile than Saddam’s “Scuds” and I personally doubt that the Israeli “Iron Dome” can intercept them (though, of course, I might be wrong here. Nobody knows until this actually happens). The Tochkas are highly survivable, mobile, accurate missiles, and they sure could hit some very important Israeli targets (airbases in particular). Yes, they are not the latest Soviet or, even less so, Russian technology, but they are really very good systems and I am sure that they top the Israeli list of concerns. BTW – these Tochkas might well be protected by Pantsyr S-1, a much better use of these mobile anti-air missile/artillery systems than protecting poultry farms :-)
So yes, if the reports of Tochkas in Syria are true, and if the Syrian military is skillful in their use, they could really hurt the Israelis with these missile systems.
Syria also has these old Scuds which could also be used, but which are far more vulnerable, less accurate and easier to intercept. Still, they could probably add to the pain, in particular if skillfully combined Tochkas.
HTH. Cheers!
Saker,
Appreciate your response and can tell you that the issue of certain codes being passed on was brought about by serious folks, including Israelis….otherwise I would not toss it around!
But I am fully aware of the capabilities and complexities that you have so well enumerated in your two responses…
Best,
Joe
On a related note Saker what is your estimation of how powerful the Russian Zionists are? There’s a large Russian Jewish community with strong links to the Russian Israelis plus the Zionist argument that Russia and Israeli face a common threat from Islamic terrorists which must resonate among many people.
@Joe & Robert: The question of the Zionist power in Russia is a fair one to ask, I would even say that it is an very important one. While I cannot prove a negative, I can say the following with a high degree of confidence:
a) in the 1990s Russia was ruled by the USA and the Jewish oligarchs; during these years Russia almost ceased to exist as a country
b) Putin is the person to credit with ridding Russia of these overloads; what happened in 2000 was not the election of a new President, but truly a process of *regime change*.
c) Putin earned himself the eternal hatred of the Anglos and the Jews for tossing them out of the Kremlin.
d) in the Russian context, this *regime change* did not happen overnight, but is an ONGOING process which began in 2000 and which still is going on.
e) the Medvedev Presidency was very much a “zag” following Putin’s “zig”, and while now in the minority, the “Atlantic integrationist” of the Medvedev camp are still fighting hard and outright sabotaging a lot of the efforts of Putin’s “Eurasian sovereignists”.
f) in this context the Zionists are (very intelligently) keeping a low profile and, unlike what is taking place in the USA, are avoiding getting directly involved in the pro-Israeli propaganda; but they are still very much there.
g) Putin is first and foremost a pragmatist and he would not hesitate to sacrifice Syria for Russian national interests. HOWEVER, he is also a realist and an extremely smart man, advised by extremely well-informed and intelligent folks.
From all of the above I personally conclude this:
IT MAKES NO SENSE FOR RUSSIA TO ASSIST THE ISRAELIS IN THEIR ATTACKS ON SYRIA. Not only does this make no sense in the context of trying to save the Assad government, it makes no sense economically. Would you EVER purchase a Russian air defense system if you suspected that the Russians would immediately help your enemy defeat them?!
However, please consider this carefully:
IF YOU WERE ISRAELI WOULD YOU NOT LOVE TO BRAG ABOUT HOW YOU GOT SOME RUSSIAN “CODES” JUST TO DEMORALIZE YOUR OPPONENTS AND TARNISH THE REPUTATION OF RUSSIAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS?
I say that the Israelis probably have excellent intelligence about these systems but rather than to say that they got it from the USA or their own agents, they also skillfully spread the rumor that “haha, we got it from the Russians”. For them, its a win-win rumor.
Is that not a far more plausible scenario?
Cheers,
The Saker
Saker,
Many thanks for this latest response and i am inclined to believe your excellent argumentations…
I was in my responses merely repeating what i heard from various sources…but your points are more convincing to me…
Best,
Joe
There is a couple of factors that favour Russia’s insurgency efforts over Syria.
1) Syria’s neighbouring nation states North and South are actively directly trafficking, training and supporting fighters to go into Syria which is virtually impossible to stop given the border and arms by groups operating in Iraq.
2) The hotbed of the insurgency is areas near sea access where they can receive supplies by boat.
3) Syrian forces are not skilled in fighting the insurgency with top defection inside the military and probably spies giving aid to rebels and foreign intelligence.
4) The international community like with Serbia has more pressure that they can use to support the rebels like initiating a no-fly zone and sanctions.
The one advantage Syria has as far as I can tell is that they don’t have large mountainous terrain to operate in like with the Caucasus mountains as well as Iranian and Hezbollah fighters.