Following the lead of the New York Times, now it is Stratfor’s turn to finally start deciphering the writing on the wall. Check this out:
——-
Editor’s Note: The following is an internal Stratfor document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
As night falls in Georgia, the conflict is entering a new phase. Intermittent fighting continues in South Ossetia as isolated pockets of Georgian troops are mopped up or try to exfiltrate. The Russians are heating up the situation in another Georgian breakaway region, Abkhazia, in order to intensify pressure on Georgia, and they are creating military options for further operations inside Georgia proper. But the primary issue now is a political one.
With its South Ossetian operation, Russia has demonstrated three things. First, it has shown that its military is capable of mounting a successful operation — something that outside observers had expressed doubts about. Second, the Russians have shown that they can defeat a U.S.-trained force. And third, they have demonstrated that the United States and NATO are in no position to intervene militarily.
Moscow’s primary audience for these messages was the rest of the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine, the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These messages also were intended for Poland and the Czech Republic, who are hosting U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. Russia is certainly not threatening to invade anyone else; instead, it is inviting everyone to reconsider their assumptions about the correlation of forces in the region.
The real issue now is what comes next. There are indications that the Russians do not intend to invade Georgia proper, but that they are asking for a regime change in Tbilisi as the bargaining price. (Or, if not a regime change, then at least the replacement of Georgia’s president and other figures Moscow dislikes.) The Russians can achieve this only if they appear ready to attack — and the Georgians will test them to find out whether they are bluffing. Therefore, the Russians can’t afford to bluff.
The situation thus remains extremely volatile, and it is not yet clear whether Russia is satisfied with the outcome. Moscow might want more, and it might use force in the process of going after it; even now, the Russians continue to eviscerate what remains of Georgia’s military capability. Various diplomatic initiatives are under way, including French and German attempts at mediation. But the more diplomatic initiatives that emerge without being backed by threats of force, the more credible the Russians will be.
This is deja vu for me. I found Stratfor comments on the Kosovo war to be staightforward and generally unbiased although I have since found Mr. Friedman to be somewhat of a Neocon.
When I read the acceptance of Kosovo on the BBC I couldn’t believe the arrogance. It is not difficult to imagine mounting Russian anger which could only lead to this.
I came across your blog by way of Whatreallyhappened. Although I don’t speak Russian my wife does, who came from eastern Ukraine. It is not easy finding the other side of this story as the controlled media is so dominant.
Tustin, CA
I have to sort of laugh at your three points and assessment.
Point by point observation:
“First, it has shown that its military is capable of mounting a successful operation — something that outside observers had expressed doubts about.”
I doubt that it was ever truly considered by those that actually put thought into it, that Russia was not capable of pulling off a successful military operation. In fact, quite the opposite, Russia’s army has always be formidable in a Conan kind of way. (I WILL CRUSH YOU).
“Second, the Russians have shown that they can defeat a U.S.-trained force.”
Uh, what U.S. trained forces? Some elements of the Georgian Military was trained, but that is a long way from saying that all of the Georgian army was “U.S. trained”. Furthermore, its hard to train them in the U.S. style when their equipment is still primarily Russian. So I have to disagree with this broad blanket statement. If you want to make a real comparison statement, lets talk about how the U.S. dismantled a Soviet/Russian modeled army, not once, but twice in Iraq. Until then, be more precise with your language.
But furthermore to the point, as usual Russian (OVERPOWER) style, they overran a small country with limited military firepower. I daresay if Georgia had been properly trained and equipped similiarly as Israel has been by the U.S., the Russians would be taking more of a pounding than they are.
“And third, they have demonstrated that the United States and NATO are in no position to intervene militarily.”
Considering that Georgia was not a NATO member, this is hardly news. Had they been otherwise, you’d be seeing different headlines. In fact, I would wager that once NATO (i.e. the U.S) re-established control of the skies over Georgia, Russia has two options: Escalate or withdraw. There would be no way for them to control the ground after they lose the skies.
This of course is dependent on how far the Russians really want to push the envelope… if they decide that convential warfare isn’t enough… well then we are all in trouble.