By Rostislav Ishchenko
Translated by Ollie Richardson and Angelina Siard
cross posted with http://www.stalkerzone.org/rostislav-ishchenko-the-tomorrow-of-donbass/
source: http://alternatio.org/articles/articles/item/62541-zavtra-donbassa
Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zakharchenko, the Head of the DPR, the chairman of the board of ministers, and also the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the republic perished. He was one of the most charismatic leaders of the Donbass uprising, the potential leader not only of a united DPR and LPR, but also of all the Southeast. And since it is precisely the Southeast, in the conditions of holding minimally honest elections, that determines the format of Ukrainian power, Zakharchenko could’ve (owing to a certain combination of circumstances) become the first actual national president of Ukraine.
However, events obviously developed in an alternative way. That’s why in practice Aleksandr Zakharchenko was that person who persistently and consistently led Donbass towards Russia, openly affirming that he doesn’t see another destiny for the region.
It isn’t surprising that after his death a feeling of uncertainty appeared in Donbass. A question arose: what will happen tomorrow? Will Zakharchenko’s course be preserved or will it be changed? And if it is changed, then how and when?
Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky was also a charismatic general, the youngest front commander at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, and also perished shortly before the Victory (on February 18th, 1945) at the age of 37 (Zakharchenko was 42 years old). He also didn’t protect himself.
I write that he didn’t protect himself because on February 18th, 1945 the commander of the 3rd Belarusian front Chernyakhovsky had no vital need to be in the firing range of an artillery shell fired from German positions, and in addition – in the limits of the enemy’s visibility. The destiny of the East Prussian offensive operation that the front participated in was almost solved on January 26th, when troops of the neighboring 2nd Belarusian front of Marshal Rokossovsky arrived at the Baltic Sea near Elbing, having cut off the East Prussian group from Germany. It was possible to finish the enemy without leaving the HQ.
Zakharchenko in exactly the same way, in conditions where the in agony Kiev regime looks for any opportunity to aggravate the situation, could’ve paid more attention to his personal security.
But both died – they died because they lived as they lived. And if they had lived in a different way, then they wouldn’t have become military leaders.
And it’s not a coincidence that I wrote that both of them died on the eve of the Victory. The capitulation of the Reich was signed less than three months after the death of Chernyakhovsky. The East Prussian operation that came to an end on April 25th was the last one for the troops of his front.
Now the situation is less obvious than it was in 1945. Nevertheless, the term agony, when applied to the Kiev regime, is not at all an exaggeration. It’s not a coincidence that Poroshenko tries to find any reason to aggravate the situation. He needs arguments to preserve his power by force. And it doesn’t matter how – whether by introducing martial law and cancelling elections, or by exposing a “plot” of “agents of the Kremlin” and sending all those who can damage his approval rating behind bars. What is important for him is to transfer the process of the race for power from the legal sphere to the framework of force. But he will most likely lose in the framework of force, but at least here he has a chance, unlike with elections.
And Poroshenko tries to apply himself. He deploys the project of creating a “united Ukrainian local orthodox church”, by receiving Tomos of Autocephaly from the Constantinople patriarchy. At the same time, since no canonical church in Ukraine asked for autocephaly, he invents a certain “national autocephaly”. This is a provocation of religious war in Ukraine. Poroshenko hopes that all armed nazi gangs will be on his side when it comes to seizing temples from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). And the blood that will thus inevitably be shed will allow him to, as a minimum, postpone elections for an indefinite period of time. If the opposition tries to stand up for the canonical church, it will find itself on the receiving end of the blows of these same armed nazis.
He declares the termination of the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and partnership with Russia. This statement is absolutely senseless. Ukraine anyway doesn’t abide by this Treaty, but if it is officially terminated, then serious ramifications await Kiev. But this creates additional tension in bilateral relations and allows to interpret the actions against Poroshenko as “work for the Kremlin”.
He throws Kirill Vyshinsky – the head of the RIA Novosti Ukraine agency – in prison and is preparing to jail another 30-50 well-known journalists and public figures in order to, first of all, shut the mouth of the opposition, and, secondly, to accuse politicians with higher approval ratings – his competitors in the fight for the presidency – of committing “state treason”, together with this opposition.
He already organised a lot of similar provocations, including jailing the former Ukrainian “heroine” Nadezhda Savchenko. The act of terrorism that claimed Aleksandr Zakharchenko’s life became only the latest, and in principle not the last provocation. Zakharchenko’s death increasing the tension at the line of demarcation is also one of Poroshenko’s arguments in the race for power. Besides this, Poroshenko can now evade the unprofitable for him meetings with the leaders of the DPR/LPR, who not only Russia, but also France and Germany incline him to directly negotiate with. The pretext is simple for him – representatives of the republics don’t have the mandate of the people, they aren’t elected. Thus, Poroshenko can play for time, avoiding unprofitable to him discussions about the need for a meeting and its format. Not only direct contact with the DPR/LPR, but also even its theoretical assumption can upset very many militants who Poroshenko places a stake on.
But it is especially this stake that allows us to speak about the agony of the regime. Let’s remember history. The Ukrainian state started to shake (and plaster fell down from it) during the unconstitutional seizure of presidential power by Yushchenko in 2005, and after the unconstitutional dispersal by him of the duly elected parliament in 2007. After the armed coup of 2014 the Ukrainian state started collapsing, losing territories and control of the central power over the regions that weren’t able to escape. Moreover, in the spring months it was especially on the verge of disappearing, before the formal legitimation of the power of Poroshenko via new presidential elections. The former speaker-president Turchynov now says, without hiding himself, that they held onto power via preventive terror exclusively.
Now Poroshenko again leads an already fatally exhausted and extremely worn-out Ukrainian state towards anti-constitutional methods of solving the question of power. At the same time, people hate him, and those who will succeed him are loved not much more. Only the formal legitimacy of power that is expressed in its international recognition still keeps Ukraine united. The competing oligarchical groups still hope that the international community will somehow stabilise the internal political situation for them, and that they will be able to remain engaged in their favourite thing – plundering the people and the country.
All this shaky design starts instantly collapsing as soon as the legal framework is in the rear view mirror.
This is a big trouble for Russia and for the EU, but it’s not a catastrophe. “Nord Stream-2” is on the verge of being launched, which is supposed to take place in 2019. Even if the Ukrainian transit of gas is terminated already this year, the EU will be able to live through one winter. It’s not for nothing that in Germany gas storages were actively being built and filled, and Russia increased its capacity for the transportation of liquefied gas.
Nobody at all has the grounds to maintain the stability of the Ukrainian regime. Big civil war in the whole of Ukraine – and not just small war in Donbass – has been more favorable to the US since the beginning. That’s why they also help Poroshenko with Tomos.
For Europe, it is all the same. Bypass gas pipelines have almost been constructed, and it turned out that, except for gas transit, the Ukrainian state has no other use. If the country starts collapsing, then it’s possible that France and Germany will even find some advantage in the fact that Poland, Hungary, and Romania will be obliged to defend their compatriots and it isn’t excluded that they will lay claim to others territories. They will need the support of the EU to solve the arisen international legal problems and they will need to restrain their own pro-Americanism for some time.
But Russia will be given a free hand in Donbass. In principle their hands will be free all over Ukraine too. But it must be kept in mind that from all the regions of Ukraine, only Donbass has been already partially integrated into the Russian economic, legal, and financial systems. It doesn’t mean that it will be inserted into the structure of Russia already tomorrow (though presently everything is possible), but the fact that integration processes will be accelerated and that the framework of the region being integrated will widen practically doesn’t raise any doubts. It simply has nowhere else to be put.
So, in the same way that the death of General Chernyakhovsky changed nothing in the destiny of the Reich – not even adding a few minutes of life to it, the death of General Zakharchenko didn’t change anything in the destiny of Ukraine either. The in agony regime, which doesn’t have any substitutes from among adequate politicians owing to a lack of such persons in Ukraine, in principle can’t bring the country (which stopped being de facto a state already long ago) anywhere besides the grave.
It also won’t change anything in the destiny of the Minsk Agreements. Zakharchenko’s death doesn’t influence the obligations of Ukraine in any way. Kiev still didn’t understand that these agreements were signed in such a way that Russia wins regardless of whether Ukraine implements them or not. The question consisted only in how much Ukraine will lose. Should the agreements be implemented, it would preserve quasi-statehood in the form of a weak confederation, and the people wouldn’t incur those costs that they incur now – in the form of unemployment and the destruction of education-healthcare systems and municipal services. Now it is the financial system’s turn. Ukraine chose another option – the most expensive of all. Nothing is left of the state anymore, soon the country won’t exist, and the destinies of tens of millions of people are forever crippled (not to mention the tens of thousands who died in the civil conflict and those who died because of the sharp fall in the standard of living). Now the Ukrainian elite, in the person of Poroshenko and his opponents, starts the process that can end in hundreds of thousands of direct victims and the destruction of what remains of civilisation infrastructure within the borders of Ukraine, turning it into territory that is unsuitable for life.
Zakharchenko’s death won’t stop these processes. It won’t postpone even for a minute what’s only inevitable for Ukraine, Poroshenko, and all the Ukrainian elite (and, unfortunately, for the mass of Ukrainian citizens). This is a matter not of subjective desires, but of objective reality.
Major General Zakharchenko won his war.
I still believe that, in principle, it makes sense to divide Ukraine along the line of the Dnieper, with everything to the East of that river reverting to Russia. (After all, the whole of Ukraine was part of Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution). The Dnieper is a sound, unmistakable geopolitical boundary that is also a serious military obstacle. And the people to the East of it are overwhelmingly Russian.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOrBUKHgV7Y
Speaking of fruits of a nation…
This comment reiterates a simplistic understanding of the actual demographics, frequently evidenced among the armchair corporals in the west.
To get a slightly better grasp on reality (and to help understand one of the central reasons why Moscow has no interest in prising the two tiny and incomplete Donbass regions away from the rest of Ukraine), people who like to comment here about secession or partition but are not familiar with Ukraine, may like to picture this. Imagine a plain whitewashed wall, where you are standing with two pots of quick-drying paint, say yellow (thinly diluted) and red (thick and slurpy) and two brushes, one huge, 12 inches wide and thick-bristled, the other a paltry one-inch brush with many of its bristled fallen out.
First, take the wide brush, saturate it thoroughly for a minute or two in the thick red paint and then drag it from the right side of the wall, slowly across to the left side.
Now take the little, flea-bitten brush, dip it gingerly into the pot of yellow paint, place it at the top left side of the wall and drag it rightwards, Ebven though most of the paint is quickly exhausted, you may continue to drag it rightwards and traces of yelllow may continue to emerge almost to the other side.
Now, stand back and observe your handiwork.
The red paint starts thick, remains tick as you look leftward, and is slightly thinning and paling as it reaches the left side. The red represents Ukrainians wholly or mostly sympathetic to Russia, or at the very least, to their Russian and or SU roots. They are ALL fluent in Russian and most are nearly fluent in Ukrainian, at least receptively. Most of them remain pragmatic and realistic about their heritage and historical connnection with greater Russia and shared soviet and empire experience.
The yellow starts off fairly clear at the very left of the wall and quickly thins out rightwards, so that even when it reaches Zhitomir, Odessa and Kiev it has all but been swamped by the red. The yelllow represents Ukrainians who identify with Galitzia and are either extremely or partially hostile to the Russian heritage all around them. They are fluent in Russian and usually in Ukrainian, but they studiously avoid speaking Russian. Some of them are, well, far-right. Others less so but Ukrainian-nationalists.
There is absolutely no cut-off that conveniently demarcates the Reds from the Yellows. Or rather, there is no cut-off that demarcates the red swish _anywhere_ between left and right sides of the wall! Even snipping off a tiny piece in the far west and calling it Galicia/Galitzia or Ukraine would leave many within that rump dissatisfied, particularly those who feel some affinity with Russia 9yes there are those) and more affinity with Romania, Hungary or Slovakia, than with Poland or any sense of Ukrainian uniqueness.
Petra
I am afraid you have contradicted yourself. You have stated that no clear cut division can be made inside Ukraine, yet with your expose you have virtually confirmed that a clear cut division can be made, or something very close to it. It is a fact that 75 % of current Ukraine has been built on historic Russian lands. Nobody disputes the fact that western Ukraine, the former Galicia, has no affiliations with Russia. However, this does not apply to eastern and central Ukraine. Yes, the Donbass is made up of Russians, so of course it is pro Russian. However, central Ukraine is the key. Which way will it go ? In the end to Russia. Just to point out that by December of 2017 a total of 4.4 million Ukrainians fled to Russia. And how many of these 4.4 million were from central Ukraine ? Probably the bulk.
No I have not. The inconvenient truth that many refuse to recognise is not that Russian-leaning Ukranians / Russians in Ukraine are thick in the east, but that — and this is what I had hoped our paint experiment might illustrate — that Russian-leaning Ukranians / Russians in Ukraine are almost as thick in central Ukraine and (indeed) yet in western Ukraine. For obvious reasons (Mariupol? Odessa? ___ fill the blank?) they are keeping a low profile. Please remember that it does not take enormous numbers to run an SS operation.
Prising two half-regions,”half-Donetsk” and “half-Lugansk” away from Ukraine will not only do nothing for the Russia-leaning Ukrainians/Russians in Ukraine in the remainder of Ukraine — it will actually set them back. This is something that Mr Putin, Russians in Russia and Russia-leaning Ukrainians / Russians in Ukraine well understand.
Regarding the flood of refugees, which I have drawn attention to several times here, many millions have fled and are fleeing both to Russia and to the west via Poland (mainly). There is no simplistic pattern that says something like those fleeing into and through Poland are nationalists/galitzians/russophobes/whatever and those fleeing to Russia are novorussian/malorussian romantics. My many contacts in western, central and eastern Ukraine both still living in Ukraine and settled now or on the way to both Russia and Britain, Switzerland, Germany etc. are overwhelmingly balanced about understanding Russia’s stance,
Of the few who are more extreme in their views, even I, who has a long history of contact with the country and its wide array of people and opinion, am surprised to hear expressed an almost universal sentiment that the Yanukovich days were halcyon in comparison. Which of course, reinforces the warning/observation I am making, that Russia cannot (and will not) betray the _vast_ majority of Ukrainians by peeling bits. (And please do not mention Crimea, because as even the NC bigts behind all this admit “off-mike”, that ain’t ever going back.)
BF, just to respond also to a couple of the other specifics in your comment that I omitted for the above.
No, There is no pattern to the origins of the refugees in RF (and to Khazakstan, by the way) and those going to and through Poland. Both directions of passage include “red paint” Ukrainians, i.e.Russia-leaning, from across the country, from east to west, with this small exception, that most of the refugees from the secessionist half-D and half-L made their way initially to RF for obvious reasons. But even then, many have found a way of moving into Poland, Germany and GB. I personally know Donetsk refugees living in Poland.
To repeat my original paint point, this mental “regionalisation” into E, W or E, C, W or NR, MR, Gz and obsession with identifying a demarcation for the imaginary partition obscures the demographic facts on the ground. (Please reread my paint metaphor.).The only plausible split would be a tiny fracturing in the ultra west with a little going to P, a little to H, a little to Slovakia and a little to Romania. But this is not a likely scenario, and one that Moscow would prefer to avoid and can avoid; and unwelcome to Hungary, Slovakia and Romania (for domino reasons at the very least). But again _we are not talking here_ about “western Ukraine” but a tiny fringe of territory (I mean tiny) at the western edge of western Ukraine. Sometimes I wonder whether people grasp the size of the country.
I doubt there would really be a good way for dividing Ukraine. Wherever the border was, there would always be lots people who identify more with the other side. Maybe that would not matter if the countries on both sides of the new border had good relations – but if they had good relation, such a division probably would not be necessary in the first place.
Crimea was a different case – it had always been a separate entity that had little in common with the rest of Ukraine to which it had been added by an accident of history, and there were no doubts about the borders.
The ideal solution would be if there was widespread acceptance for diverse aspects of Ukraine, bilingualism with the two main languages (and smaller minority languages) and – what is probably more difficult – different concepts of history. Some parts of Ukraine share most of their history with Russia, others never belonged to the Russian empire and some were sometimes a part of the Russian empire and sometimes not. If Ukrainians try to base their culture on people who wrote in Ukrainian or even on people who supported Ukrainian statehood, the result is a very narrow base for such a relatively large country, one that includes a large share of violent extremists and one that is very divisive for people in different parts of the country. Both these people (if possible without the worst extremists) and Ukrainians who became important writers, politicians and other important people in the Russian empire and the Soviet Union were included in what is regarded as Ukrainian heritage, the situation would become much better. But it may be doubtful whether that is possible.
In any case, the situation with a unitary (non-federal) state and a relatively strong role of the president is hardly adequate. What mostly happened that either a president was elected who was mostly popular in the East and South or one who was mostly popular in the West, depending on how many votes they could get from the center. The losing side did not feel represented, and often the results were narrow. Maybe now, without Crimea, the politicians who have their power base in the West of the country think they can dominate for a long time, but that does not remove the problem with these internal divisions.
I think a federal system would be more appropriate, and perhaps it would be better if there was not just one president and one prime minister, but a system like in Switzerland with a government consisting of several people (7 in the case of Switzerland) among which it is customary to have an adequate number of politicians from the different parts of the country.
In general, I don’t think there is just a division between two parts within Ukraine. There are at least three parts of Ukraine that are quite different from each other – the East and South (Kharkov, Donetsk, Odessa etc.) which is closest culturally to Russia (but also has some distinct Ukrainian characteristics), the West of Ukraine (Lviv, Vinnytsya etc.), which has never been a part of the Russian empire (it belonged to Poland and Austria-Hungary in different times) and has relatively little in common with Russia and the central part with the capital Kyïv and areas on both sides of Dnieper that is in many respects in between the Eastern/Southern and Western part of Ukraine. In such a division with at least three parts (or more smaller parts), e.g. for a confederation, the borders would be so problematic any more because in all cases, people close to the border would still have quite a lot in common with the part of the country on both sides. A shared concept of Ukrainian nationhood for Lviv and Donetsk is hard to imagine, but with a strong center where a more diverse concept of Ukrainian nationhood could develop and which can mediate both with the East/South and the West that have less in common with each other, it might work out.
Unfortunately, it seems that such ideas mostly have support in the East and South of Ukraine, with people from the former party of regions or today’s opposition block (after all, although they are sometimes called pro-Russian, there programme is not unification with Russia), while in the West of the country, the predominant goal still seems to be to impose their idea of Ukrainian nationhood on the whole country.
I don’t think Dnieper would be a particularly good border. Odessa, a city that has been founded by Russians and is almost exclusively Russian-speaking would belong to the Western part, while many rural areas on the Eastern side of Dnieper where probably more people preferred the Western part would belong to the Eastern part any Kyïv would be divided in two parts with the main city center in the Western part, but other parts of the city in the Eastern part.
Adrian E
Yes, you are correct. One can safely say that Ukraine is made up of three parts. However, the question is how different are they to each other. The west is certainly different to the east. And the central part ? It has more in common with the east then it has with the west. As I have said on numerous occasions, the east and central parts of Ukraine are bound to rejoin Russia. As for western Ukraine, I don’t think Russia even wants it, leaving it to Poland and Hungary.
One cannot actually “safely” say that, except in the echo chamber of like-minded internet forums, where we have heard it reiterated now for nearly five years. The purpose of my wall-painting exercise was to try to suggest that these mental divisions do not reflect the sociodemographic _continuum_ across Ukraine. To those familiar with the people populating those lands now, in the 21st century, _any_ line would be arbitrary and disingenuous, invoking images of “scramble for Africa” type entities. Fortunately, it will be people in Russia (and I daresay Kiev) who understand these things, who come to a resolution.
Petra
RT has yesterday quoted Pavel Klimkin, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, who has stated that almost one million Ukrainians are leaving Ukraine every year, although the true number is probably more than that. What is going to become of Ukraine when it finds itself in a situation of having a labor shortage ? The present negative situation will become even worse. What then ? Yes, you are right that people in Russia and Ukraine will come to a resolution. That resolution can only go in one direction, in the direction of the Russian Federation. As I have written before, the eastern and central parts of Ukraine will opt to join Russia. Of course I could be wrong as far as the central part of Ukraine goes, but then again how will it survive ? By living off loans ? I think not.
Petra
As an additional point, I would like to remind you that on 27 July 2018 the Russian Orthodox Church in Kiev celebrated 1030 years of the Baptism of Rus. The event was celebrated by 200.000 people in Kiev, proof that certain historical facts have not been forgotten.
Tom Walsh
Not a good idea. The Dnieper does not back history. If a division of Ukraine is made, then a frontier would have to be made west of the Dnieper, as 75 % of current Ukraine is based on Russian historic lands.
Saint Vladimir the Great, Prince of Kiev and all Rus, baptizer of Russia, pray to Christ that He have mercy on these people and His Church, to save them from the plots of evil men.
This is without doubt another project of the U.S. empire They have built up the military, supplying Ukraine with more advanced military hardware, just as they did in Syria with the mercenaries. An attack on the east would be a good distraction for Russia to allow the empire to then ramp up it’s assault on Syria and Iran with little Russian intervention. This may be a good time for Russia to move forces into the east to help defend them if and when the attack comes. Why are NATO forces there? I’m ashamed Canadian soldiers are there. Ukraine is not a NATO member.
I’m a new Christian, baptized into the Orthodox church last December. I’m very suspicious of Bartholomew, that he at least lacks in wisdom and understanding, being schismatic and possibly heretical. I understand he is very favorable to buckling to Rome. His foolish decision is going to cause the deaths of Orthodox believers for political reasons.
God have mercy.
This something that in the nearly four years of the war I have not seen brought up here either by contributors or by those commenters who appear to understand the situation well: there is a barely factored yet widely acknowledged observation amongst ordinary Ukrainian people of every persuasion across Ukraine (and Donbass) (and acknowledged in Russia too) that Kiev has no desire to “finish off” or otherwise resolve the Donbass crisis, and is as happy for it to cool to a frozen state as Moscow., because it provides perfect justification for the theft of assets and siphoning of tax and loan receipts, which is happening on a massive scale among the Ukr. elite and their US state and corporate connections, Though people widely acknowledge this, the official explanation of “war expenses” is sufficient to stifle any overt criticism or investigation.
Petra,
Ummm…..the summer ’14 cauldrons, Saur Mogilyeh, Debaltsyevo…..do they ring a bell?
Orcland did not ‘finish off’ the republics because even with open US and NATO help, it couldn’t and can’t.
Auslander
Very much so, And still very fresh in my mind.
However, we are not talking about “facts on the ground” but something very different, called internecine party-politicking. Remember, the next few months are crucial to both Poroshenko and his internal rival/enemies.
I think there are several reasons. Probably, an ongoing conflict with the unrecognized republics that are somehow perceived as “Russian” is crucial for getting Western support. For that purpose, it is necessary that the conflict goes on – it should not become too “frozen” (if it was as frozen as Transnistria or South Ossetia, Western countries might still lose interest), but a large-scale escalation is not necessary, either.
Certainly, the deflection of public attention from economic problems and corruption is easier when nationalism and the idea of being under threat can be used for political purposes. Without the conflict in Donbass, it would be much more difficult for the political elite in Ukraine to keep power.
But it is also not very clear what a resolution would mean. One option would, of course, be an implementation of the Minsk agreement with autonomy and reintegration for Donbass. But in addition to the problems mentioned above with the useful aspects of the conflict going away (less deflection of public attention from internal problems and probably less support from Western countries), this would also mean that almost 4 million people who mostly do not support the current government of Ukraine would vote again in Ukraine, and their autonomy rights according to the Minsk agreements could lead to people in other regions demanding the same. I think this would be the best option for Ukraine, but I think it is understandable that those who are in power in Ukraine (politicians and oligarchs) don’t find this particularly attractive.
The most violent option that is sometimes brought up is something like the Croatian action oluja in 1995 – driving out people (then Serbs in Krajina, now people in the unrecognized republics DNR and LNR) with massacres. But the situation in today’s Ukraine is very different from the situation in Croatia 1995, and the likelihood of a Russian intervention is not the only reason why that is not a realistic option for the Ukrainian government. Although it certainly was a crime, action Oluja served a useful purpose for Croatia, after expelling the Serbs in Krajina, Croatia was mostly homogenous. Even if the Ukrainian army could make the populations of Donetsk and Luhansk flee to Russia, Ukraine would not become much more homogenous. Unlike in Krajina, the population on both sides of the ceasefire line is not that different. In large parts of the East and South of Ukraine, there was no large-scale insubordination like in Donbass, but according to many polls (and in the voting behavior), these areas have a lot in common with people in Donetsk and Luhansk, and after large-scale massacres and the expulsion of people from DNR and LNR, the authority of the Ukrainian government over large areas would be called into question and it is questional whether Ukraine in its current form would survive this. This was quite different from the situation in Croatia 1995 where most Croats probably did not care too much about the refugees from Krajina in Serbia and the victims of the attacks. Therefore, the danger that someting like Oluja is attempted is probably not too big.
Perhaps, the Ukrainian government would like to retake Donetsk and Luhansk by force, without autonomy and amnesty, but also without expelling the inhabitants and without large-scale massacre. But that is hardly possible. People would certainly fight – especially if they were threatened with long prison sentences for treason -, and urban warfare is generally very brutal and impossible without large numbers of civilian victims. The two unrecognized republics mainly consist of two relatively large cities (most of the rural part of Donbass is under the control of the Ukrainian government), and it is unlikely that they could be conquered without a very large number of victims, which would not only make a Russian “humanitarian intervention” likely, but could also make Ukraine lose support from Western countries and possibly break apart (of course, there would be Ukrainian attempts to blame “Russian aggression”, but while such propaganda can sometimes be effective, it would hardly work if Ukraine started large-scale brutal urban warfare).
Therefore, I think most people who are in power in Ukraine (politicians and oligarchs) are aware that the violent options are not really viable and would not solve the Donbass crisis for Ukraine. Since that crisis is useful, anyway, the Ukrainian elite is probably fine with the status quo, and I don’t think the danger of a large-scale war should be overestimated.
Since in the near future, an implementation of the Minsk agreements by Ukraine can hardly be expected because the conflict is too useful, the main question is probably to what degree the conflict will be frozen. A really frozen conflict without any shooting (like in Transnistria or South Ossetia) would be good for the people who live there, but I fear that such a low level conflict would be too little for serving the purpose (deflecting attention from problems and getting Western support). Therefore, the most likely scenario for the near future is that Ukraine attempts to walk a fine line, neither letting the situation get too peaceful nor escalating too much. That is sad for all victims of smaller attacks, but at least it probably won’t get much worse soon.
One thing that could improve the prospects for peace in the future would be if there was if the relationship between Western countries and Russia improved, Western countries were not interested in keeping up pressure near Russian borders any more, and keeping the conflict would not be seen as a chance of getting Western support any more. Then, the conflict could still serve the purpose of deflecting attention from problems (although I doubt that works indefinitely), but if the other reason, getting support from Western countries, was not relevant any more (of if financial support was even made conditional on fulfilling the Minsk agreements), that might not be enough any more, the advantage of keeping up the conflict might not be big enough any more for the Ukrainian elite.
Europe is not stupid, although several of the ‘leaders’ thereof, it is patently obvious, seem to have dossiers in Langley that said ‘leaders’ pray every day are not made publik, and these dossiers explain to us why the likes of Merkel, Marcon et al make decisions that cause ponder to a five year old.
However, as laid out in the article, preparations are being made, and have been for the last three years, for the day that Orcland is no more. The ironclad truth is Europe can not survive without Russian gas and POL. Period. It’s that simple, and that explains all the shenanigans of sanction avoidance from everyone including US. No or drastically decreased gas/POL to Europe, and not so many shiny new Benz, BMV’s, Opels, Bosch appliances, etc etc etc ad infinitum, let alone that the peasantry will be come for the aristocracy with torches, pitchforks and ropes the first time they have to break the ice in their toilet on a chilly winter’s morn.
It’s going to get more ugly than it is now, but in the end Orcland will collapse, and possibly not that noisily, like the house of cards it is. The only two flies in that ointment is gas/POL for Europe, which is being alleviated as rapidly as possible with alternative delivery routes, and I don’t mean LPG from CehSha, and the aging and crumbling nuke power plants stumbling along in orcland. The NPP’s should give more than a few heart palpitations, they are that bad. How do I know? Inside source, an old family friend who stayed working at one, I won’t tell you which one or what he did, but he returned to safe haven a month ago and let me tell you, he is shaken by the condition of his plant. As he clearly stated, it’s a good thing that the upper atmosphere tends to move west north west from his previous location. Think ‘eastern’ Europe, IOW all of Europe.
The fact that Foggy Bottom did not get my peaceful little valley overlooking the harbor after the coup in Kiev negated every kopek they spent and have spent since, although the ‘since’ spending has been sheer spite because ‘Russia’ stole my peaceful little domicile. Of course, nothing could be further from the truth, but CehSha has to blame someone for their self impose disaster, so Russia it is.
So, life goes on. We lost a very important commander, but Russia has this habit of doing her level best to build in redundancy in just about everything she does, including supporting a new country, Novorossiya, and her, and it’s, military and control apparatus.
Zhak’s loss was tragic and sad, but DNR and LNR will live on and prosper as orcland stumbles on unsteady feet to her demise. So be it. Some things just can’t be changed, such as life and death, and the fate of orcland.
Auslander
Author
Never The Last One https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00ZGCY8KK A deep look in to Russia, her culture and her Armed Forces, in essence a look at the emergence of Russian Federation.
An Incident On Simonka https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01ERKH3IU NATO Is Invited To Leave Sevastopol, One Way Or The Other.
Correct, but it looks like Ukraine’s puppet-masters aim precisely at creating the ungovernable territory in the center of Europe filled with roaming gangs in cocamamie attempt to stop creation of a single functional Euro-Asian economic entity.
Read closely, those who have never understood Minsk 2:
“It also won’t change anything in the destiny of the Minsk Agreements. Zakharchenko’s death doesn’t influence the obligations of Ukraine in any way. Kiev still didn’t understand that these agreements were signed in such a way that Russia wins regardless of whether Ukraine implements them or not. The question consisted only in how much Ukraine will lose. Should the agreements be implemented, it would preserve quasi-statehood in the form of a weak confederation, and the people wouldn’t incur those costs that they incur now – in the form of unemployment and the destruction of education-healthcare systems and municipal services.”
And please, you don’t understand these matters better than Ishchenko or Putin. Your opinions for 3.5 years have never grasped the depth of Minsk 2, 13 steps, that were the steppingstones to the end of Kiev.
The militia delivered to Russia the border and barrier to the very soft underbelly of Rostov. Ukraine will never get that border back.
Like Crimea which came this close to falling into NATO hands, Donbass will be Russia and it will be armed as Crimea is.
Look at the action of the Russian coast guard and navy in the Azov. Virtual absolute control.
This is just the beginning.
Carefully watch Belarus. It will soon be another wing of the forming boiler.Ambassador Babich was sent there to run the place for the Kremlin.
When the time is correct or necessary, Kiev will fall.
Who will stop that moment? Not NATO or US. It will be all over and the criminals will be in chains and marched to tribunals before any reaction can be mustered.
The Russophobes crossed a line and signed their own warrants by this assassination.
With FSB doing the investigation now, Putin has changed to anti-terror from geopolitical. This is now an anti-terror war. The Russians have shown many times that they excel at this style of conflict.
Cleaning out the rest of the Donbass (2/3rds of the oblasts are in Ukie hands) will be surgical.
And if there were traitors in Donetsk, there are certainly thousands in the Ukraine who would easily finger the nazis and nationalist terrorists for the FSB and Spetsnaz to destroy.
The Bear was poked. The forest will be shaking.
I think the heavy weapons will be moved back to the front to silence the Ukie bombardments.
The bulk of my work has been based on countering the stupid bullsh*t about Minsk being a “betrayal” and “the militia would’ve had Mariupol” blah blah blah. Sofa “analysts” like to play with people’s lives as if they are elements of a video game. The population was exterminated? Just restart the game. Things are a bit different when it is your relatives who are these “pawns”. They complain that there is no “action”, that the war is “frozen”, that Armata tanks are not on the move to Kiev, yet it doesn’t enter their chicken brain that the S-400 and the Minsk Agreements are the only way of thrusting a stick into the wheels of the Anglo-saxon war machine AND there being a world worth living in as a result. Their “strategy” of mimicking Western behavior and bombing everything in sight will turn Russia into something as hideous and disgusting as that **** that was just buried named McCain. Russians are different. They could’ve exterminated Germany 70 years ago, and they had the moral right to do so, but they did not. Those who don’t understand why are lacking an equivalent experience of the Leningrad blockade, for example. Russia has never exterminated a nation – the empire always integrated the people living on the land it conquered. I can’t say the same for Britain, for example. And how does the thought of dropping nuclear bombs on cities even enter someone’s mind? When someone starts saying that killing people or aggression in general is the solution, then it is advised to walk away promptly, because standing in front of you is a neanderthal who can only think with their fists, and they will eventually turn on you and devour you.
http://theduran.com/ambassador-kurt-volker-us-to-drastically-expand-military-assistance-to-ukraine/
the US is willing to expand their military aid to Kiev – as if the US was not part of the plan and the deed of the death of Zak.
Yes, Ukraine is finished. As I have written before,the Western organized coup d’etat in 2014 started a chain reaction which cannot be stopped. Not only did the West fail to comprehensively analyze Ukrainian history – the fact that the first Russian state was centered in Kiev – but in Ukraine it applied the same methods of regime change it applied in Latin America, concentrating on the oligarchy for support. And the result ? The country is being plundered by both oligarchs and Western corporations while the population is being impoverished. By December of 2017 4 million Ukrainians fled to the West and 4.4 million to Russia. The only thing which can keep the oligarchs in power are the neo-Nazi elements, and only for a period of time, because not even neo-Nazis can solve a financial implosion, not to mention mass unrest.
Ukraine cannot survive in it’s present form. The eastern and central parts will certainly rejoin Russia, while the western parts will become an object of contention between Poland and Hungary. The EU certainly knows this, stating it has no more money to give to Ukraine. The US might try one more attempt at provoking a new war in the Donbass, but the results would almost certainly be catastrophic for Ukraine, speeding up it’s break up. The US will have to accept reality, having started a process which now it does not know how to conclude, being reduced to a spectator demanding more of the same, and this more of the same can only lead to a catastrophy.
Finally, today I have read that NATO has sent US and Canadian officers to the Donbass region. Why ? To give advice for a new military operation ? Not a good idea. NATO gave advice back in 2014, with catastrophic results for the Ukrainian Army. Even NATO HQ in Brussels was in a state of shock by what happened. This time it will be even worse. The Ukrainian Army is the personification of the Ukrainian population, which is demoralized. The morale of the Ukrainian Army cannot be better, if not worse.
I doubt that there is much desire in central Ukraine to join Russia, and Western Ukraine – where those who massacred Poles during WWII are revered as heroes – could hardly form a state together with Poland. The times when Galicia belonged to Poland is not remembered fondly by Ukrainian nationalists, and Poland has little desire for territorial expansions and certainly would not want the main centers of Ukrainian nationalism within its borders. Hungary might be interested in some villages where people speak Ukrainian, but neither the EU nor Poland nor Hungary sees the option of taking over responsibility for large parts of a poor country full of corruption as very attractive.
Adrian E
Times change. We shall see which way central Ukraine goes, bearing in mind that the Ukrainian Foreign Minister has stated that almost one million Ukrainians are departing Ukraine every year, although the number is probably higher. The country has found itself in a situation which is almost impossible to reverse, where a feudal mentality is governing the country. All the power is in the hands of Poroshenko and his oligarchs, while the population is being impoverished. How long can this last ?
On 27 July 2018 the Russian Orthodox Church in Kiev celebrated the 1030 years of the Baptism of Rus. The celebration was attended by 200.000 people, and this says plenty. These people have obviously not forgotten history.
Posting a link from Cassad-outlines an alleged “plan” for kiev offensive with some 12,000 ukies and nato mercs; have no idea as to the authenticity of the ‘plan but here it is.
Just a passing observation would be that for the ukies to move (if at all possible) to the Russian border would not seem to be a very good idea. The other passing observation would seem to be that a cauldren could be surmised just from the disposition of ukies advancing on their designated ‘attack’ routes.
https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/
(BTW, from what little I know, cassad seems to have access and has almost immediately current photos and videos but I’m sure that many on this site have more detailed insight into his blog (posted in Russian but can be translated via google-ugh) Scrolling down is recommended.
The actual article you reference is: https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/4433044.html
FYI each article on Cassad has its own URL.
Generally, he has very good source material on Donbass and Syria.
He also is a very good analyst.
He has a very professional approach most of the time.
Russia: A warning to Ukraine
Today, Russian Foreign Minister Serguey Lavrov drew a parallel between the situation in Georgia in 2008 and that in Ukraine today: In 2008 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili had “imagined that everything was allowed him, and attacked his citizens, “he said adding that according to him, we can say the same thing about Ukraine. The permanent pledges of NATO membership made in Kiev have “turned the heads” of Petro Poroshenko, and now Kiev is strengthening its military means on the Donbass line of contact.
We remember the consequences of Saakashvili’s attitude in 2008: On the night of August 7 to 8, 2008, when Georgian soldiers entered Tskhinval in South Ossetia, the Russian army intervened and expelled them, then continued its advance and finally stopped near Tbilisi, capital of Georgia. This war resulted in the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Moscow.
If one replaces Ossetia with the Republics of Novorossya, Russia’s warning to Ukraine is very clear: Do not enter Novorossya, otherwise we will intervene. By continuing the transposition, the Russian army will approach Kiev and finally Russia will recognize the independence of the Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.
In 2008 the United States strongly advised against Saakashvili to intervene in South Ossetia. The Georgian President had gone beyond. Today in Ukraine, however, the United States delivers arms, and US military advisers are on the ground. The situation is even more serious than in Ossetia, since Ukrainian President Poroshenko could benefit, contrary to Saakashvili, from American support.
While in Syria Russia supports a decisive attack by government forces against terrorists, despite the “warnings” issued by the Americans, it is possible that the United States want to open a second front against Russia in Ukraine.
via google translate from:
https://rusreinfo.ru/fr/2018/09/russie-un-avertissement-a-lukraine/
Interesting article at SOTT… by Christopher Black – international criminal lawyer based in Toronto.
‘ …the Kiev-NATO cabal cannot break the will of the peoples of the Donbas nor of Russia and so the constant attacks, the constant propaganda, the constant turning of the economic screws…’
https://www.sott.net/article/395165-Alexander-Zakharchenko-Donetsks-hero-is-dead-and-bloody-flows-the-Don
Interesting excerpt (not new but astonishing all the same):
Expressed differently, the United States has not won a major conflict since 1945; has a trillion-dollar national security budget; has had 17 military commanders in the last 17 years in Afghanistan, a country plagued by 23,744 “security incidents” (the most ever recorded) in 2017 alone; has spent around $3 trillion, primarily on that war and the rest of the war on terror, including the ongoing conflict in Iraq, which then-defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld swore, in 2002, would be over in only “five days or five weeks or five months,” but where approximately 5,000 U.S. troops remain today; and yet 74% of the American people still express high confidence in the U.S. military.
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2018/09/nick-turse-u-s-military-winning-no-really.html