(thanks to L. for pointing me to this article)
The King’s Torah: a rabbinic text or a call to terror?
Prohibition ‘Thou Shalt Not Murder’ applies only ‘to a Jew who kills a Jew,’ write Rabbis Yitzhak Shapira and Yosef Elitzur.
The marble-patterned, hardcover book embossed with gold Hebrew letters looks like any other religious commentary you’d find in an Orthodox Judaica bookstore – but reads like a rabbinic instruction manual outlining acceptable scenarios for killing non-Jewish babies, children and adults.
The prohibition ‘Thou Shalt Not Murder’ applies only “to a Jew who kills a Jew,” write Rabbis Yitzhak Shapira and Yosef Elitzur of the West Bank settlement of Yitzhar. Non-Jews are “uncompassionate by nature” and attacks on them “curb their evil inclination,” while babies and children of Israel’s enemies may be killed since “it is clear that they will grow to harm us.”
“The King’s Torah (Torat Hamelech), Part One: Laws of Life and Death between Israel and the Nations,” a 230-page compendium of Halacha, or Jewish religious law, published by the Od Yosef Chai yeshiva in Yitzhar, garnered a front-page exposé in the Israeli tabloid Ma’ariv, which called it the stuff of “Jewish terror.”
Now, the yeshiva is in the news again, with a January 18 raid on Yitzhar by more than 100 Israeli security officials who forcibly entered Od Yosef Chai and arrested 10 Jewish settlers. The Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security agency, suspects five of those arrested were involved in the torching and vandalizing of a Palestinian mosque last month in the neighboring Palestinian village of Yasuf. The arson provoked an international outcry and condemnation by Israeli religious figures, including Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Yona Metzger, who visited the village to personally voice his regret.
Yet, both Metzger and his Sephardic counterpart, Chief Rabbi Shlomo Amar, have declined to comment on the book, which debuted in November, while other prominent rabbis have endorsed it – among them, the son of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Sephardic Jewry’s preeminent leader. Also, despite the precedent set by previous Israeli attorneys general in the last decade and a half to file criminal charges against settler rabbis who publish commentaries supporting violence against non-Jews, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz has so far remained mum about “The King’s Torah.”
“Sometimes the public arena deals with the phenomenon and things become settled by themselves,” Justice Ministry spokesman Moshe Cohen told the Forward.
A coalition of religious Zionist groups, the “Twelfth of Heshvan,” named after the Hebrew date of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, has asked Israel’s Supreme Court to order Mazuz to confiscate the books and arrest its authors.
“You open the book, and you feel that you read a halachic book. And it’s a trap,” said Gadi Gvaryahu, a religious Jewish educator who heads the coalition. It was, in fact, “a guidebook [on] how to kill,” he charged.
Family members who answered phone calls placed to the homes of both authors said they did not wish to comment.
In 2008, author Shapira was suspected of involvement in a crude rocket attack directed at a Palestinian village. Israeli police investigated but made no arrests.
Co-author Elitzur wrote an article in a religious bulletin a month after the book’s release saying that “the Jews will win with violence against the Arabs.”
In 2003, the head of the Od Yosef Chai yeshiva, Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh, was charged by then-Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein with incitement to racism for authoring a book calling Arabs a “cancer.”
In 2006-2007, the Israeli Ministry of Education gave about a quarter of a million dollars to the yeshiva, and in 2007-2008 the yeshiva received about $28,000 from the American nonprofit Central Fund of Israel.
“The King’s Torah” reflects a fringe viewpoint held by a minority of rabbis in the West Bank, said Avinoam Rosenak, a Hebrew University professor specializing in settler theology. Asher Cohen, a Bar Ilan University political science professor, thought its influence would be “zero” because it appeals only to extreme ideologues.
But the book’s wide dissemination and the enthusiastic endorsements of prominent rabbis have spotlighted what might have otherwise remained an isolated commentary.
At the entrance to Moriah, a large Jewish bookstore steps from the Western Wall, copies of “The King’s Torah” were displayed with children?s books and other halachic commentaries. The store manager, who identified himself only as Motti, said the tome has sold “excellently.”
Other stores carrying the book include Robinson Books, a well-known, mostly secular bookshop in a hip Tel Aviv shopping district; Pomeranz Bookseller, a major Jewish book emporium near the Ben Yehuda mall in downtown Jerusalem; and Felhendler, a Judaica store on the main artery of secular Rehovot, home of the Weizmann Institute.
The yeshiva declined to comment on publication statistics. But Itzik, a Tel Aviv-area book distributor hired by the yeshiva who declined to give his last name because of the book’s nature, said the yeshiva had sold 1,000 copies to individuals and bookstores countrywide. He said an additional 1,000 copies were now being printed.
Mendy Feldheim, owner of Feldheim Publishers, Israel’s largest Judaica publishing house, said he considered this a “nice” sales figure for a tome of rabbinic Halacha in Israel. He said his own company, which distributes to 200 bookstores nationwide, is not distributing “The King’s Torah” because the book’s publishers did not approach the company.
Prominent religious figures wrote letters of endorsement that preface the book. Rabbi Yaakov Yosef, son of former Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, blessed the authors and wrote that many “disciples of Torah are unfamiliar with these laws.” The elder Yosef has not commented on his son’s statement.
Dov Lior, chief rabbi of Kiryat Arba and a respected figure among many mainstream religious Zionists, noted that the book is “very relevant especially in this time.”
Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, one of the country’s most respected rabbinic commentators, initially endorsed the book, but rescinded his approval a month after its release, saying that the book includes statements that “have no place in human intelligence.”
A handful of settler rabbis echoed Goldberg’s censure, including Shlomo Aviner, chief rabbi of Beit El and head of Yeshivat Ateret Yerushalayim, who said he had “no patience” to read the book, and spoke out against it to his students.
Previously, Israel has arrested settler rabbis who publish commentaries supporting the killing of non-Jews. In addition to Ginsburgh, the Od Yosef Chai yeshiva head, in 1994, the government jailed Rabbi Ido Elba of Hebron for writing a 26-page article proclaiming it a “mitzva to kill every non-Jew from the nation that is fighting the Jew, even women and children.”
“The atmosphere has changed,” said Yair Sheleg, senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute, who specializes in issues of religion and state. Previous governments took a tougher stance against such publications, he said, but “paradoxically, because the tension between the general settler population and the Israeli judicial system is high now, the attorney general is careful not to heighten the tension.”
It is not uncommon for some settler rabbis, in the unique conditions of West Bank settlement life, to issue religious decrees, or psakim, that diverge from normative Jewish practice. In 2008, Avi Gisser, considered a moderate rabbi from the settlement of Ofra, ruled that Jews may violate Sabbath laws and hire non-Jews to build hilltop settlements. And In 2002, Yediot Aharanot reported that former Israeli Chief Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu sanctioned Jewish harvesting of Palestinian-owned olive trees.
an interesting article here:
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61934
could be one of the reasons why S300 for Iran are still put on hold.
alibi
Alibi, that is an interesting article. So, do you think Russia is freezing S-300 deliveries to Iran, expecting the US to do the same with Georgia?
@Alibi & Carlo: seems to me that, if true, this is a bizarre trade. Frankly, even if Uncle Shmuel arms Georgia to the teeth, it will not be able to repeat its attempts to invade South Ossetia and, even much less so, Abkhazia.
Right now, the toughest spot for Russia is still South Ossetia, but work is underway there and before US arms get delivered and the Georgians get trained on them Russia will have fortified the border of South Ossetia with Georgia and, hopefully, dramatically improved the infrastructure in South Ossetia itself to allow for a much faster and, even more so, smoother insertion of Russian troops into the Republic should Georgia attack again. My understanding is that Abkhazia, being much easier to reinforce, would be much easier to defend. Even if the USA delivers PAC-3 Patriots to the madman in Tbilissi, this will not affect the events on the ground. The entire concept of the Georgian attack on South Ossetia was predicated on the notion that Russia would not be able to reinforce on time to stop the Georgians from taking over all of South Ossetia. Now that this is not an option anymore, an attack would have to be predicated on actually overcoming Russian ground forces and that is something which I personally do not see the Georgians EVER being capable of doing.
Carlo
We can only speculate on this. But this article gives us some ground to think that if the Russians give something to the west they make sure that it pays off I can‘t imagine what else would make the US to become so sensitive in regards to rearming Georgia and we all know that Russia is still at fault there having occupied a big chunk of Georgian territory so the US should feel obliged to restore the justice. The Russians have a long history of geopolitical trading with the west. Personally I think that the trading balance is still positive for Russia since the August war and that’s the time during which Medvedev has been blamed for being too soft.
Saker: “Frankly, even if Uncle Shmuel arms Georgia to the teeth, it will not be able to repeat its attempts to invade South Ossetia and, even much less so, Abkhazia”
Absolutely. But by refusing Georgia with the arms that Saak is asking for the US send a message to those who can hear. Russia is blamed for the invasion and occupation and Georgia is an oppressed island of freedom suffering from it’s northern bad neighbour and what do we have at the end? The occupier gets a reset button and the freedom fighters get a moral support and what never happened before – refused a material support. A very loud message indeed.
alibi
@Anonymous
“…and we all know that Russia is still at fault there having occupied a big chunk of Georgian territory so the US should feel obliged to restore the justice.”
No Russians are not at fault since the breakup of the USSR Georgian forces and proxy Chechen lead militia units have repeatedly attacked the enclaves and Georgia is the one who violated the ceasefire agreement that launched the war.
Russia wants to create a protective base in the two regions and a buffer zone around the regions which Georgia used the neighbouring Georgian villages as a shelter to launch attacks.
And we know the OSCE monitors from the Kosovo example are staffed by western military intelligence officials.
Jack
The Russians needed this war and needed it badly, Saak was just dumb enough to fall into the trap.
alibi
@alibi: two questions:
a) why do you think Russia needed that war?
b) what evidence do you have that Russia prepared for it?
Thanks,
The Saker
Saker
Russia was running out of time back in 2008. During the NATO summit back in Bucharest, Bush kept pushing Germany and France to allow Georgia to join the MAP. The Germans and French didn’t cave in at that time so NATO assured Georgia in a special communiqué that they would eventually join the alliance once the requirement for membership were met. Members promised to REVIEW the decision in December 2008 at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Ukraine was just queuing behind Georgia, Azerbaidjan was next and Kasakhstan watching closely while being extensively courted by the US. So this REVIEWING was extremely important for both sides Russia and the US. There was enough time for Bush to persuade Merkel to give her nod, and France would follow. It was just too risky for Russia to wait and see what happens. No wonder the skirmishes between the Georgians and the enclaves intensified greatly. Earlier Russia sent it’s engineer troops to Abkhasia to rebuilt it’s railways, Russian passports hand outs helped a lot too so the Georgians got a feeling that time was running out for them as well. Saakashvilly for some reason was pretty sure that Russia wouldn’t get involved and this along is an evidence of an intensive work done by the Russian intelligence in both Washington and Tbilisi. Otherwise why would Saak leave the Roki tunnel intact the only route for the Russian forces to get in. Ok Saak and the whole bunch of his generals were not adequate but the US military advisers I’m sure were, and I wouldn’t believe for a sec
that they didn’t participate in the planning. And if the plan was to capture S. Ossethia and hold it until Bush and co would pressure Russia to back off and accept it why would you leave the only possibility for the Russians to ruin the whole plan and keep the Roki tunnel intact? And the Russians including the top military officials on many occasions kept saying that they would respond accordingly should the Georgians use force against the enclaves. So – how is it – the Russians warned loudly and officially and the Georgians and Yankees didn’t buy it? The only answer I can see – the Russian intel made them both to believe that those were just empty threats.
And one more thing – the speed of the Russian forces response. That was something. Considering that it took a few hours to get the UN Council together, that Putin was in China and Medvedev somewhere down the Volga river the speed was awesome. I even felt proud at that moment. It took for Russia quite a few days back in 1999 to move troops against the Chechens during the Basaev’s invasion. And Dagestan was a Russian territory and Russia had plenty of troops stationed there, and the Chechens actually committed an act of war against Russia and not some territories in question. Sure the Russian army had changed a bit since 1999 but not that much.
alibi
Saker
Russia was running out of time back in 2008. During the NATO summit back in Bucharest, Bush kept pushing Germany and France to allow Georgia to join the MAP. The Germans and French didn’t cave in at that time so NATO assured Georgia in a special communiqué that they would eventually join the alliance once the requirement for membership were met. Members promised to REVIEW the decision in December 2008 at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Ukraine was just queuing behind Georgia, Azerbaidjan was next and Kasakhstan watching closely while being extensively courted by the US. So this REVIEWING was extremely important for both sides Russia and the US. There was enough time for Bush to persuade Merkel to give her nod, and France would follow. It was just too risky for Russia to wait and see what happens. No wonder the skirmishes between the Georgians and the enclaves intensified greatly. Earlier Russia sent it’s engineer troops to Abkhasia to rebuilt it’s railways, Russian passports hand outs helped a lot too so the Georgians got a feeling that time was running out for them as well. Saakashvilly for some reason was pretty sure that Russia wouldn’t get involved and this along is an evidence of an intensive work done by the Russian intelligence in both Washington and Tbilisi. Otherwise why would Saak leave the Roki tunnel intact the only route for the Russian forces to get in. Ok Saak and the whole bunch of his generals were not adequate but the US military advisers I’m sure were, and I wouldn’t believe for a sec
that they didn’t participate in the planning. And if the plan was to capture S. Ossethia and hold it until Bush and co would pressure Russia to back off and accept it why would you leave the only possibility for the Russians to ruin the whole plan and keep the Roki tunnel intact? And the Russians including the top military officials on many occasions kept saying that they would respond accordingly should the Georgians use force against the enclaves. So – how is it – the Russians warned loudly and officially and the Georgians and Yankees didn’t buy it? The only answer I can see – the Russian intel made them both to believe that those were just empty threats.
And one more thing – the speed of the Russian forces response. That was something. Considering that it took a few hours to get the UN Council together, that Putin was in China and Medvedev somewhere down the Volga river the speed was awesome. I even felt proud at that moment. It took for Russia quite a few days back in 1999 to move troops against the Chechens during the Basaev’s invasion. And Dagestan was a Russian territory and Russia had plenty of troops stationed there, and the Chechens actually committed an act of war against Russia and not some territories in question. Sure the Russian army had changed a bit since 1999 but not that much.
alibi
Contd
I’m not saying that the Russians were meticulously prepared for that war as the time the intensity and the general command was left for Saak, the Russians probably would have intensify the border clashes between the Georgians and the enclaves by the Fall. Russia just keept provoking Saak and dragging him deeper into the conflict. The war of that magnitude was just a hand of God for them.
alibi
hi Saker
Im not sure if my first post in regards to your questions will find it’s way around, the “contd” post is a follow up on the topic.
If the first one would go missing let me know I’ll try to repost it. Still confused by the system.
alibi
@Alibi: you offer a very interesting and, in many ways, compelling version of the events. I think that your case that Russia had to do something before Georgia, the Ukraine and Azerbaijan would join NATO is very strong. However, let me still offer a couple of counters to what you say and see what you respond, ok?
1) strategic rationale: even if we assume that NATO would have been crazy enough to try to incorporate a military like the Ukraine’s (in shambles) and against the will of the population, I would call it a *strategic* rationale for Russia to want to provoke some kind of crisis to stop this process from proceeding. Actually triggering a war with Georgia is, in this non-military context, a tactical goal. One does not automatically entail the other. But even if we assume for the sake of the argument that Russia did decide to use a conflict with Georgia as the way to achieve its goal, I still have my doubts.
2) the Roki tunnel. First, as far as is known, the Georgian plan was precisely to reach the tunnel and prevent Russian reinforcements from coming in. It is the desperate resistance of the Ossetian militias inside Tskhinval which forced them (mistakenly, I believe) to allocate resources to combat on the periphery of the city and even inside it instead of rushing to the north. How can I explain such a massive blunder on the Georgian side? By what I think is a typically Georgian feature: a huge bloated and a all-prevailing hubris. “NATO is with us! The Russians scared! The Ossetians are just puppets! We are like America, invincible! We even have their hardware! etc.” All the analyses I have seen about this war show that they did want to get to Roki but just failed to keep a clear focus on what they were doing. Basically, their commanders are incompetent idiots.
3) Roki – part2. I do not believe that even if the Georgians had reached Roki it would have stopped Russia. I remind you that Russia had at least one more way to reach Ossetia – through Abkhazia (that is why the Georgians never allocated all their forces to Ossetia – some of them were kept at the Abkhaz border. Furthermore, I do believe that Russia could have re-taken Roki from the Georgians and even that Russia could land several paratroop battalions deeper inside Georgia and use vertical envelopment to both free Ossetia and, in the process, annihilate the Georgian military
To be continued…
4) Roki taken – hypothetical Russian response: let us assume that Roki is taken, that most of South Ossetia is in Georgian hands and that the Ossetians are only capable of small guerrilla actions against the invader. The Russian High Command did have the means to issue the following orders:
i) using Abkhaz and Russian forces, attack and destroy the Georgian positions in the Kodori Gorge; insert one Paratroop company at the south entrance of the Gorge. (24 hours)
ii) send in reinforcements by sea and land to Abkhazia until 3-4 battalion tactical groups are ready to enter Georgia through the Gorge. (48 hours)
iii) bomb the Senaki airfield, and prepare it for the deployment of one Airborne battalion tasked with holding the field until reinforcements from Abkhazia come in. (24 hours); prepare the airfield for a sustained airlift operation of Russian forces into Georgia (36 hours)
iv) deny the entire Georgian airspace to the enemy air force and proceed to destroy military targets throughout the depth of the country, with a special focus on reducing the mobility of Georgian forces and disrupting their communications. Declare the entire air space of Georgia a closed military zone. (36 hours)
v) conduct a sustained bombing effort on the Georgian side of the Roki tunnel; dispatch by helicopter a special tactical group to free the entrance to the Roki tunnel; this group is to include FACs to act in coordination with SU-25 strikes (36 hours)
[this is just an outline, it does not cover all aspects such as (covert) operations from Armenia, Adjara or naval operations]
I believe that this rather basic operational plan would have ended the war in about 72 hours since, at that moment, Russian ground forces would have been fanning out inside Georgia proper.
Of course, the timetable given above assumes a degree of readiness, but that is consistent with your hypothesis that Russia did have a conflict with Georgia as a goal.
My point? Even if the Georgians had seized the Roki tunnel they would have lost the war in about 4-7 days anyway. Sure, the Russians would have had more casualties and the effort would have been bigger, but the outcome would have been the same.
5) Signs that Russia was caught off guard: I think that there are a lot of signs that Russia was caught totally off-guard by this war. For example, did you know that most Russian aircraft were shot down by Russian units in cases of “friendly fire”? The ground forces clearly has zero information about what the Russian Air Force was doing. Speaking of the Air Force – the Air Force acted in totally improvisation with crews and aircraft flown in from training centers, without any form of coordination from the air or the ground. I think that the *HUGE* degree of improvisation of the Russian Air Force is a very good indicator that Russia was caught off guard by the Georgian attack.
6) the Russian peacekeepers. If Russia had premeditated or even expected a Georgian attack, three things would have happened to the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Tskhinval:
i) it would have prepared the base for strikes by the Georgian artillery and air force and it would have prepared from direct tank attacks.
ii) the Russian forces would have had a ready evacuation plan including transport vehicles and escorts; instead it took a specially skilled (and lucky) Russian recon force to extract the peacekeepers
iii) the peacekeepers themselves would have included FACs which would have coordinated close air support inside and around Tskhinval as soon as the war began.
Nothing of the sort was done.
to be continued…
7) Sure the Russian army had changed a bit since 1999 but not that much.
The Russian army – yes. But the *North Caucasus Military District*?
It changed IMMENSELY. Even just between 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 it changed immensely. And even much much more so between 2000 and 2008. The NCMD is by far the most capable and most ready of all Russian MDs. True, its hardware is 2nd and 3rd rate, but in terms of training and professionalism, these are the best forces in Russia right now. That is one thing for which Russia as to thank the Chechens: their horrible but most skilled wars forced, and I really means *forced*, Russia to finally wake up from its slumber, depression and chaos and to recover its real capabilities. The fact that most of the hardware in the NCMD is hoplessly old also makes sense: Russia did not expect to fight an enemy equipped with modern hardware, hence all those T-72, BTR-70 and the rest of this museum like parade of old stuff. But a I would prefer a skilled MR battalion equipped with T-72s over a “parade” MR battalion equipped with T-90A anytime, would you not? If there is one thing which is clear about the folks of the NCMD is that they are tough SOBs, trained through years of war, and that having beaten down the Chechens they did not even break a sweat in smashing the “parade” Georgian military.
I think that this goes a very long way towards explaining why Russia reacted so fast. Even the Generals were awake this time. For example, did you know that on the very FIRST DAY of the attack the Russians established a special headquarters near Vladikavkaz and that this operational command was headed by the C-in-C of the Russian ground forces. I posted that news on my blog on the very same day and right there I knew, I KNEW, that Russia “meant business” and that the Georgians would loose (at the time the prevailing opinion of “experts” was the “Georgian was a tough nut to crack” and that Russia was in dire straights. I am proud to say that, just with the 2006 war in Lebanon, I called this one correctly on DAY 1)
For me the only surprise was that the Black Sea Fleet also responded so rapidly. But that is only a reflection of my ignorance of the real state of affairs in the BSF. Maybe you have sources that can help you comment on this aspect. If you do, I would very much appreciate any info on that topic.
Anyway – what do you make of my arguments to indicate that Russia was not ready?
Cheers!
The Saker
Saker
The Georgians should have just blown it that’s all, a few spec ops groups would do that perfectly, so why wasn’t that done?
Would have my doubts here. Georgian air forces were still operatable until Sep 11 a transport airplane would be just too vulnerable target to risk it.
I would speculate here but my take on this is that the Yankees would expect the Georgians to quickly capture Tskhinvali dig in and hold on for a few days whilst the US and its gang would pressure Putin to back off and accept the reality, probably by selling him something like say Ukraine would not join NATO or something alike. There was no point whatsoever in taking Tskhinvali if you weren’t able to hold it at least for a while. And there were only two ways to hold it – 1. Just hold it fending off the oncoming Russians which would be plane stupid. 2. Blow the Roki tunnel and make the Russians go all the way through Abkhasia /just imagine what cry would stay all over the free world putting Russia under immense pressure/
Just your usual Russian army. It’s never prepared for a war that is looming. It wasn’t prepare back in the 19th Century fighting the Crimean war, then the Turks later, though Russia beat the Turks eventually and was about to capture Istanbul but that was due to the ground troops’ heroism and despite the general command involvement. Then there was a 1905 war with the Japs – Russian army wasn’t ready again, then the WW1 – a disaster, war with Finland – wasn’t ready, the Russian army wasn’t ready for 1941 either though the whole country’s resources were brought to get it ready for the war, I’ d say that the Afghan war was probably a single exception when it would be hard to blame the top command for being incompetent because they were competent and military wise the invasion was executed perfectly.
I guess the Russians could expect anything from the Georgians, but killing the peacekeepers? That was the biggest mistake done by the Georgians.
Exactly my point – even the generals were awake. The RUSSIAN GENERALS. Just think about that.
alibi
Correction – Georgian air forces meant to be Georgian air defence.
alibi
Hi Saker
For some reason the system cut off your quotes I was referring to in my post above. If you want I can repost it with your quotes included.
alibi
“First as far as is known, the Georgian plan was precisely to reach the tunnel and prevent Russian reinforcements from coming in”
The Georgians should have just blown it that’s all, a few spec ops groups would do that perfectly, so why wasn’t that done?
“Russia could land several paratroopers battalions deeper inside Georgia”
Would have my doubts here. Georgian air defence was still operatable until Sep 11 a transport airplane would be just too vulnerable target to risk it.
“Even if the Georgians had seized the Roki tunnel they would have lost the war in about 4-7 days anyway. Sure the Russians would have had more casualties and the effort would have been bigger, but the outcome would have been the same”
I would speculate here but my take on this is that the Yankees would expect the Georgians to quickly capture Tskhinvali dig in and hold on for a few days whilst the US and its gang would pressure Putin to back off and accept the reality, probably by selling him something like say Ukraine would not join NATO or something alike. There was no point whatsoever in taking Tskhinvali if you weren’t able to hold it at least for a while. And there were only two ways to hold it – 1. Just hold it fending off the oncoming Russians which would be plane stupid. 2. Blow the Roki tunnel and make the Russians go all the way through Abkhasia /just imagine what cry would stay all over the free world putting Russia under immense pressure/
“The ground forces clearly had zero information about what the Russian Air Force was doing. Speaking of the Air Force, the Air Force acted in totally improvisation with crews and aircraft flown in from training centers, without any form of coordination from the air or the ground. I think that the *HUGE* degree of improvisation of the Russian Air Force is a very good indicator that Russia was caught off guard by the Georgian attack”
Just your usual Russian army. It’s never prepared for a war that is looming. It wasn’t prepare back in the 19th Century fighting the Crimean war, then the Turks later, though Russia beat the Turks eventually and was about to capture Istanbul but that was due to the ground troops’ heroism and despite the general command involvement. Then there was a 1905 war with the Japs – Russian army wasn’t ready again, then the WW1 – a disaster, war with Finland – wasn’t ready, the Russian army wasn’t ready for 1941 either though the whole country’s resources were brought to get it ready for the war, I’ d say that the Afghan war was probably a single exception when it would be hard to blame the top command for being incompetent because they were competent and military wise the invasion was executed perfectly.
“the Russian forces would have had a ready evacuation plan including transport vehicles and escorts; instead it took a specially skilled, (and lucky) Russian recon force to extract the peacekeepers”
I guess the Russians could expect anything from the Georgians, but killing the peacekeepers? That was the biggest mistake done by the Georgians.
“Even the Generals were awake this time. For example did you know that on the very FIRST DAY of the attack the Russians established a special headquarters near Vladikavkaz and that this operational command was headed by the C-in-C of the Russian ground forces”
Exactly my point – even the generals were awake. The RUSSIAN GENERALS. Just think about that.
Alibi
Saker “Anyway – what do you make of my arguments to indicate that Russia was not ready?”
I don’t think the Russians could tell the exact time and magnitude of the attack and that says a lot about degrading of it’s intel ability. The Russians had no idea about the capability of the Georgian air defence either. But this is normal for the Russian army. Hubris – is a vice inherent the Russian army for centuries.
alibi