Dear friends,
I am under the very strong impression that a lot of folks are in a full-blown “panic” mode for no valid reason at all. I did my best to calm things down in my recent Q&A/FAQ+RFC post (if you have not read it *please* do so!) but my feeling is that my words have fallen on deaf ears. Then I tried again, by posting Yuri Baranchik’s article. Again, I was underwhelmed with the response. So this time I have decided to let somebody much better qualified then myself, Alexander Mercouris, give it a try. Honestly, I don’t expect that those who have fully made up their minds will be convinced by this effort either, but I hope to at least reassure those who are on the fence or just confused by a complex situation.
While I am on this topic, I have apparently confused many people by posting the Mozgovoi and Strelkov letters. Let me clarify, I did that because I assumed that they 1) he wants the same thing as I do 2) that they are honest and 3) that they might be right. However, as I have said it many times, the difference between “possible” and “probable” is absolutely huge. Yes, Mozgovoi and Strelkov might well be right, this is possible, but this is not probable, at least not in my opinion. I think that they are wrong.
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| Russian Security Council Emblem |
I also want to share something else here. There are different “vision levels” out there. As somebody who did strategic analysis on the General Staff level I assure you that things look very different from a national command position then form a division, army corps or even army level. Mozgovoi strikes me as probably an excellent regimental-level commander. Strelkov clearly has a much higher potential: though he does not have the rank for that (major-general) he seems to have the potential to make an great corps commander. But these are still not the level of national leaders who have a much, I would say infinitely, more complex reality in which to operate. During the 1812 war or during WWII Russian generals often had very different ideas than Kutuzov or Stalin, but the latter always prevailed in their decision. If the choice is to trust Mozgovoi or Strelkov on one hand and Putin on the other, for me personally – it is a no-brainer whatsoever, if only because the former two simply do not have access to the kind of information Putin has. In fact, in the Russian government system, only a select few would have the full picture: officially – the permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and, in reality, an informal and small group of people really close to Putin personally. Though they might well be right, I am not denying that, to simply assume that Mozgovoi or Strelkov have the full picture is simply wrong. And if we accept that they don’t have it, why assume that they are necessarily right in their appreciation of the situation?
The ease and speed by which practically the entire Novorussian leadership was changed should indicate to you how high these men really are in the real Russian hierarchy of power and that, in turn, should tell you something about the kind of access they enjoy.
Anyway – please read Mercouris’ analysis of the ceasefire agreement and protocol.
Kind regards,
The Saker
PS: for a full picture please also read Mark Sleboda’s analysis who takes the opposite view and who sees the ceasefire as a sign that Russia is losing.
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CEASEFIRE by Alexander Mercouris
(Written 6th September 2014)
The ceasefire agreement is the subject of intense discussion and has clearly left some people unhappy. I will make a few quick observations here before returning more fully to this subject later when I am under less time pressure than I am at present:
1. The ceasefire has been forced on Poroshenko and the junta as a result of (1) the disastrous military situation the junta now finds itself in and (2) the refusal of the NATO/EU powers to intervene militarily on his behalf to redress the balance. The last was again clearly reiterated by Obama at the NATO summit yesterday when he publicly refused even to supply the junta with weapons (NB: we should not take that seriously – weapons have already been supplied on a significant scale but clearly even the outward appearance of involvement through token public weapons transfers is being ruled out). Incidentally Obama’s talk about the importance of Article 5 of the NATO Charter was intended to underline this point. Obama brought up Article 5 not to “reassure the Baltic States” – which are not being threatened and do not therefore need this reassurance- but to underline to Kiev the point that as the Ukraine is not part of NATO it is not entitled to military help from NATO.
2. The ceasefire agreement announced yesterday has not been published but it gives the strong impression of being a purely technical, temporary document for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It is unlikely it will hold for very long. Either it will be replaced by a more permanent agreement or the fighting will resume
3. The most important point about the ceasefire agreement is not its terms but that following Putin’s refusal to “agree” a ceasefire with Poroshenko he was obliged to agree it with the NAF (see below on this Page). This is something Poroshenko, the junta and the Maidan movement have up to now adamantly refused to do. By negotiating with the NAF and coming to an agreement with them on a substantive issue namely a ceasefire the junta has been forced to acknowledge that the NAF are not merely “terrorists” but are parties to a conflict and therefore people the junta must negotiate with.
4. The DPR/LPR have won a decisive military victory so that their survival is no longer in doubt. Those who worry that the junta will use the ceasefire to rebuild its army in order to resume its offensive disregard
(1) the fact that the junta’s attempt to achieve a military victory at a time when the military odds were overwhelmingly in its favour has ended in disastrous failure. The NAF is now an immeasurably stronger and better organised force than it was in April when the “anti terrorist operation” began or in July when the junta launched its great offensive in order to destroy it. This really has been a case of Nietzsche’s famous dictum that “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger”. If the junta could not defeat the NAF in the period April to July it cannot do so now;
(2) the junta is in no position to relaunch an offensive on anything like the scale of July any time soon. Not only is the junta’s military in no condition to resume the offensive but the catastrophic economic situation and the onset of winter absolutely precludes it. If the ceasefire holds it is much more likely that it will be the NAF that will continue to grow in strength as it gains more recruits, has more time to train them and repairs and absorbs into its arsenal the cornucopia of weapons it has captured;
(3) Russia will not allow the DPR/LPR to be destroyed. The junta’s and NATO’s claims that the Ukrainian military were defeated by the Russian army rather than the NAF are untrue but actually now benefit the NAF because they have established the perception that Russia will in any crisis intervene militarily in order to save them. In politics perception is 90% of the battle and the perception that Russia will not let the NAF be defeated or let the DPR/LPR be destroyed will determine decision making in Washington, Brussels and Kiev from now on.
5. Since there is no possibility now that the DPR/LPR will be destroyed the political initiative now rests with them. They have made absolutely clear what their objectives are (1) total withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from their territory and (2) full independence from Kiev. As I have previously said Putin supports (1) and is slowly coming round to (2) (see below on this Page). Poroshenko is of course rejecting both. Days ago he was also rejecting demands for a ceasefire and talks with the NAF and he has now been forced to concede both. It is no longer within his power to deny the NAF’s further demands and the fact that he has been forced to say publicly that he rules them out shows that he knows it.
6. None of this course means that the junta will not try to use the ceasefire to improve its position on the ground. The fact that Poroshenko has been defeated does not mean he is reconciled to the fact. Were he to become so such authority as he still has in Kiev would melt away. It is precisely because Poroshenko cannot bring himself to accept defeat that I expect him to do everything he can to try to reinforce his position by misusing the ceasefire for that purpose. It is for that reason I expect the ceasefire to be only temporary and to be followed by a renewed NAF offensive before long.
7. I suspect what disappoints most people about the ceasefire (see the comments made about it for example by Gleb Bazov and Colonel Cassad) is that it appears to rule out the option of an NAF march on Kiev to overthrow the junta. However the reality is that this option had been ruled out some time ago as was made clear by Zakharchenko at his press conference of 2 weeks ago (see my discussion at the time on this Page). The whole tone and content of Zakharchenko’s comments since he was confirmed as the DPR’s leader is that the NAF is fighting a purely defensive war to defend its people and territory. I appreciate that this is disappointing for many people but there it is.
8. Lastly and by way of postscript I would add
(1) the decision not to march on Kiev is surely the reason behind the dismissal of Strelkov who made his intention to march on Kiev clear. It is now universally believed that Strelkov’s dismissal was engineered by Moscow as part of its political strategy for the Ukraine. Whilst this is no doubt true I suspect this underestimates the strength of feeling on this issue within the Donbas itself with many (most?) people there fighting to defend their families and homes and unwilling to march on a Kiev they no longer want to have anything to do with. I would add in passing that the extraordinary publicity Strelkov was getting cannot have failed to rile some of the other commanders who must have felt their own contribution was being overlooked. I suspect Strelkov’s panicked reaction on 9th August 2014 to the junta’s attack on Krasny Luch and his unjustified criticism of the town’s defenders was for these people the final straw.
(2) the now certain secession of the Donbas is not the end of the Ukraine’s crisis. That is still in its early stages and has very far to go. At best we are at the end of this crisis’s beginning. That however is a big issue to discuss when I have more time.
SOME POINTS CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE
Since the ceasefire was announced criticism has mounted with more criticism from people like Gubarev. I understand some of this criticism but I think it would help to explain some points.
Criticism is now focusing on two specific issues:
(1) The protocol of the ceasefire agreement, which is in Russian only.
and
(2) Complaints that the ceasefire benefits the junta more than the NAF and is at the very least premature.
In my opinion (1) is simply wrong. There is much more to be said for (2). However there are points to be made even about (2).
The Protocol
Before discussing the Protocol in detail I want to say that this is in my opinion an essentially academic discussion. The wording of the Protocol does not bear the weight people are attaching to it if only because those involved in the conflict will interpret it in their own way. I merely discuss this issue because others do.
1. The first point to understand about the Protocol is that it originates from a forum, the Tripartite Contact Group, that was supposedly set up to “implement” Poroshenko’s (non) peace plan. The NAF is not formally a member of the Contact Group. Its members are the OSCE, Russia and the Ukraine. The Contact Group “invited” the NAF representatives to attend and provided a venue for discussions between the junta and the NAF, which was useful for agreeing a ceasefire. However the Protocol is in no sense a final settlement agreement. That is postponed pending the “national dialogue” the Protocol refers to.
2. The Protocol is a technical document. If one ignores the language of the Protocol (deriving from the Contact Group’s origins as a body to “implement” Poroshenko’s (non) peace plan) and focuses instead on its content it is clear that it is the NAF that has gained most from it. Specifically
(1) It has obtained a “bilateral ceasefire” something it has been seeking since April. Please note that the key word is “bilateral”. Poroshenko’s previous ceasefire was unilateral which meant he could end it whenever he wanted to and that he did not recognise the NAF by declaring it. What “bilateral” means is that the Ukraine now acknowledges the NAF as a party to the conflict and is negotiating with it. As I have previously argued Poroshenko did everything he could to avoid this and tried to agree a ceasefire with Putin instead of with the NAF. Putin said no.
The word “bilateral” incidentally also means that Kuchma’s status is no longer in question. The junta had previously pretended that he was not representing it. Since Kuchma negotiated the ceasefire, which is “bilateral”, and since the junta is bound by what he agreed, the fiction that Kuchma does not represent the junta is over and he is confirmed as the junta’s representative in negotiations with the NAF.
(2) the Protocol commits the junta to a total amnesty and an exchange of prisoners. Quite apart from the obvious human considerations by definition this again recognises the NAF as a party to the conflict since the people so amnestied can no longer be criminals or “terrorists”.
(3) the Protocol reproduces language drawn from the 17th April 2014 Geneva Statement about the dissolution of “illegal groups”. Note however that in light of (1) and (2) since the junta now recognises the NAF as a party to the conflict it cannot in logic any longer claim in international law that the NAF is an “illegal group”. Already the NAF leadership is treating this part of the Protocol as referring to the various paramilitary groups controlled by people like Kolomoisky and Right Sector.
(4) Russia is a signatory of the Protocol. This is crucial. The US and EU by contrast are not signatories to the Protocol. They have been completely cut out of the negotiations. The fact that the Protocol is only in Russian and that there is no official translation of it into any other language (apparently not even Ukrainian) is a significant fact in itself. The long weeks of February to July when the Russians negotiated fruitlessly with the US and EU are over. Since Russia is a signatory of the Protocol it is a party to it. Since the US and EU are not signatories to the Protocol they are not parties to it. Its signature gives Russia grounds to act if the terms of the Protocol are breached. Russia has not had clear cut grounds to act up to now, As a party to the Protocol Russia is in effect its guarantor and it now does.
3. The part of the Protocol that is causing the most criticism are the sections that refer to “decentralisation” and to local elections happening under a Ukrainian law for “decentralisation”.
(1) The point to understand about these sections is that the Protocol does not present itself as a final political settlement of the conflict. That in theory depends on the “inclusive national dialogue” referred to in the Protocol (wording that also ultimately originates with the 17th April 2014 Geneva Statement). Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky immediately following their signing of the Protocol made clear that the NAF’s objective remains full independence. Zakharchenko has said the same today (8th September 2014).
(2) The fact that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky issued their statement immediately after the Protocol was signed (but before it was published) refutes claims by people such as Gubarev that they did not know what they were signing when they signed the Protocol but that they merely signed whatever was put in front of them. On the contrary it is clear that they wanted to make their position unambiguously clear precisely because they did not want their intentions to be misconstrued by the language of the Protocol.
(3) The point here is that the Protocol provides for elections to local bodies of power which because they would happen in accordance with a Ukrainian law the Ukraine would be legally obliged to recognise. It is a foregone conclusion that these elections if and when they happen will be won by the NAF. If so since the Ukraine is legally obliged to recognise the elections it is also legally obliged to recognise their outcome (the “international community” would be as well).
(4) What this section of the Protocol therefore means is that the Ukraine not only now recognises the NAF as a party to a conflict but once the elections are out of the way will also be legally obliged to recognise the NAF as the political leader of the Donbas.
4. Having made these points, let me now make the key point: the Protocol is in my opinion a total red herring. The Protocol is not a contract or a treaty. There is no court or tribunal that will arbitrate on the meaning of its words. All the sides will construe it as they wish. The junta will not of course construe it as I have done and nor will its western backers even though my interpretation is undoubtedly the correct one. The junta will continue to call the NAF “terrorists” and will continue to deny they are the representatives of the Donbas whether they win an election or not. Certainly the junta will not recognise an election the NAF wins or any declaration of independence the NAF makes. For what it’s worth in my opinion there is little chance of the terms of such an election being agreed upon or such an election taking place whilst the Donbas remains part of the Ukraine.
5. I have laboured the point about the meaning of the Protocol not because I attach the slightest importance to this question but because others do and because it is being suggested that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky somehow signed away the NAF’s position when they signed the Protocol. In terms of what the Protocol actually says that is simply not the case. Having said this I think the Protocol will before long be a forgotten document left to collect dust in some unvisited archive as events move beyond it.
Ceasefire benefits the Junta
This seems to me a far more powerful criticism. However I would make the following points:
(1) I will say straight away that I think this criticism has merit. The NAF would surely have been in a better position looking forward if Mariupol and Debraltsevo had been recaptured. As it is there is bound to be argument over the next few weeks and months about the status of Mariupol especially.
(2) I cannot believe the NAF leaders did not realise this when they agreed the ceasefire. However having demanded a ceasefire for months they obviously felt once the junta offered one that they had no realistic option but to agree. I would rather that they had not and that things had turned out differently but then I am not in a position to second guess their decisions or to know why they made the decision that they did. Doubtless Russian pressure played its part but one should not overlook the factor of war weariness in the Donbas itself. Possibly the NAF leaders were concerned that the population of the Donbas and possibly some of the NAF fighters might not understand or be happy if the war was prolonged further when a ceasefire was being offered. I would point out that there have been no mass protests from people in the Donbas opposing the ceasefire since it was declared and the NAF troops (apart from some commanders) seem to accept it. The one possibility I do exclude is that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky are fools or traitors. I have watched Zakharchenko and I am sure he is neither.
(3) It is important anyway not to over dramatise the problems the arguably premature end to the fighting will cause. Just 3 weeks ago the very existence of the NAF and of the DPR/LPR was in doubt. Lugansk was suffering from a humanitarian crisis and both Lugansk and Donetsk were threatened with encirclement.
(4) That danger has gone. The junta instead of achieving a military victory has suffered a decisive defeat. NATO has refused to help the junta. Despite desperate attempts by the junta to get at least token NATO support through publicly admitted (as opposed to covert) arms supplies even that request has been refused. The US/EU has failed even to provide additional economic support. For all the brave talk at the recent EU and NATO summits the reality is NATO and the EU have cut the junta off. Meanwhile the Ukrainian economy is in freefall with Russian gas and Donbas coal no longer available, output plunging, the currency collapsing and foreign exchange reserves draining away The vice meanwhile is tightening. The very latest reports say the Russians are quietly telling European states thinking of sending gas to the Ukraine through the (bogus and illegal) “reverse flow” scheme that they may have their own gas supplies reduced if they do.
(5) Any idea that the latest redeployments are going to change the situation decisively in the junta’s favour look in the light of this frankly alarmist. In truth these deployments look to me like further examples of the junta’s perennial tendency to reinforce failure by sending troops to places like Mariupol and Debratselvo that are no longer defendable.
(6) The NAF made absolutely clear again today that they want all the junta’s military units withdrawn from their territory. As I said previously (see below on this Page) Putin now supports this demand. If the junta does not withdraw its troops a renewed NAF offensive to drive them out looks inevitable. Indeed the NAF said as much today.
(7) I would repeat what I have said previously. In my opinion in military terms a prolonged pause will strengthen the NAF militarily more than the junta. I appreciate many others take a different view. However the NAF now has more time to consolidate its gains (some people were worrying not so long that it was overextending itself), to attract more recruits (easier to do now it is winning) and to absorb the vast quantity of heavy weapons it has captured. A renewed NAF offensive when it comes will be more powerful than the one we saw in August. In its weakened state the junta’s military will struggle to resist it. Following its defeat and against the backdrop of the economic crisis and the coming of winter the junta’s ability to renew the offensive on anything like the scale we saw in July is surely for the time being non existent.
Conclusion
The key lesson of the last few weeks is that the NAF can no longer be defeated, that Russia is now involved, that the US/EU are no longer involved in any meaningful way and that the junta having been defeated and facing an economic crisis is left facing the NAF and Russia by itself. In the Ukraine it is unwise to count on anything but the balance in this conflict has now shifted decisively. I do not see how that will change. For what it’s worth that is also the assessment in Britain. The mood here in the news media is one of humiliation and failure.
Agree with this finding, makes more sense than the ‘chicken little’ analysis I’d been seeing from some.
Bravo to Saker for saying that perhaps Putin sees more from his level than those further down the command chain. And, for all those “democracy” peddling freaks at the NED, Putin WAS elected by the Russian people to do precisely that job.
In the Western world we usually think in terms of two alternatives about every issue: “Yes or No” or “Good or bad”. This has no relation to reality, but we are all conditioned to think as if it has. For or against something without thinking about other alternatives.
A simple computer processor based on an electronic two port solution works with four alternatives. Each port, simple as it is, can only say yes or no, but together they produce four alternatives: Alternative one, alternative two, both or none of them. This is close to ancient Indian philosophy and it provides a much needed freedom.
I have finally learned to say “both alternatives are possible” or “neither alternative is good” and also that “this is not my problem or I dont have the full picture, so I dont have to provide an answer”. What a freedom.
New Russia is an emotional issue for many of us and we are stuck with this Western thinking. We say the peace treaty is good or bad, without considering the whole picture. We look at only one issue at a time.
A big power like Russia has to deal with “fifty-eleven” variables and there are many more than four possible outcomes in such a situation. Iran is an important partner, but the spread of nuclear weapons is not in Russias interest. The US is a pain in the _ss, but Russia has still need of it. For now. The EU, a US colony, may break free eventually and that is in Russias interest. The war against New Russia is a painful wound in the Russian soul, but a serious confrontation with the West is a much more dangerous longterm alternative for mother Russia and also for New Russia.
I have studied Vladimir Putin. When he came to power, he knew his country was controlled by foreign international capitalists. He, a man of the people, a son of a worker, knew the economic situation and how ordinary Russians suffered. He went to the London Club and got a partial solution for Russias foreign debt. Then he went to the Paris Club, but got nothing. I remember when he reminded the Russians about the fact that the Finnish economy was more important than Russias. Look at his accomplishments since then! Russias economy is now much bigger than Finlands, as it should be. He visited Israel and called Bush after 911. He worked hard on international relations. He solved the border problems with China. The purchasing power of the Russians is three times better than in 2000. A miracle. Purchasing power must not be confused with wages. I dont know any other country that can claim the same achievement in only 14 years and certainly not in todays West, where we are getting poorer. It is unique in our time. Unique.
There is a lot of talk about Russian oligarchs. Putin has decided to allow them and he sure has his reasons. I know a semisocialist country in Europe that worked closely together with the main oligarch for decades and got a thriving economy. The oligarch got richer, but so did the country. There was almost no unemployment at the time and wages went up. Politics is the art of the possible.
For the sake of Russia, Putin will work with his western partners as long as he has need of them, but not a moment longer. Russian politics is pragmatic as always.
Vladimir Putin has worked on several fronts both in Russia and internationally. He is the only statesman I can name. Have some trust in him. He will deal with the West when the time comes. He will not abandon Novorossiya. Have some trust in the Commander in Chief, as Strelkov used to say. Pray for him.
Heads Up,
I do not want to distract from any discussion of the analysis by Mercouris but felt an alert should be given:
Menendez, Corker Ask Speaker Boehner to Invite Ukrainian President Poroshenko to Address a Joint Session of Congress (Sept 18th)
We write to request that you invite President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine to speak before a joint session of Congress during his visit to Washington, D.C. on September 18, 2014. We believe that it is critically important for every Member of Congress to hear from Ukraine’s President at this defining moment for not only Ukraine, but for Russia and the post-Cold War international order.
Earlier this year, the Ukrainian people surprised the world when they came together and stood their ground in Maidan Square in the face of violence and tyranny, in order to defend their beliefs and the very sovereignty of their nation against corrupt leaders who had abandoned the will of the people and the interests of their nation. Today, with a newly elected democratic government in office, and having chosen for themselves the direction of their nation, Ukraine faces a renewed battle for its economic and political sovereignty.
Russia, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, is challenging the very foundations of the security architecture that has supported peace and stability on the European continent since the end of the Cold War. President Poroshenko is on the front line of this conflict to determine the fate of Ukraine and the future of the international order.
At this historic moment, we urge you to extend a hand of friendship to the Ukrainian people by inviting President Poroshenko to address a joint session of Congress and share his views on the critical situation in Ukraine.
Thank you Saker and Alexander Mercouris for this excellent piece! What is set forth here is an undogmatic and unemotional analysis which should hopefully act as a corrective to the fears and hand-wringing, at least of those who genuinely care.
One relevant factor I think that is still missing, though I believe Mercouris alludes to it in passing, is the ongoing role in NR — not just Russia by any means — of various oligarchs and their jockeying for power. That system is not yet broken, they’re probably fighting harder than ever and it’s really hard to tell who belongs to whom in all the ongoing disruption. And it can’t not be a very strong set of ever-fluctuating influences throughout the Ukraine. And in that light, I still don’t fully grasp the undercurrents of dissent bc it’s hard to determine which dissenters have ulterior motives in all the danged power struggles going on beyond our purview.
Mercouris is more than likely correct in seeing that the Donbass will never return to Ukraine as it is now constituted — but this is, as he said, merely the end of the beginning. Who knows how long the whole mess will continue, the various convolutions it may take, or what the final resolution will involve. But the whole concept of Donbass residents proceeding to Kiev has always just struck me as sheer folly: just as the Donbass had to find within itself the spirit of resistance, so does everybody else in Ukraine. Otherwise, all the NAF would be doing would be imposing *their* solution, *their* ideals, *their* values on others who don’t necessarily share them now *and may never share them.* Which would make our heroes into an army of occupation subject to the same guerilla warfare they’re now conducting.
Huh?
And finally, I’d like to say one thing about Strelkov here, and I’ve said it before: the man does not look well. Just check out his eyes in that last picture: diagnosis via Internet snapshot is hardly kosher but at first glance he almost looks like he’s recovering from a heart attack. And that really makes me wonder at all the things being said about and even supposedly by him: again, rumors about rumors about rumors and no way for any of us to substantiate a one of them. I say we take everything about Igor Ivanovich since he left the Donbass with a huge grain of salt and just pray for the man, wish him well and see what the future will bring.
I would agree to a certain extent with Mark Slebeda. Putin is doing a good job of reacting to the twisted game played by NATO / USA, but he has lost the propaganda war…
Excellent balance to the hysterics and gloom.
1. We few here who analyzed the imperatives from Russia’s existential need always believed Putin and the military would back the militia if it could win. Their bravery and small unit tactics were heroic and got that backing.
2. Putin even allowed active duty soldiers to volunteer, fight and die. He invested blood on the ground and sorrow in the body politic at home. That blood on ‘Ukraine’ soil marked ownership for the future. Russia will take what it wants and needs. Russia will draw the borders. Like Crimea, parts of Ukraine are coming home in some kind of integration not yet known to us.
3. Novorossiya will be what Putin and Russia make of it, not what the militia might want.
4. This is the beginning of another stunning Putin triumph in time, as Syria was, by stopping Obama and getting rid of the chemical weapons. Better yet, this is right next door and protects Russia’s security.
5. It is another smash in the chops to NATO.
6. It is a minimalist war, brilliantly conceived.
7. The oligarchs probably will be driven out of Donbass and whatever the new Ukraine is.
8. Fascism is bleeding to death in Novorossiya.
9. Putin and Russia will rise to world eminence when this is finally settled.
10. Eurasia will be the topic from 2015 onward.
This analysis is absolutely brilliant and fits on the Saker’s blog very beautifully! Thank you!
Well that is an interpretation that sounds on the mark. Much of the hysterical comments over the 12 point plan didn’t make any sense at all. Those points were so vaguely worded that almost any interpretation was possible. In fact, it was not much of a plan. It was just a ceasefire announcement with much verbiage. Mercouris is quite correct that the rebels gained in two significant areas. One is they have now been recognized by Kiev as legitimate players in the conflict, not just outlaws that must be destroyed. Also, implicitly perhaps, Kiev has acknowledged that they have lost control over much of Donbas which is a first step in their relinquishing sovereignty over that territory.
Even if the ceasefire fails these two points are important precedents for any future negotiations.
Sleboda:
be a very pyrrhic “Victory” for Putin. Strategically, geopolitically, and possibly in the long term, it is a huge defeat for Russia. The Kremlin took its eye off the ball, naïvely trusted (and underestimated) the West as a “partner”, and lost sight of the big picture, a true clash of civilizations. Lets hope this bitter loss causes some lessons to finally be learned in the Kremlin.
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I agree that Putin underestimated the sucker punch of Nuland’s Maidan coup In the glow of a better than expected Winter Olympics
I also think it was naive of Putin to think NATO/ EU would be honest brokers once the Civil War started
In reggae there is a common lyric, “don’t mistake my kindness for weakness”
Putin has mostly recovered and because of anti Russian chauvinism combined with American Exceptionalism, they have overreached
Putin has deftly played the asymmetric sanctions and unsurety of winter gas deliveries
Putin’s true leadership is exploiting Israelite Rahm Emmanuels’s mantra: never let a crisis to to waste
The speed and dexterity of Putin’s alternate trade deals has been dizzying.
I don’t ascribe to Sleboda’s pessimism long term. Putin can work the system while all the West can do is whine
Putin won’t take Obama Tusk and Fogh of war at their word. He know’s what is at stake now. The total exclusion of Russia from Western trade
It most certainly is a new Cold War and Clash of Civilizations
video- Ukie officer and Ukie general admit openly how they bomb their own people, their own cities.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Km39LTR9grM&feature=youtu.be
Concerning the “dismissing” the NAF’s intention to march on Kiev (see point “7.”): fortunately, that does not accord with fact.
See the latest news in REGNUM: “One of the leaders of Lugansk Peoples’ Republic: We want to to take Kiev and overthrow the oligarchic establishment”, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1842532.html Aleksey Mozgovoy states: “We hope that by the 31-st of December we will drink champaign with Vladimir Vladimirovich celebrating the birth of the state of Novorussia and congratulating the Ukrainian people the liberation from oligarchs.”
Mercouris has made me feel less betrayed that Putin sold out the NAF to score points with the west
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3. The most important point about the ceasefire agreement is not its terms but that following Putin’s refusal to “agree” a ceasefire with Poroshenko he was obliged to agree it with the NAF (see below on this Page). This is something Poroshenko, the junta and the Maidan movement have up to now adamantly refused to do. By negotiating with the NAF and coming to an agreement with them on a substantive issue namely a ceasefire the junta has been forced to acknowledge that the NAF are not merely “terrorists” but are parties to a conflict and therefore people the junta must negotiate with.
—-
1. So is Pol Pot Shenko still calling his “engagement” an Anti Terror Ooperation?
2. Is the psychological damage of having to negotiate with the dirty Moskal traitors instead of the head of the Russian nation apparent in Chocolate boy’s utter failure
A. Will an attempt on his life or coup happen because of this unadorned debasement for the whole world to see
B. Will he and his crew go down to crushing defeat in the elections
3. Wow NATO really left the Maidan Fascists hanging out to dry. Pitiful for Obama. He talks the talk but never walks the walk.
Hegel has denied supplying weaponry to the Orcs. Can’t wait to see the trophy report on Col. Cassad’s page
Putin stated ‘Crimea is an opportunity for us to reconcile the Red and the White’ . . . well, the Crimea accession and that statement is about as revolutionary as the President of the Russian Federation can afford to be at this time. And that is alright. He’s fighting on multiple fronts.
But the people’s army of Novorossiya fights on one front, against the Nazis, the neoliberals, the neofascists, the USA, the EU, NATO, against capitalism, against the oligarchs in Ukraine and Russia. Fighting for freedom, love, humanity, honor, peace, revolution.
It will take a long time to build the Red – and maybe it starts with humanitarian and economic aid from Russia.
We’re lucky to have men like Mozgovoy, Strelkov, Gubarev. Many others will join the next phase of the revolution.
I hope we live to see an October guerilla campaign from Odessa to Kharkiv to Kiev.
I hope we live to see guerilla warfare in Berlin, Chicago and Oakland.
All power to the people, right on.
I hope you are right, but I don’t agree. The Junta has made significant moves to beef up areas the NAF was ready to take. It was, as you said, a bad time to stop fighting. I believe this has cost them more than you say. I don’t believe they will no be able to retake Delbaco or Mariupol without Russian help. You are wrong about NATO help too. They have been sneaking it in all day in Kramatorsk, from various NATO countries. A US Air Force jumbo jet landed and unloaded a lot of goodies. How I wish Russia would call them out on this.
The biggest problem is Putin’s indecision. One day he totally supports NAF and the next he is once again caving to US and EU in fear of sanctions. He has given them emergency help when they needed it but never enough to win, just prolong the death and destruction. As soon as US yells “Russian invasion” he runs like a beaten puppy dog. He either needs to go in and DO IT or let them know they are abandoned. IF he had taken DPR and LPR the day after the May 11 referendum with ‘green men’, it would all be over now, thousands of lives on all sides could have been saved, and the US/EU would be well on the road to ‘getting over it.’ Of course since it has gone this long ,there is even MORE support in Donbass for independence due to the people seeing homes destroyed and dear ones dead in the street. But it will all be for nothing and all the dead will be in vain if this ‘ceasefire’ holds.
This document has taken Kiev from a defeated, cowering baby to a big, bold talking bully again. No matter how you look at it, this was a mistake.
Not sure if the rebels can go it alone all the way to Kiev. No need to be greedy: from Kharkiv in the north to Odessa in the south might make a good pipeline route
Stick it right up the Bulgarians’ tailpipe
@Nora:
And finally, I’d like to say one thing about Strelkov here, and I’ve said it before: the man does not look well.
I agree with you, and think your guess as to why may well be right.
In support of Mr. Saker this is a brilliant “K-I-S-S” analysis by Mr. Mercouris. Should quiet the hysterics of those claiming that Mr. Putin sold out Novorussia.
My key concern:
From your conclusion In the Ukraine it is unwise to count on anything but the balance in this conflict has now shifted decisively. I do not see how that will change. .
The US-backed Kiev junta is not to be trusted. There are many Ratz to be ushered out.
What a great and very under appreciated point; that the same event can be looked at from different altitudes, or as you say “vision levels”. At one level the entire Ukraine war is ‘merely’ a battle in what is looking to me like is going to be a very long war.
Mark Sleboda is not saying that the current tactics are poor. He is saying that the Kremlin has royally screwed things up for 23 years and is in a lousy position today. What I want to know is “Who made decisions regarding the Ukraine over the last ten years or so, and are they still making policy”
As for the so-called ceasefire, a couple of key aspects are the moral and morale angles. It was obviously just the case that the Kremlin ordered the locals to do it – even though it seems a high percentage of the fighters were against it. So we go back to the issue that the locals have many reasons for not trusting or being happy with the Kremlin. They may feel they were sold down the river at the very beginning, as the Crimea was taken in and the Donbass was just given some nice words. To try to delay EU sanctions for an extra couple of days doesn’t sound like a good reason to lose more fighters from the perspective of the rebels.
Another issue that doesn’t get discussed much here is that this is a class struggle. Yes, there are many struggles, but one of them is class. The Ukraine is an oligarchical slave state. Oligarchy naturally turns into fascism, and it was entirely to be expected that it would be a Nazi, anti-Russian radical fascism that would come out of it. Yet, the Kremlin’s position has been to be happy with the oligarchical system, as it makes things easy to do. So it probably looks to a lot of locals that the Kremlin would be happy to bring back the old system, which is the problem, not the solution. A signed peace of paper with the US, EU, and Poroshenko is worth all the combined good you can find in Kholomoisky’s heart.
For the NAF to march on much of central and western Ukraine, at least prior to the collapse of Kiev coalition, would likely mean facing insurgents in their own rear. The counter-insurgency measures that they would have to take, even if they had the resources to spare, would do much damage to their political position. We need to remember that Bandera’s Ukrainian Insurgent Army fielded thousands of guerillas in the 1940s and waged a major insurgency against Soviet troops into the early 1950s.
This may be out of place here, but I have to say I see many (some) similarities. It’s about the Cherokees, political fundamentalists and pragmatists and the tensions within the Cherokee Nation. For those who have the time it is a 36 minute audio:
http://johnbatchelorshow.com/podcasts/2014/09/06/author
Some thoughts on the argument made in the entry that there is some “binding” nature to the Protocol.
Kuchma holds no authority in Ukraine. Hence the Protocol is not binding on Ukraine. The author attempts to get around this basic fact of contract law by using language in the document itself (“bilateral”) to establish Kuchna’s authority. Under that argument, I can sign an agreement and bind Ukraine simply by adding the words “Bilateral obligations” to it. Yes, this argument is that absurd.
Indeed, one can even question whether Poroshenko would have the authority to sign it. I am far from an expert on Ukrainian constitutional and statutory law, but some of the provisions (amnesty, exchange of prisoners, etc.) may require the approval of the Rada to be effective (to the extent the obligations are not “precatory”).
Other problems abound in this section of discussion. Recognizing the existence of a group (NAF) does not in any manner indicate the group is not considered “illegal”. No doubt they are illegal, as would be an armed group in Chechnya fighting the government, even if the government elects to negotiate with them. Of course, illegal groups cannot enforce contracts in court, though in this case nobody would resort to a court of law anyway.
On the other hand, the author claims “illegal groups” does cover some of the paramilitary battalions sponsored by oligarchs. We have seen in the past that the junta solves this “problem” by simply legitimizing these groups – after all, it is up to the government to determine if an armed group is legal vel non.
To say that by signing the document, Russia became its “guarantor”, defies all logic.
Indeed the entire contractual analysis (on which I have focused as I am familiar with law and not so familiar with the “facts on the ground”, as I am not living in Donbass – and frankly anybody not living there is likely equally clueless) is quite poor, illogical and misinformed.
I agree with Mercouris, but would add some points:
Although US/EU/NATO were not a party to the Minsk meeting, they undoubtedly had to approve the outcome – you don’t allow the puppets to make the important decisions.
Both sides were surely very tired and will benefit from the break, and time to collate intelligence and restrategise, but the besieged Ukies will not be able to replenish supplies of food and ammo, so they won’t benefit as much.
If NAF is forced to attack Mariupol, they will undoubtedly cause civilian casualties and loss of support amongst the survivors. This should be avoided if at all possible – far better to let the city be surrendered.
Part 1 of 2
To the Saker: With respect – re: cease-fire “panic”.
The wave of comments protesting the cease-fire were not a “panic”, they were passionate about the added cost such an agreement at this time would inevitably mean in Novorussian lives. Commenters did however raise all kinds of questions about Putin’s leadership and the reasons for such a process. Contrary to your intent to show the “reasonableness” behind such a decision by Putin, this post by Alexander Mercouris only adds to such questions.
1) “The ceasefire has been forced on Poroshenko and the junta…” Yes Poroshenko was forced to accept the cease-fire by the defeat of the forces he sent into battle. But it was not the NAF that offered or pursued a cease-fire – it was the Russian Federation(RF). The Saker has often talked of Hezbollah – never once did Iran rail-roaded them into an agreement. The Iranians know how to give independence and respect to the forces they support. If Putin lacks this ability, in the end he is not much different from the empire. Your points #2&3 show the same RF control.
2) ‘What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger’ – the same applies to the Right Sector and the Ukrainian army. They are both coming back infinitely wiser. Those who protested on this blog did so because the pause would mean the loss of many many more lives should fighting resume. If fighting does not resume, the Novorussian entity is stillborn – whatever concessions that DPR/LPR get may just as easily be repealed in future – just as their rights were repealed when the Junta first came to power. With only Right Sector and Pro-Western parties allowed how will they protect their rights??
3) You say “Since there is no possibility now that the DPR/LPR will be destroyed the political initiative now rests with them”. The initiative does not rest with them. It rests with Russia who set up this agreement. The DPR/LPR as you call it has no current initiative other than military. The argument of your post (legitimizing the cease-fire) is that their military initiative should be given up …. for what? Negotiations?
4) You yourself do not believe there will be negotiations; you state: “for that reason I expect the ceasefire to be only temporary and to be followed by a renewed NAF offensive before long…” When it comes to talking to the NAF you state “Were he (poroshenko) to become so (open to talking to the NAF) such authority as he still has in Kiev would melt away”. That indicates implacable hatred in the country – which those who argue for Novorussia refer to repeatedly. You continue and state that “I expect him (poroshenko) to do everything he can to try to reinforce his position by misusing the ceasefire”
So what is the point??? The NAF did not initiate the cease-fire, faces implacable hatred fanned and fed by a monolithic media, has no one to negotiate with and can expect only betrayal of any agreement made – yet you argue for a cease-fire?? Do you hear yourself?
The cease-fire benefits only Russia. In such a situation you can only say that Russia is hurting, afraid, or as some have suggested has an interest in working with the Anglos and Oligarchs at this particular time.
Part 2 of 2
5) Your technical points on the protocols are well stated and would be worth the cost of a cease-fire if only they would not evaporate with a phone call from the US. Need I ask the obvious? What is the value of those technical points when in your own words you expect betrayal? What is the value of those technical points when an election and new leader will either tear them up or use those very points as a basis of inciting hatred. Can anyone be elected on the basis of negotiation with the NAF?
The protest against the cease-fire on this blog has the passion of those who hate to see more lives lost needlessly. We all agree that fighting more fighting will be inevitable. Those who spoke against the cease-fire said get it over quickly while the Junta was in disarray, retreating, on the roads, with inner rivalries. Now the NAF has the unenviable task of going up against well dug-in and rested forces entrenched in cities.
Sigh…
Hi Saker
I like Alexander’s analysis better of course…I read Mark’s too and a few of the comments…Mark seems to be arguing with the commenter on every little point and it seems to me he is having to work very hard….
Alexander’s is clear and precise. I especially liked the part about Strelkov at the end of the first part…before the discussion of the protocol…which was (boring) .
All I can say is, as usual, I prefer the optimistic one.
The Slav race is again taking the brunt of the world’s problems on its shoulders and sacrificing itself for the rest of us in preparation for a glorious and golden age of Aquarius….
Putin is not selling out Novorossiya, nor is he caving in to the west because he fears sanctions. He is certainly smart enough to see that since the west chose to initially impose sanctions for a premise which was largely discredited over and over again, the west will not hesitate to continue making up reasons to ramp up its attempts to strangle the Russian economy. Sanctions and trade action will continue until somebody cracks, and my money is on it being Europe. Frank-Walter Steinmeier is in India right now trying to sell the Eurofighter to India. Why? Because India let it be known it was by no means committed to the French Rafael, which is a kick in the nuts for Hollande for caving to the USA on the Mistral sale to Russia. Russia still has powerful partners in all the developing countries, while Europe never even had a coherent plan for sanctions and is merely sleepwalking to the USA’s orders.
However, as regards the ceasefire, the west never expected it to hold, and hopes it will not despite its official protestations to the contrary. The west needs the ceasefire to be broken in order to impose the next wave of sanctions, and if the west wanted the ceasefire to hold it would have asked for peacekeepers from disengaged nations such as India and Brazil. That it did not suggests it expects fighting to flare again and is not unhappy with the prospect.
Russia, however, will not trust the west again for a long, long time once the dust on this one has settled. New alliances will be formed and the BRICS will renew their efforts toward closer economic and military ties between themselves, as well as the most complete disengagement from the western financial system that can be achieved. The loss to western business which results is going to be incalculable even if the U.S. dollar is not finished as the world’s reserve currency, which it may very well be.
I don’t care what anybody says.
Emperor Obama launched a civil war in Ukraine as a personal vendetta against Putin for giving Edward Snowden asylum
I hope Putin gives him Russian citizenship and a Cabinet post
This is no contract at all, as SunDancer correctly points out.
The signatories don’t represent anyone and this was as it was meant to be.
The EU and Russia have an interest in calming the situation in hopes of bringing the conflict to an end in negotiations. PolpotShenko has an interest in buying time in order to allow his forces to regroup. If the rout continued any longer you can be sure that right sektor goons would be baring down on Kiev. The ceasefire, if there is one, is holding because all of the major players want it to hold, at least for now.
What comes next is predictable as evidenced by Porky’s trip to Mariupol. As soon as the Ukies are ready to go again they will resume their offensive operations in the east. There is absolutely NO evidence that Banderastan wants anything else. They are committed to the course of war.
My belief is that Putin already knows this and has calculated that Ukraine and NATO cannot withstand the blowback from another assault against mostly civilians.
Sooner or later the Ukies will pull together sufficient forces and resume their offensive. The current leadership of Ukraine cannot survive otherwise. Poroshenko’s position is entirely dependent on him continuing to make war.
In the meantime Russia is training and preparing a large army of newly conscious Novorussians and volunteers. The latter, the volunteers, represent a spirit that has not been evident since the days of the Spanish Civil War.
These are battles in a civilizational struggle. All of Russia’s actions can be seen as a recognition, according to the counsel of people like Glaziev, that this is war and it must be fought. Forget this meaningless piece of paper. Putin is fighting to win.
Think it has to do with JUSTICE.
To think most of those who committed the crimes will get away and that is part of the ceasefire protocol as well.
I saw the pictures of the occupants of the car stein was in. I almost cried seeing the expression on the kids face at the time of death. Surprise and horror, you cant look away but you cant watch it either.. Instead of giving them a half decent burial they burnt them. And to see those who did it will live to do it again is what is hard to take.
One more point about Mariupol. As the 6500 men were closing in on the city, the word got out that they would not bombard it with artillery. That meant they would have to battle block by block. Or keep it surrounded and cut off, or a combination of both.
The battle would take a month or more, I’m betting. So, let’s not think Mariupol would have fallen in the shortest of time. It may have, but even in worst situations like the boilers, the Ukies held out for long times. In the city, it would have taken two or there times as many men to win a surrender. Could they commit 15,000 or more men and still protect their other gains?
IF that many men committed to Mariupol, other areas would have been weakened.
It is entirely possible that the junta falls before Mariupol does. The junta may be turned over by their handlers or disrupted by angry nazi and oligarch forces.
And when or if Putin decides he wants Mariupol, it will take 48 hours. So, he’s saving militia lives for now. He needs them for the equipment he will be sending sooner than later.
At some point there will be a collapse of the Ukies and a rout will need all the experienced militia drivers to move hardware to the new borders of Donbass/Novorossiya.
Marknesop brings to light the asymmetrical factors in this war. One should ask themselves about the new alliances being formed in both the hearts and in the minds of the rest of the world. For instance, do you suppose we would see the disarray in the EU if Russia had gone in immediately or would they have fallen into lock step as previously? I think the answer is becoming clearer. How much is that worth, and how else would that have been achieved?
Les,
Good points to chew on.
re:
“The cease-fire benefits only Russia. In such a situation you can only say that Russia is hurting, afraid, or as some have suggested has an interest in working with the Anglos and Oligarchs at this particular time.”
Russia should be afraid. For that matter, surrounding countries should be as well. And some argue that Russia’s main strategy so far has been to try to work with the oligarchs to come to some deal. It looks like Novorossiya is now under Akhmetov and Surkov control to a large degree, so that right there says a lot. This ceasefire might have been a way for Putin to help Poroshenko.
Perhaps another reason for not wanting the NAF to do well is that it could spiral out of control. If they do well, Kharkov and Odessa might revolt, and the terrible morale of the Kiev forces could really have collapsed. But there is no way the NAF could have kept more than half the country. Thus the break-up that the Kremlin has opposed. Also, the Kremlin wants to control the political structure of any future government. As it stands, the oligarchs might get kicked out and this would serve as a terrible example for folks inside Russia as they, too, are under an oligarchical system. Finally, the Kremlin probably wants an economic collapse as a way to rearrange things.
The Kremlin and the people of Novorossiya likely have significant differences in terms of what they want to have happen.
IMHO the question is: Would the “rebels” have made great strains against the junta? Would they have been capable to change the regime?
It is not believable. But in actual fact this is the only guarantee of their independence.
But this one could be brought about only by making them realize, the hard way, the harm they’ve done to themselves by their irresponsible childish behaviour and entice them to correct it.
The site http://cassad-eng.livejournal.com/ now has this banner at the top of the page:
This journal is read-only. New entries and comments cannot be posted to it.
What happened? Does this mean that they are not going to translate the entries in Colonel Cassad blog anymore? If so, I will miss it a lot, because Colonel Cassad is my favorite source of information about the war in the Donbass.
Could someone please answer?
Thank You,
Eva
Following from my previous commentary/request, I must clarify that for political analysis, the Vineyard of the Saker is my favorite, but Cassad has more information about what is going on the ground (and I love the photos with the charred material of the Junta).
So please, if you have any information about what happened to http://cassad-eng.livejournal.com/ I would appreciate your help.
Thanks,
Eva
Yeah sorry. If the other pov is ” chicken little ” then this ” analysis ” is utter wishful thinking. What New Russia needs is weapons, logistical support and political cover. Lets be serious for one moment and not whell out things like ” my credentials are bigger than your credentials therefore im right “. Appreciate the post saker but again it seems you are trying to convince a majority that simply doesnt buy the double speak. All this talk of the junta not having the weapons todestroy the donbass militia. Be serious for a moment. There are report coming from all over that the junta is now moving brand newforeign tanks and artillary to surround the Donbass. The whole public plea was staged. Geez you two sound really naive. As if porky does anything without his masters approval. This simply gave him a boost at home and with his military and then the nato facists simply denied it publically. Giving them plausible deniability.
Russia is looking out for Russias economy. Putin doesnt want the Ukraine split. Those are his goals. Protect Russian interests and keep the ukraine whole. The problem is the people of New Russia want something completely different.
Putin is playing with peoples lives and if he over plays his hand and the people of New Russia suffer even more for it, I hope they drag him out of office like a judas and his own people hang him.
Hes playing both sides too close to the middle and is risking losing everything.
Lets see how this plays out but the bottom line is this action has DEMORALIZED all of New Russia and their supporters around the world. This is putins strategy? Rediculous.
The Q&A article did not fall on def ears.
But many “ignored it”, because the logic was very weak and faulty.
Like the argument that no oligarch had any benefit of novorossia failing.
Which is very false. Many russian oligarchs want sanctions to end, and betraying novorossia is a shortcut.
It was a shortcut many of us has seen playing out all this summer, and now in september it also visualized itself.
Basicly the screwjob got out of the bag. (“The cat was let out of the bag”).
So offcourse people will react!.
And it is important that people do react!.
I doubt this is Putins work. But i doubt Putin has full controll or can do as he really wishes in Kreml/Russia.
There are many rich powerfull oligarchs also in Russia.
“4. This is the beginning of another stunning Putin triumph in time, as Syria was, by stopping Obama and getting rid of the chemical weapons. Better yet, this is right next door and protects Russia’s security.”
Disagree 99,99%
Putin had nothing to win here, but ALOT to loose.usa sadly had almost nothing to loose, and ALOT to win!.
Although i hate usa behaviour in the world.
It is obvious that usa won MANY rounds on the ukraine-card.
Alot of damages to russia (more distance between eu and russia, more pressurized/inline “allies”, nato got rekindled, all nato countries will now increase their warfundings again, usa can sell alot more weapons/military, more natobases around russia, almost got crimea, so far destroyed ukraine as a viable tradingpartner to russia (45million people), hurt russian economy, tested russias inability to react when neighbour country gets burned!, able to put false flags on russia, next false flags around russia allready started, got start of internal 6th coloumnists in russia to play on, etc.
Maidan will come to russia in only a few years.
EvaCB how about using Yandex to autotranslate the russian site?:)
Most of us do, but at start it can be tricky to understand.
But you quickly learn how to read the autotranslated rus-eng.
And its many generations beyond the bad google translater.
It certainly is a revelation to me that Russia is now a Guarantor to a ‘Protocol’ that you say doesn’t really exist. Huh? How does that work exactly Mr. Lawyer.
You really think that if Bro. Poroshenko starts a big offensive Bro. Putin will ride into the rescue atop a T72? He didn’t for three months while his ‘fraternal’ Russian civilians in Slavyansk were getting shopped to pieces by Ukrainian shrapnel while sitting on their living room counches. Did he now?
And what instead of a really big psychedelic bombardment with columns of T64’s he does a series of small positional offensives cutting off naf forces town by town? Not so noticeable perhaps for the ‘masterminds’ in the Kremlin & Moscow Stock Exchange.
One last point, one of the hardest things to gain in a military conflict is the initiative. Forces can fight months for little pieces of ground and then when the opponent suddenly breaks into retreat you can gain miles and miles in a day. This is especially true in Russia’s vast spaces, which definitely includes the Donbass.
This moment has been completely p.ssed away and will only be regained with a heck of an expenditure.
‘Novorussiya’ includes the millions of Russian speakers in Odessa, Kharkiv and elsewhere, don’t leave them to the Azov battalion.
Finally one last point ‘here’s my take’ this will only end two ways, either Russia/NAF quits, gives the entire thing up, or goes to Kiev. There will be no third choice because the headcases in Kiev will not stop fighting, even with a big further loss of territory, and as time marches so does the chances that Kiev’s plea to Nato and the US for an intervention will be finally successful, i.e. a General War and we don’t want that.
Russia needs to finish this thing.
EvaCB,
I’m still trying to figure out who he is/who he represents, but he’s not an unbiased source, so do keep that in mind. He’s actually got a whole bunch of sites and said he was going to be introducing something new, but these still seem to be ok:
http://slavyangrad.org/ Mostly opinion pieces, some good, some meh
http://en.voicesevas.ru/news/ More war stuff, some other things
Re: “Mozgovoi strikes me ….. Strelkov ….”.
Wow Saker, you are an beacon of modesty in this crazy world where everyone sees himself as Napoleon at least, if not God. I understand anyone has opinion on past events, even what might happen in the near future, but for someone to judge who is capable of what, that is way over my head.
Being not very young, I can tell you that lesson in humility is coming to you, not because I say so, but because you are calling for it to come. Please fell free to send this to /dev/null, it is for you, not for public. And I sincerely hope you find your way, ’cause in the words of those not quite meeting the expectations:
Тот, кто ошибок не имел —
В безделии зачах —
Он груза жизни не посмел
Примерить на плечах!
I would like to add a comment about the PoW exchange.
The NAF has many more PoWs than the Kiev regime. The NAF treats their prisoners humanely, giving medical treatment, food and providing secure accommodation. This approach incurs significant costs in terms of diverting resources for guarding, treating and feeding the PoWs from the military effort.
In contrast, there are numerous reports that the troops of the Kiev regime torture, beat or otherwise abuse PoWs in their hands. I would expect medical care, provision of food and safe shelter to be minimal.
There is therefore a clear practical and moral self-interest for the NAF to accept a prisoner exchange. They will reduce the demand on their resources and regain (hopefully in one piece) their own trained fighters.
Given the widespread demoralized state of the Ukie troops, and their surprise at being well-treated by the NAF, they may serve as free propaganda agents on their return further destabilising the Ukie mobilization effort.
Just a thought on the Protocol, while agreeing with Mercouris that it has been widely misinterpreted as to significance.
Keep in mind that Putin is an extremely sharp lawyer! Poroshenko’s education is in law and economics, work experience includes founding a legal advisory firm. Obama’s training in law. I mean, imagine the phone conversations Putin has with these guys. I see him outmaneuvering them, cornering them. They are in no position to claim that any legal arguments put forth by Putin are irrelevant.
DC staff lawyers would never give up, but Putin has already taken the wind out of the boss’s sails.
EvaCB 07:53
The cassad-eng.livejournal.com site hosts ann English translation of some of the Russian site. It is not kept up to date. The definitive and latest information is in Russian at
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/
Yandex does a variably reasonable job of providing the gist of the Russian text.
Dear Saker,
*Thank you* for digging this out of Mercouris’s facebook page and posting it!
(As far as I know these words were buried only there.)
This blog is really a rare treasure, imo.
I follow retire Colonel Pat Lang blog, and he has always been very clear headed as to what is going on in Ukraine. According to him, the rebels needed the ceasefire. It may not have seem so at the time but they were becoming dangerously close to being overextended. We need to remember, that the rebels are a small group
Quote:
In spite of their awesome tactics, IMO the militia of Novorossiya was getting dangerously close to overextending themselves. The drive south from Donetsk began with furtive advances by small SRGs along the border. It developed into a dash to the coast before turning west to the gates of Mariupol. SRGs even pushed further west bypassing Mariupol. With Ukie reinforcements moving from throughout Ukraine to Mariupol, those separatists to the far west wisely withdrew. Without the ceasefire, those SRGs probably would have continued west towards the Crimean Isthmus. The Ukie reinforcements would still arrive and the separatists themselves could have been caught in a cauldron of their own.
The half assed ceasefire may have broken the momentum of the separatist counteroffensive, but it did not halt the Novorossiyan resistance.
end quote
Sometimes you need an outsider, who is not passionately committed, therefore not emotionally involved to see the danger and point it out.
You know back in June when everyone was saying Putin betrayed the rebels, he was one of the few who said no, that strategically Putin made a good move.
Here is the link:
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2014/09/we-dont-need-no-stinkin-ceasefire-ttg.html#comments
In an earlier post, one of the commentators had this to say:
quote:
But the rebels are in dire straits. There are simply not enough of them. They cannot defend every town with sufficient forces and are, thus, subject to penetrations by the battalion plus sized armored formations used by the Ukrainians. This is what happened a few days ago when Western media reported that Donetsk was surrounded. For a short time, it technically was surrounded, but so were the Ukrainian armored formations. There is no continuous forward line of troops for either side. The rebels are effectively using their mortar, artillery and MLRS fires to rain hell on these Ukrainian forces, but they lack the reserves to finish them off.
Actually, the rebels are very smart in not defending every inch of ground to the last man. That would only guarantee a rebel defeat. One of the rebels most effective tactics have been their use of reconnaissance-saboteur groups ranging behind the Ukrainian front line units striking at logistics, command and control and fire support targets. North of Lugansk, the rebel leader called Motorola is using this tactic to great effect. Another good sign for the rebels is the increase in sabotage throughout the proposed area of Novorossiya. Strikes are being reported even in Kharkov.
I think Mercouris nails it. MAny people’s opposition to Putin’s handling of Ukraine does stem from a macho desire to see direct confrontation between Russia and the US. But Putin is much wiser and stronger than that.
His strategy in Ukraine especially with the ceasefire is to give the west enough rope to hang itself.
For those criticizing Russian policy before and during Maidan, what was Putin to do? Ukraine is a separate country, it had its own government. It would have been stupid for Putin to intervene directly and overtly on behalf of a weak and vacillating leader!
BTW Russia’s strongest leaders come with two syllable names ending with ‘in’. Just an observation.
Firstly, I would like to thank the Saker for posting my two pieces and thank also many of the contributors for their comments.
There is however one point I must make. Several people eg. Sundancer appear to think I am treating the Protocol as a contract, which Ukraine is somehow “bound by”. Nothing could be further from the truth. Those who say this obviously haven’t read my analysis properly. My exact words were
“The Protocol is not a contract or a treaty. There is no court or tribunal that will arbitrate on the meaning of its words. All the sides will construe it as they wish…….
…..I have laboured the point about the meaning of the Protocol not because I attach the slightest importance to the question but because others do and because it is being suggested that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky signed away the NAF’s position when they signed it. In terms of what the Protocol actually says that is simply not the case.”
I am frankly astonished that people worry so much over the wording of this minor document.
As for Russia being a guarantor, it is a party to the Protocol having signed it. If the ceasefire completely breaks down the junta will have broken an agreement to which Russia is a party. I do not think Russia will send an army to Ukraine in that case but I would certainly expect it to provide more political and military help to the NAF than it has being doing up to now and to do so more openly.
One should not conflate the question about whether or not for the NAF a ceasefire was a good idea (about which see what I say) with the question of the wording of the Protocol – a far less important (indeed trivial) question.
Theodore Svedberg has grasped the essential point: the junta through Kuchma has agreed a ceasefire with the NAF. By doing so it recognises the NAF as a party to the conflict, which it cannot now win.
Greetings from Finland.
There´d be a lot to say and to discuss but I´ll settle for a few points.
* Analysis of the situation in Ukraine was very good
* Analysis of the situation in Ukraine confirmed what I think is going on elsewhere also. For example the Finnish govt. is pushing hard for NATO-membership but the people aren´t still buying it, despite massive campaigning in media. Instead we, the people, have started considering whether we need democracy with reprentatives at all; why not have something Swiss-style instead?
* Eu also seems to have made its calculations without any consideration to the people´s opinions. Also the acts of Eu has made clear that no such thing as Eu´s foreign policy does not exist, not in real life.
* I wouldn´t be surprised if we had “Ukraine situation” in Europe also before long.
Riikka Söyring
ps. Have you seen this Le Ruscino-tweet? https://twitter.com/LeRuscino/status/509630859901931521/photo/1
Anonymous 13:33,
I know not your reference but my King James Bible has this parable in it about people who throw stones. And perhaps should not.
@Riikka Söyring 10 September, 2014 17:18
Kitos [thanks], Riikka. I am writing from Sweden and I share your feelings.
Swedish politicians have worked hard on weakening the military to get the people to demand NATO membership. We used to have an extraordinary good defence and now we have almost nothing. They did a similar thing when they stopped supporting the farmers financially in the 1980s. Then the farmers were told they would get lots of money if they voted for membership in the EU. The farmers voted YES with their wallets.
The Swedish people does not like NATO, but it is much weaker than the Finnish people. We suffer under the upper classes much more than you do. Like the British. Political change is almost impossible, but in Finland it is possible and that gives me hope. You can inspire us, there is more people power in Finland than in Sweden. Show us the way. As you did when the Bible was first translated into Finnish, years before we got a Swedish Bible. In old Sweden-Finland, your country was a driving cultural force. The big brother-small brother complex has no relation to reality and should be abandoned.
A Ukrainian situation is possible somewhere in the EU. Not in the North, not yet, we are too law abiding, but in Southern and perhaps also in Central Europe. I think especially of the Hungarians scattered in many countries after the world wars. The Catalans, the Basque. The people of Venice.
@Strategically, geopolitically, and possibly in the long term, it is a huge defeat for Russia….It most certainly is a new Cold War and Clash of Civilizations
Isn’t that to endow the “West” with that sort of “manifest destiny” to always supersede the “Rest”? That things go necessarily in the direction wanted by them?
Slovyansk | vgiannelakis
http://vgiannelakis.wordpress.com/2014/07/05/sloviansk/
To Midnight Sun/Midnattssol
Tack (kiitos) ska ni ha också. Jag vet inte mycket om vad händer i Sverige nutiden. Från uppslagar i tidningar det är mycket svårt att ha en klar bild. Uppslagars fokus på vad politisk systems officielt position är.
Men om jag förstår, ni sägar att svensk folk förtröstar inte på NATO eller inte på politiken/politiker heller. Att motstånd, betänklighet och labilitet i svensk samhället är större än man kan läsa ut från pappers. Att styrsel fattas.
Det stämmer, tycker jag.
—–
You say the Swedish politicians have worked hard on weakening the military. Same here in Finland. It is called “rationalisation”, “structural reforms”, “spending cuts”, “optimisation of defence” etc.
Not that many believe the official narrative. Basically people think it is because the govt wants to create There Is No Alternative -conditions; no army of our own so we have to join NATO because the “situation is so critical (because of Russian aggression, as goes without saying)”.
It is also known that the PM Alexander Stubb´s political aide Jori Arvonen promised in 2009 to United States that Stubb´s party Kokoomus/National Coalition Party would bring Finland to NATO. The ex-PM Jyrki Katainen (also of Kokoomus) has said that there will be no referendum about NATO-membership as the question is too difficult for a layman to understand; the politicians know better so they should decide.
When the situation in reality is that – after years of pro-NATO campaigning – only somewhat 26% of the Finnish voters would, according the latest polls, say Yes to NATO.
NATO´s own rules block Finland from joining as the membership does not have people´s backing.
Our government does not see that as an obstacle.
I´ve been talking to people in streets and cafes, asking questions, and my experience is that they see the USA as a greater threat to the world than they see Russia. Or China, for that matter. Polls tell that this is a common view shared globally among laymen.
Do you refer with “upper classes” to such as Wallenbergs and Saltsjöbaden-gang ie. to financial elite closely knitted with Bosch, Krupps, IG Farben, Mannheimer, to US Foreign Ministry etc or to “old families” related by marriage and business to Europe? And having heavy political influence via parties?
We do not have much of that here (som i förra konungariket Sverige, Österlanden har ingen ansenlig frälse/adel, du vet), true, but instead we have lots of structural corruption ie. people chosen to positions on other basis than their competency. “Suitable, not best” as a reward for their services to the party.
What you tell about Swedish farmers can be applied to here, also.
I sure hope you´re right when you think our “lafsigseg” attitude will prevail and we´ll tear away from the European union. Better alternative would be a Scandinavian union, I think, if there a union must be. Or do the Swedes still dislike Danish immensely?
I don´t know. I think that the spirit of times is a common tiredness; that govts aren´t trusted about anywhere and the feeling, that politicians do not talk about the same things as people and that the politics do not serve the people, is mutual around Europe.
So it is hard to say, from where comes the spark that will ignite a pan-European uprising.
Bättre sent än aldrig ;)
Riikka Söyring, Finland