by Andrew Korybko
PART II: The US’ Geopolitical War Against Venezuela
(Please read Part I before this article)
The Military-Political Game In Guyana
The US is exploiting its latest proxy client, Guyana, in order to open up a second ground front in the containment of Venezuela. Franco Vielma, in a translated article for The Saker, brilliantly explains how this came to be. To summarize his detailed research (which the reader is highly recommended to read in full), Venezuela and Guyana have been engaged in an over-100-year-long territorial dispute stemming from the UK’s colonial seizure of a large swath of Eastern Venezuela. Although the 1899 Paris Arbitration Award set the current borders, the 1966 Geneva Agreement invalidated its predecessor, but retained the status quo until a joint resolution could be worked out between them. Guyana, however, was reluctant to see this happen, recognizing the potential energy wealth lying underneath both the mainland and maritime portions of the disputed territory that it controls. When Exxon Mobil prospected for oil in the disputed maritime area, Venezuela saw t he writing on the wall of an imminent destabilization and knew that it had to act in protecting its territorial claim before it could be stolen out from under it, ergo the 26 May decree establishing the Zodimains, one of which cut into the contested area (the other was in the Gulf of Venezuela and was described earlier).
Mr. Vielma rightly notes that Venezuela took this step in order to preempt the deployment of affiliated mercenaries by Exxon in securing its potential offshore resource stake, which could eventually even gain a mainland component someday. He also makes proper mention of the US’ strategic interests in all issues related to energy, arguing that prospective major finds in Guyana would surely place the country front and center on the Pentagon’s radar and invigorate full-spectrum bilateral relations, including in the military sphere. Taking that into account, it’s thus worthwhile to sketch out where the situation is headed, and how it fits into the larger strategy of containing Venezuela.
Here’s the three-step escalation plan that Venezuela must prepare to deal with:
1. Attract US Attention:
Guyana wants to transnationalize the crisis and move it past the realm of Venezuelan-Guyanese bilateral relations. It had hoped that its CARICOM allies , some of which are also ALBA members (Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), would issue a strong declaration of support for its side, which would then escalate the issue to one of regional attention and create friction between the Caribbean members of ALBA and the Venezuelan core. While ultimately not worded as strongly as Guyana would have preferred, the regional grouping did take its side in the dispute after a three-day summit in Barbados, showing that the topic has officially become one of international importance and raising the possibility of a larger fissure within ALBA.
The US saw CARICOM’s support of Guyana as a trigger for its own diplomatic involvement, with the American Ambassador to Georgetown expectedly issuing his own statement in support of the country, too. Thus, the crisis has expanded to hemispheric proportions and the door has been opened for further American involvement in it. This could predictably see a rotating presence of US warships stationed in the disputed maritime area, supposedly to ‘protect’ the Exxon prospectors from the Venezuelan navy. Along the same lines, the US Navy could also base its operations out of the port of Georgetown, which it previously called port at for the first time in 2010, showing that there is indeed a precedent that could be built upon in expanding bilateral maritime cooperation with Guyana.
2. Divide Venezuela’s Military Focus:
The appearance of US naval vessels and their expected ground component counterparts in Guyana would instantaneously elicit an angry response from Venezuela, which would likely attempt to counter it with a reinforcement of military assets along the border. One needs to keep in mind that the Venezuelan military has up until this point paid less attention to Guyana than it has to Colombia, so an urgent focus on the eastern border would be something akin to a military pivot of sorts. Additionally, this region is scarcely populated and infrastructure development is at a bare minimum, meaning that this will be somewhat of a different operational environment for the military than it is accustomed to as regards Colombia. Complicating matters even further is that the military must still retain a sizeable presence in the country’s major cities in order to deter and respond to any Color Revolution destabilizations, so it must consequently enact a careful balance between this priority as well as its deployments along the Colombian and Guyanese borders. All of this serves to divide the Venezuelan military from a concentrated focus on any singular crisis spot that erupts (be it Colombia, Guyana, or a Color Revolution), and the simultaneous opening of all three fronts would represent a doomsday scenario for its strategic planners.
3. Entrap Venezuela In A Disastrous Military Campaign:
The US’ grand strategic goal is to coax Venezuela into a military intervention to restore its historical sovereignty up to the Essequibo River. It’s not being argued that Venezuela shouldn’t reestablish control up until this point or that it has no grounds to do so, but rather that such a move, if it takes a military dimension (no matter if it’s to preempt an American deployment in the area or to respond to a Guyanese provocation), entails significant tangential costs that might not be recognized at first glance. It’s not as simple as beating a much weaker military foe, but in holding and administering dense jungle territory with barely any infrastructure to speak of. This is an enormous hurdle for even the most advanced global militaries, to say nothing of a regional mid-rate power like Venezuela’s, although it does have a bit of a competitive edge over them because of its own jungle terrain that its soldiers are accustomed to training in.
The problem, however, is that the area being claimed by Venezuela is about 56,121 square miles large, which to put it a different way, is about the size of Nepal (or one-fifth the size of Venezuela’s currently governed territory). Administering such a vast and difficult-to-traverse area carries with it enormous financial costs and creates a plethora of military vulnerabilities to stay-behind US-supported guerrilla forces. There’s a serious risk that Venezuela could find itself quickly engaged in a mission creep scenario where it ultimately overstretches its military forces and creates strategic openings for provocations coming from Colombia and the Color Revolutionaries. Compounding this risk, an extended military campaign, wrought with financial burdens and piling casualties, could escalate dissent at home and increase the risk that the next expected Color Revolution attempt could gain wider support and perhaps succeed in toppling the government (especially if it’s aided by surgical ‘anti-FARC’ strikes and complementary ‘limited incursions’ by the Colombian military).
* * *
Guyana has fast emerged as a major strategic vulnerability for the Venezuelan leadership, in that it presents a Catch-22 dilemma which must be responded to in one way or another. If Caracas concedes to Georgetown’s oil exploration in disputed waters and allows Exxon to drill there, then it essentially cedes the maritime zone to Guyana once and for all. However, by responding to this clear provocation, Venezuela has unintentionally initiated a process whereby Guyana will can now escalate the crisis to regional and hemispheric proportions, all with the ultimate goal of inviting the US military as a de-facto party to the conflict, albeit on its side. Furthermore, because Venezuela is in a much better military position against Guyana than it is against Colombia, it can be expected the Pentagon would accelerate any assistance it renders to Georgetown in order to rapidly mend the military imbalance as best as it could (perhaps substituting its conventional inequality with asymmetrical advantages such as unconventional warfare training ). There’s no ‘silver bullet’ solution to the Guyanese threat, showing that Venezuela must carefully mind all of its options and their expected consequences before taking its next step.
Calculating The Containment Consequences
There are three immediate consequences of the US’ current progress in containing Venezuela:
Strategic Damage To ALBA Unity:
The co-opting of Cuba’s leadership has created the opportunity to eventually split Havana and Caracas. This won’t be evident on the physical side of things (bilateral on-the-ground assistance to one another is still strong) but more on the strategic one, such as through an unfriendly rivalry for control of ALBA. Any number of scenarios could present themselves in the near future where Raul Castro and Nicolas Maduro enter into firm and public disagreement with one another (perhaps over FARC, or Cuba’s friendly relationship with the US amidst a renewed Washington-driven regime change campaign against Venezuela), and given the personality-driven nature of Latin American politics in general, this could lead to a national falling out between the two that would inevitably force the ALBA states to take sides. Speaking of which, the Caribbean members of the alliance have refused to take their Andean patron’s side out of institutional CARICOM solidarity with Guyana (which hosts the organization’s headquarters , incidentally), thus setting the stage for a larger intra-ALBA split in and of itself, and if Cuba uses this occasion to promote its own interests with those countries at Venezuela’s expense, then this could herald in the Venezuelan-Cuban split that was just discussed.
Two-Pronged Encirclement:
The US has manipulated South American politics in such a way that Venezuela is now caught in the middle of two pincers, each of which can use their respective territorial disputes to escalate the situation at will. Venezuela is pushing back against these aggressive claims, but it is not yet certain how long it can hold out for. Should Colombia and Guyana enter into coordinated agreement with one another under American strategic supervision, then they could realistically construct a scenario by which their united efforts could be channeled in destabilizing Venezuela for each of their respective territorial gains. The reemergence of Guyana as a hostile anti-Venezuelan force dramatically changes Caracas’ strategic calculations, since it must now simultaneously balance between countering it and Colombia, which could lead to weaknesses along either of these fronts that could be exploited by the other per their American-coordinated strategic collaboration.
Self-Imposed Containment:
Faced with two serious strategic concerns along its borders, an economy that’s tanking due to the US’ subterfuge, and the ever-present threat of a renewed Color Revolution, Venezuela has been forced onto the strategic defensive for self-preservation purposes. It still retains influence in the region, but it’s not as capable of projecting it in the same manner as it previously did a few years ago owing to the plethora of problems that the US has unleashed against it under Barack ‘honest man’ Obama’s Administration. It simply doesn’t have the available resources or manpower to focus on such goals as it once did. In and of itself, this is already a victory of sorts for the US, since it’s succeeded in tempering Venezuela’s multipolar exports throughout the region, but in order for Washington to fully come out on top, it must either topple the Venezuelan government or guarantee its capitulation in the same fashion as it did Cuba’s.
Action Plan
It’s advised that Venezuela urgently follow the prescribed action plan below in order to best defend itself against the imminent containment threats that are brewing around it:
Regain Control Of The Country:
The first thing that must be done is for Venezuela to stabilize its economy and reign in the Color Revolutionary civil society. Prolonged economic malaise, regardless of the cause, naturally leads to dissatisfaction with the government, and even individuals who are not orientated towards regime change may innocently be drawn into Color Revolution protests because of this, without understanding the full context of what they’ve gotten themselves into. So far, Venezuela has secured a $5 billion loan from China in exchange for future oil exports, but it’s not yet known whether this is the proper scale of relief that its economy needs right now. More than likely, the country will require a lot more than China’s loan to get back on its feet again, but if it adequately invests this amount into easing the economic burden that its citizens have faced over the past year (made even worse by the global oil price slump), then it could be a positive step in the right direction.
When it comes to reigning in Color Revolutionary elements, it’s advised that Venezuela follow Russia’s model in forcing foreign-funded NGOs to register as foreign agents. After that, it can then continue in Russia’s footsteps by giving the government the right to shut down undesirable NGOs, which could simplify the legal hassle in dismantling these subservient networks and kicking them out of the country. However, removing the foreign elements of regime change will arguably not be enough in securing Venezuela’s sovereignty, since a large amount of the forces agitating against the government are its very own (albeit misguided) citizens. This means that the absolute prime focus must be on helping citizens deal with the ongoing economic turmoil, which in turn would diminish the appeal of anti-government Color Revolution protests (whether the participants recognize their larger regime change intent or not) and aid the government in separating the legitimate demonstrators from those who want to overthrow the state.
Engage In Proactive Defense:
The most commendable thing that the Venezuelan government has done in protecting its sovereignty was the establishment of the two Zodimains. These demonstrated that Caracas was cognizant of its neighbors’ plots against its territorial claims and showed the state’s commitment to securing its legitimate interests. In a way, Venezuela emulated the China approach to the South China Sea, by which China took proactive steps to fortify its maritime position in advance of its rivals doing the same in the disputed territories. Had China or Venezuela refrained from their respective actions, it’s entirely conceivable that the US would have set up bases in the same islands that China is currently reclaiming and that American naval assets would be sailing along Venezuela’s northeastern Atlantic coast.
At this point, Venezuela needs to show that its proactive defense is a serious move predicated on a solid commitment to maritime sovereignty, and it will pragmatically respond to any forthcoming provocations from either side (just as China has done). By showing that it’s not a pushover and won’t be intimidated into backing down from its position (while keenly avoiding a military entrapment by the US, be it on land or at sea), the Venezuelan government can score patriotic points among the population and hopefully increase its appeal among the many that had been adversely affected by the latest economic crisis. If the population can acutely understand the threat facing their country at the moment, the well-intentioned anti-government flock being herded by the Color Revolution organizers might horrifyingly recognize their inadvertent contribution to regime change and change their ways. They may not be any more satisfied with the government or their despairing economic position, but realizing that their physical anti-government manifestations are only making the situation worse might be enough to get them to stop partaking in such protests for the time being, which could help achieve the earlier stated goal of separating the legitimate protesters from the regime change provocateurs and therefore helping the state reassert control within its own borders.
Reconceptualize ALBA:
The Venezuelan leadership needs to understand that political alliances of the type that it expects cannot be bought by oil subsidies alone, and sincere ideological solidarity to the multipolar cause is much more important than rhetorical statements of support. While not all members of Petrocaribe (Venezuela’s regional subsidized oil network) are part of ALBA and vice-versa, there’s still a strong overlap between ALBA membership and Petrocaribe participation. Excluding Ecuador and Bolivia, all members of ALBA are part of Petrocaribe, meaning that they receive Venezuelan oil imports at preferential prices. The weak link in this allied chain are the smaller Caribbean states such as Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These countries are reportedly looking for supplier alternatives as Venezuela cuts back on shipments and their own fears are raised that their once formerly reliable partner, having been brought to its economic knees by the US’ asymmetrical war against it, might not be able to continue the program in the same format in the future. As such, these island countries, which are also members of CARICOM alongside Guyana, might deepen their support for the latter in its territorial dispute with Venezuela, hoping that doing so could lead to a compensational windfall of resource benefits from the US in the likely form of fracked oil .
Venezuela must therefore accept that its smaller Caribbean ‘allies’ might leave ALBA when their oil subsidies dry up, and that such tiny countries are easily susceptible to the US’ ‘dollar diplomacy’ when the bolivar finds itself in the tough times it’s currently experiencing. Instead of viewing any potential CARICOM-member desertion from ALBA as a loss, Venezuela must see it as a strategic gain in the sense that it frees up its resources and attention to focus more intensely on aiding the joint ALBA-Petrocaribe state of Nicaragua. Cuba, too, is a member of both groups, but given its leadership’s recent pivot towards the US, it’s also just as susceptible to dollar diplomacy and ‘fracked friendship’ as its CARICOM counterparts, and must no longer be seen as an ally whose ideological loyalty can be guaranteed. Nicaragua, on the other hand, is in strict ideological solidarity with Venezuela and the multipolar world because of the Chinese-financed Trans-Oceanic Canal that’s planned to run through it. By looking at ALBA more as a constellation of firmly committed multipolar states like Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, Venezuela can cushion the blow from the any CARICOM desertions that occur and work on strengthening its core constituency in confronting the US’ renewed unipolar ‘rebound’ in Latin America.
Receive Multipolar Diplomatic Support:
Venezuela should use its diplomatic channels to inform its multipolar allies of the importance of any supportive statements they can make on its behalf. Russia, China, and Iran have close relations with Venezuela, but each is presently so embroiled in handling their own complicated regional affairs that they may not be aware of the threat that their South American ally is facing right now. They should thus be informed of Colombia and Guyana’s boisterous actions against Venezuela’s maritime sovereignty and encouraged to publicly proclaim their position on the issue. It’s not expected that they’ll be as openly partisan as Venezuela may want them to be, but those familiar with diplomatic speech could easily read through the lines and see the implicit support being expressed. This is very important because it would demonstrate multipolar solidarity with Venezuela (in whichever degree it’s being voiced) and cause the US to take note that the local meanderings of its regional proxies have now attracted global attention, which would set the stage for the logical implementation of the final policy recommendation.
Host Russian And Chinese Naval Facilities:
The capstone recommendation in securing Venezuela’s territorial integrity from American-directed Colombian and Guyanese geopolitical intrigue is to have the country host Russian and Chinese naval facilities. Such a proposal is quite logical in light of recent statements made by each of these multipolar giants. Russia has conducted joint naval drills with Venezuela before in 2008 and has announced plans to do so again in the near future, so maritime cooperation between the two is not unprecedented or unusual. Additionally, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has voiced interest in having Venezuela host such a naval base as is envisioned by the author. Regarding China, its first-ever white paper on military strategy makes it abundantly clear that it wants to spread its naval influence throughout the globe as a means of defending its economic interests. It goes without saying that China would likely open up a facility in Nicaragua to guard the canal that it’s financing there, but it could also do the same thing in Venezuela in order to more concretely secure its oil interests. After all, the South American country is home to the Orinoco oil basin, which experts have assessed as containing one of the world’s largest untapped reserves totaling upwards of 513 billion barrels , and Maduro said that he received assurance that China would invest $20 billion in the country’s economy (some of which will naturally go to Orinoco resource developments) during an early 2015 trip to Beijing.
Russia and China evidently have strategic interests in Venezuela, and it would be natural for them to defend their investments in the country via a (joint) naval deployment there. If the US can and has been doing similar things for decades in relation to its own allies, there’s no reason why Russia and China can’t do the same with theirs. The presence of their naval forces in Venezuelan waters would cause the US to second-guess the proxy conflict potential that it had planned to unleash against Caracas, as it may not be prepared for an escalation of the New Cold War right on its own doorstep (despite the irony of it doing so against Russia and China in Ukraine and the South China Sea, respectively). A coordinated Russian-Chinese naval posting in Venezuela (whether at the same facility or separate ones) has the potential to completely disrupt the current dynamics of the New Cold War and turn the initiative against the US, and since it can also secure Venezuela’s sovereignty and reinforce its government against the external threats facing it, it should be seriously contemplated by the highest decision makers from all three states as a masterful move to be unveiled in the near future.
Concluding Thoughts
Venezuela is being geographically choked by the US’ latest inroads in regional affairs, which seek to constrict the strategic and military flexibility that Caracas once wielded in Latin America. Cuba has, whether knowing or unwittingly, become one of the highest strategic uncertainties for Venezuela, and it can no longer unquestionably rely on its supposed ally’s ideological solidarity in guaranteeing the positive state of bilateral relations between them. The main consequence of this emerging doubt is that ALBA’s unity is not as solid as was once thought, and that any forthcoming Havana-Caracas fissure could lead to the dissolution of the alliance or its separation into two distinct blocs (with Cuba influencing the CARICOM members and Venezuela retaining influence on the mainland). This strategic threat doesn’t have any immediately military implications, unlike the one emanating from Colombia. Venezuela’s neighbor seems primed to flex its muscles the moment the FARC conflict is resolved, and it’s expected that this will take the form of an eventual American-Colombian military buildup along Venezuela’s borders. In the future, this could be used to add teeth to Colombia’s maritime claims in the Gulf of Venezuela, or even stage a false-flag ‘anti-FARC’ operation in Venezuela to push the government to the breaking point if it’s mired in Color Revolutionary chaos at the time. Finally, Guyana has somewhat unexpectedly jumped to the forefront of Venezuela’s security concerns as a result of the renewed maritime dispute in the Atlantic Ocean, which has the prospective of drawing in the US’ Fourth Fleet.
Confronted with such heated geopolitical adversity, the Venezuelan government must find a way to neutralize the domestic Color Revolution threat in order to secure its territory, and only after that can it efficiently and confidently defend its border and maritime claims. Behind as proactively as China does in the South China Sea is a good model to follow, but Venezuela must commit to remaining consistent in its actions and rhetoric and not cede in the face of aggressive threats, something which may be difficult for it to do in its currently weakened position. However, if it can succeed in doing so, as well as in reconceptualizing the ALBA grouping, then it could more reliably count on the diplomatic support of the multipolar world. The end game must be for Venezuela to successfully court the Russian and Chinese navies into setting up a (joint) base in the country, as this would provide it with the necessary deterrent to stave off the US’ proxy games. It would also turn the entire tide of the New Cold War by shifting the theater of competition into the US’ own Caribbean backyard, a much-needed reversal of Washington’s own policy of tension in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea. This development, more so than anything else that Russia and China can do in the entire Western Hemisphere at the moment, would signify the seriousness of their resolve in deterring threats to their strategic Venezuelan interests and finally taking the initiative in turning the New Cold War dynamics around in their favor.
The salvation of the government and integrity of the nation will come with development, not some socialist theory or centrifugal power concentration of the economy.
The ten year China-Venezuela development plan in some state of talks and actions is thus:
“We are going to be working on the topic of telecommunications,” to provide computer tablets for university and primary school students, install related factories and build undersea cables to connect with other parts, such as the Caribbean, said Menendez.
Also on the agenda are plans to boost Venezuelan industry by expanding cement plants, and iron, aluminum and paper manufacturing, and by bolstering infrastructure at ports and airports.
“Later, we are going to be discussing oil cooperation and aspects related to strategic topics, such as housing,” said Menendez.
The government of President Nicolas Maduro is “very pleased” with the wide degree of complementarity between the two countries and will continue working to strengthen economic and trade ties between China and Latin America, said the official.
Wang Jianjun, secretary of the China-Venezuela joint commission said the meeting provides an opportunity to “exchange ideas about priority development projects”, adding that “we believe with mutual efforts we will achieve very successful results.”
Venezuela has signed nearly 400 cooperation agreements with China in the energy, oil, education, health, technology, trade, housing, agriculture, infrastructure, industry, culture and sports sectors, among others.
The South American country supplies China with nearly 600,000 barrels of oil a day as part of a strategy to diversify its market.
http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2015-06/30/content_35942712.htm
Infrastructure, connectivity, regional trade and, of course, Chinese investment (opening up to China), is what and how things will be stabilized and sovereignty secured. The Chinese know how to do this. They have done it in Africa, Asia, inside their own country and now in Eurasia and Latin America.
Venezuela needs self-discipline. Liberal theories of justice are nice. Getting permanent jobs for masses takes investment, order, and accommodation to capitalism. It is just a fact of life. It need not be unfettered and unregulated. The Chinese know how to keep central management without scaring away investors or banks.
In ten years, the tourism and oil resources, talents of the people, and strategic location should manifest as a growing and developing economy with plenty for all.
Hopefully, the Chinese and Russians can save Meduro from himself and his ideology. The Hegemon is dangerous and active enough. The government does not need any more noble but stupid moves.
Andrew has brought great information in these two articles. He’s a wunderkind with great analytical tools. And prolific, too. I always devour his work.
Thank you Larchmonter445!
Andrew, your insight has left me speechless, ‘blinded by my own ignorance’ – i thought all was ‘sun and fun in Venezuela’ – jeez’ – ‘What a Hege(de)monic Mess!”
Thank you sincerely, for taking the time to present the world as it is and shattering my fairy-tale.
A very Fine REport. Thanks Andrew.
Being near the equator, Venezuela is ideally situated as host to a spaceport. Perhaps Russia and or China could help set up something in that line. Anybody have Xi’s, Putin’s or Maduro’s ear?
Money and greed is what’s driving all this. Find out who’s chauffeuring this vessel of debauchery… and you’ve got your culprit/s.
I still find the Cuban dimension of this analysis basically wrong. But most of the rest seems pretty reasonable.
As to what Venezuela can do . . . well, first, if there’s one thing we’ve learned from centuries of colonialism it’s that if you want to own a place, populate it with your people. If Venezuela is likely to have intractable military problems in the disputed territory it claims, it should consider moving in some Bolivarians, particularly people like native groups that are short on land where they are–people who know how to live in jungles and can build a local economy there and learn the terrain well. Back them up, arm them, and problems with US-backed asymmetric warfare get way smaller.
On the NGOs, one problem is that the US has no scruples about bringing in money illegally and many avenues to do so. So it may be better to leave the NGOs legal but regulated, in the open where you can watch them, spy on them and infiltrate them, so you know what is being done with the money and can counter it. I suspect that’s exactly what they are doing, which is one reason that every time the golpistas start something a video or recorded phone conversation shortly surfaces showing exactly what they’re up to. (Another reason is I think a lot of the Venezuelan opposition types are incapable of learning to shut up in front of the servants)
As long as your intelligence is good, it’s probably effective to wait for the color types to plan something illegal, publicize the evidence and jail them. Which, again, has been happening quite a bit. I don’t think the color revolutionaries can make much progress as long as the economy does well.
This brings us to the economy, which is where no doubt a lot of people here will part ways with my opinions. The problems with the economy are complex, there are a lot of difficulties. Among the most prominent are issues around exchange rates and currency controls. It is widely agreed that the currency controls may by now be creating more problems than they solve, and that unfortunately the best opportunity to move off them with fewer dislocations has passed. Originally, the problem was that the oligarchs were going to try to starve Venezuela of money by moving everything offshore, and in the process of a massive selloff of the Bolivar cause massive inflation and currency devaluation. Currency controls were a defensive move against this.
Unfortunately, for complicated reasons some economic, some political, and some a matter of economic war by oligarchs, the government’s valuation of the bolivar against the dollar has not kept up with inflation, meaning they assign a much higher value to the bolivar than the black market does. This has ended up creating major distortions which are doing two basic things:
1. Depressing local production in favour of exports. Local production was always weak in Venezuela since the local wealthy are largely a rentier class in the first place, living off oil rents and margins on imported goods rather than making things. But the Bolivarian revolution was attempting to broaden the economy and enable widespread popular production; cheap imports have tended to choke this off.
2. Corrupt pocketing of money by business and some in the bureaucracy. Because what they pay in bolivars for a dollar is so much less than it should be, they make windfall profits buying dollars. These dollars, supposedly to be used for imports, can be used partly for that and partly simply selling dollars on the black market. Further, the imports are often sold at black market prices even though the dollars to buy them were acquired at the official exchange rate. These corrupt windfall profits just strengthen the oligarchs and drain money from the treasury.
The problem is that suddenly dumping the currency controls would lead to a massive inflation surge as import prices multiplied and goods suddenly became hugely expensive, especially since economic warfare would be used to multiply the crisis. So the government hasn’t dared get rid of them, although they have tinkered, moving the currency regime closer to what seems to be the reality.
But in the end, the currency controls themselves are not the core problem. The problem is the ability and willingness of various opposition-oriented, which is to say wealthy, corporate (dare I say it? “Bourgeois!”) actors to manipulate those controls to collect increased rents and undermine the economy. Without the currency controls, they would find other weak points in the economy to manipulate. Now when Chavez was confronted with economic warfare, what he tended to do was first, lay out to the public what was being done and that it was wrong, and then simply expropriate the most prominent offenders. So when the banks started fuddle duddling around, suddenly there was a public bank. After that, the other banks quieted down a tad, not wanting to be next.
Right now, there’s a lot of economic problems that would go away right quick if the Venezuelan government simply nationalized Polar, the main food distribution company in the country which has been pulling a lot of shenanigans.
The second thing that needs to be done is for many of the already nationalized companies to be handed over to their workers, with no more backtracking and bureaucratic quibbling and backstabbing and undermining. Any ministry flack who tries to put the brakes on should be sacked, end of story. The bullshit that’s been going on around that has significantly blunted the popular movements that were always the backbone of the Bolivarian government.
For that matter, the government should identify some of the sectors causing the most trouble in the economic war and, instead of nationalizing them as such, should
–identify illegal actions the firms are taking (if necessary, figure out how they’re doing their damage and then make that seriously illegal)
–hit them so hard for it that their stock price tanks
–buy them up for pennies on the dollar
–hand the companies over to the workers to run as co-ops, retaining enough of an interest that they can work to integrate the company into Bolivarian production and distribution networks
In the end, the colour revolutionaries can only be stopped by the enthusiasm of the real revolutionaries, so you have to empower the people. And the oligarchs will not stop using their power to undermine the resistance to imperialism until that power (which is to say, their money and control over economic levers) is decisively taken away. The only way to slow them down in the mean time is, every time one of the bastards sticks their neck out, you (metaphorically) cut it off so the rest of them think twice.
Purple Library Guy,
Thank you for your comment. I begin to get the picture. You seem exceptionally well-informed about Venezuela. May I ask if you live or do business there?
Your program to empower the people and eradicate the “upper class” imperialism sounds just like what is needed.
Neoliberal globalization plays its part in colonialism too, I think.
I’m an armchair spectator when it comes to Venezuela. But I’ve been following Venezuelan news closely ever since Hugo Chavez was first nearly overthrown in an attempted coup back in 2002, when the people came down in their tens of thousands from the hillside barrios and refused to let it pass. I thought, “something’s going on here!” and started paying attention.
My most valuable source is the excellent Venezuelanalysis:
venezuelanalysis.com
And yes, I firmly agree–neoliberal globalization and modern colonialism are thoroughly intertwined.
Purple Library Guy, I need to copy your last paragraph and pin it on the wall. I wanted to quote the first sentence, but then every sentence following seemed equally important. I’ll quote the whole paragraph, maybe someone will see it. This seems like it applies to every country in the world, and is a great recipe for progress. I added emphasis to the words that most blew me away:
What that means is the same as the old quote of either Fidel or Che’s “the duty of all revolutionaries is, to make the revolution”.
Hegemon kills.
ISIS kills.
CIA kills.
State Dept. kills
DOD kills.
Contractors kill.
SpecOps kill.
The fight against killers must be more than a metaphor for their death.
If there is a metaphor for cutting off their heads, where in the last 70 years has it been hidden?
The future is written by these purveyors of our death and enslavement in their feudal system. And beyond mere enslave will be their plan (that is coming into the light of day) to eliminate billions of people using all sorts of technologies of Death. (Hunger, thirst, disease, wars, poverty, and weapons).
The Elites of power and greed and bizarre sociopathic behaviors need to be culled.
The physical culling is long overdue.
I refer to VV Putin who has a clarity about the threats sent against Russia.
When asked how the Russians formed their policy against terrorism, he answered: We kill them.
No metaphor. A maxim.
No revolution or counter-revolution or uprising or resistance has used metaphors.
Liberty is not won by metaphors.
If slavery and brutalization could be won without Putin’s solution, we might see books or songs or poems or prayers used on the battlefield and dark allies of the world.
There is no substitute for self-defense. And if the deadly offensive continues to come your way, the war has to be won.
I don’t see the Elites, the Hegemon, the fascists letting up, going home or quitting the war.
They have wrought a civilization of death, chaos, depravity and mayhem.
It is like cancer (to use a metaphor). It is devouring human freedom, harmony and life.
Putin’s maxim not metaphors is the solution.
Agh! Typo/thinko correction: I meant, depressing local production in favour of imports.
Andrew Korybko: Obviously you do not realize how alive and well the Monroe Doctrine is in the USA today. US elite will start a war with Russia/China over any military bases in the Caribbean and sell it as a defensive war . Your idea of parity is ludicrous—they did it in Ukraine so turn about is fair play? Hardly, The rules are different for the unbermensch/good guys and that, sadly, is the triumphalist exceptionalism that is touted during these election years. I can see Ol’ Hilary doing a Falklands type move on Venezuela.
Why did Cuba survive? The revolutionary social gains were supported by the most poor of poor and what there was to distribute was distributed more or less fairly. Only a” revolucion Venezolana” will win this battle and it will be a tough one. All the intrigue with the dinky island states means absolutely nothing—other than PR coups. Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia do matter. Cuba used to give advice and sent medical teams etc. into the poor areas to set up clinics etc. but Cuba really does not have a lot to give either way. Will Ecuador open a second front? Doubtful–why would they?
I think you are naive about the level of US infiltration into all aspects of the leadership in all levels of all the countries of Latin America. This is their turf and they are going to defend it. Unless the populace of Latin America “gets it” i.e. that they will be de-souled and enslaved unless they set up revolutionary structures to combat this, they are doomed.
You are right about the level of US control in much of Latin America.It was created by,and is maintained by,the Americanization of the middle and upper classes throughout Latin America.That can be overcome.Cuba,Nicaragua,and Venezuela showed its possible.But its an unending battle,24-7,no downtime.Venezuela will need to get serious with their 5th column to survive.The ideas on that part,that Andrew has are good ones.I do disagree with you on the military base aspect though.Years ago you were right.Today I’m not so sure.Certainly the US would have a fit over it.But if they are refueling bases (on paper).Somewhat along the lines of Russia’s base in Syria.I think in the end they would have to accept it.Its almost a certainty that when the Chinese built Canal in Nicaragua is finished that China will have some type of defensive base there.I think the US already has guessed that.And its very doubtful that no matter what, China will not insist on it.With that in mind,one more in Venezuela wouldn’t be a huge shock.Both Russian and Chinese nukes can already hit the US from anywhere in the World.So the fears of having bases near a country are less than the used to be.With the rise of the multi-polar World the US is going to have to get used to a lot of changes they don’t like.
In my opinion all those U.S. moves in and around Venezuela are neither part of a containment strategy (not in the first place) nor is Washington currently seeking a Color Revolution. The plan for Venezuela is still the same as it was at least since 2004: create a failed state and place the hydrocarbon sector under “international” control. Even if Washington would be able to install a neo-liberal government (and the Bolivarian movement has shown that it knows how to mobilize the masses in its favor), this government would scarcely be able to suppress the Chavistas as the dividing line does not run along regions, religious, cultural or ethnic groups but along social classes. So the “failed state approach” is still the preferred choice.
Regarding the “new” relationship between Havana and Washington we should also avoid to go too far in its interpretation. From Obamas side this was mainly a propaganda move against Jeb Bush and his Miami-Connection, just in order to weaken one of the main Rep-candidates and to show to some people in Washington who make their money thanks to the blockade that they must conclude a deal with him. Raul Castro also saw the chance for a propaganda coup and agreed at no costs.
All that doesn’t really alleviate the situation for Venezuela, Cuba or Latin America but the division of the ALBA countries and a Color Revolution in Caracas might not be the major threats.
what counterpoint article has to say about Cuba-USA
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/15/us-cuba-relations-what-would-constitute-normal/
A rather inchoate understanding of the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana. Here, a Venezuelan blogger writes one of the more historically accurate articles on the topic and I’d suggest that the article be read and digested rather than reflexively supporting the Venezuelan government’s position without any real knowledge of the background issues.
http://caracaschronicles.com/2015/06/12/economic-war/
[The author of this comment has completely masked their IP address. This is the first time I’ve seen this phenomenon. Usually a trace shows at least something of a return. With this one, nothing came up.]
That article you posted was written by the perfect example of a Latin American Americanized 5th columnist. Not a bit of loyalty to his country at all.He is the example of the elements in Venezuela that will need to be neutralized if the country is to survive as a free state.The Republic of Venezuela is the territorial successor of the Captaincy General of Venezuela then part of the Spanish Empire.Since the 5th columnist author likes maps,there was a few he missed posting.
The Captaincy General of Venezuela.You will notice it includes the disputed territory as part of Venezuela:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuela_Province#/media/File:Venezuela_en_1810.jpg
The map of Venezuela after liberation from Spain.With the disputed territory shown as included in Venezuela:
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/–vjSc_sBni0/Tegj3a0p5DI/AAAAAAAAAlU/gBctyj00QBg/s1600/gran%2Bcolombia.png
Venezuela has assymetric tools it can use in this struggle. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere and extremely overpopulated. Since Caracas is a firm backer of Port au Prince it can funnel hundreds and thousands of Haitian refugees to Guyana’s border area, who will then end up in Georgetown. The Guyanese will be swamped and bogged down handling this humanitarian crisis. Venezuelas diplomatic core must be more vocal and create noise and dog away at the american ambassadors in the caribbean, turn it into Jerry Springer, get dirty and show up at the events the USA ambassador is and chew him, her, it out. The Colombian border area, same thing….Send in the Haitians, if you want to bog down a government to have it’s hands tied and bogged down in some crazy shit. Bring in Haitians, they will find a way to cause trouble.
Excellente commentary Andrew, all is how the President Maduro preview it, now the fight is inside the country, however, all the people and the goverment are giving the battle, without doubt USA do the work to desestabilize, but it can´t, the peril remains yet, the aid of the goverments and peoples of Russia and China, have been very importants… My respects Andrew!!