by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb for The Electronic Intifada
While Israel fervently attempts to terrorize the Palestinians into submission in Gaza, many observers have started to wonder why Hizballah has refrained from stepping in militarily to assist its brothers-in-arms, Hamas. Such musings fail to take account of the constraints on Hizballah’s room for action, as well as the circumstances under which Hizballah would ignore such constraints. The question that should be posed is not so much if Hizballah will act, but when.
As things currently stand, Hizballah is not in a position to directly help Hamas militarily by opening a new front with Israel. In the first place, Hizballah and its supporters have only recently recovered from the devastating impact of Israel’s war against them in July 2006. A Hizballah offensive against northern Israel would surely be met with “disproportionate” force on Israel’s part, which Israel has been threatening as much for several months now. Mass destruction and devastation aside, Hizballah would once again be faced with intense domestic pressures to disarm, and possibly, more externally manufactured, locally-executed conspiracies hatched against it that could drag it into the kind of civil warfare that the movement found itself in during May 2008.
Armed action by Hizballah would not only hurt the movement but would also harm Hamas whose status as a nationalist resistance movement, capable of defending its own people, would be greatly undermined and its raison d’etre called into question. Furthermore, since Hamas has thus far managed to withstand the Israeli onslaught on its own without suffering any significant damage to its organizational hierarchy or military infrastructure, Hizballah does not regard an intervention on its part as an exigent need.
The preconditions for Hizballah’s active engagement in the conflict are two. First, if Hamas is left bleeding to death on the battlefield, either due to the decapitation of its leadership ranks or if its military infrastructure suffers a significant blow, drastically impairing its military performance and leading to its eventual collapse, Hizballah would likely step in. Second, if the organization is forced to accept a conditional ceasefire along the lines of the current French-Egyptian proposal that meets all of Israel’s key demands while weakening Hamas militarily and politically, Hizballah would feel compelled to come to its rescue.
For Hizballah, the need to act under such circumstances would override all the attendant costs that come with such action — a calculation which takes as its basis Hizballah’s moral responsibility towards the Palestinians and the shared strategic fate between the two resistance movements. As expressed by Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on 16 July 2008: “[the resistance] is one project and the resistance movement is one movement and has one course, one destiny, one goal, despite its different parties, factions, beliefs, sects and intellectual and political trends … Resistance movements in this region, especially in Lebanon and Palestine, complement one another and are contiguous groups …”
Hizballah’s view of the conflict in Gaza
This moral and strategic imperative to act is also based on Hizballah’s understanding of the current war as but one episode of an open-ended and comprehensive war waged by the US-Israeli-“moderate” Arab axis against the jabhit al-mumana’a (political and military resistance front) which includes Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas. According to this narrative, the events unfolding are simply an extension of the July War of 2006, as evinced by Israel’s admission that one motive behind its current onslaught is to restore the deterrence capability and image it lost in July 2006. Further bolstering this view is the virtually identical stand moderate Arab regimes have taken on Gaza as the one taken in July 2006. In fact, the perception of the Arab role has shifted from one of “silence” and concealed “collaboration” with Israel in the July War, to open “cooperation” and “partnership” with the Zionist state in its war against Gaza. So blatant has Arab, and especially Egyptian, government support for Israel’s military campaigns become, that even UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (known for his sympathies to the US and Israel) chided Arab regimes on 29 December for “not doing enough” to help the Palestinians in Gaza, while Israeli officials and media continue to knowingly embarrass their moderate Arab allies by flaunting their newly out-of-the closet relationship.
Considering the extent of Arab cooperation with Israel in its latest military (mis)adventure and in view of the ferocity of the latter, the current Gaza episode is deemed a particularly dangerous moment in the regional conflict insofar as it represents not merely a war against Hamas, but against the Palestinian cause, or as Nasrallah described it on 29 December, “the fate of Palestine.” Given that the Palestinian cause is embodied by Hamas and defines the political identity of its regional allies, this conflict is one in which the ideological and strategic stakes for all members of the resistance front are extremely high. Nasrallah admitted as much in his 28 December speech: “what is happening in Gaza will have repercussions not only for Gaza alone or Palestine, but for the entire umma [a term used to refer to the Arab nation in a secular nationalist context and for the world community of Muslims]. We must continue work and not be satisfied with an activity here, a demonstration there … we must exert every effort to defend our people.”
Hizballah’s regional strategy in the Gaza conflict
For Hizballah, the Israeli offensive against Gaza must have been foreseeable given Israel’s repeated violations of its ceasefire agreement with Hamas over the past several months and the latter’s refusal to renew it at least a month before it expired. It is more than likely that Hizballah has been preparing for this eventuality alongside Hamas for some time now. In a sign of such coordination, on 15 December Nasrallah used a televised speech to mobilize popular support for an “open ended” campaign to lift the siege on Gaza that was to be launched on 19 December, several days before the Israeli assault began. It is no coincidence that the Hizballah leader chose to make this announcement one day after Hamas’ political head, Khaled Meshal, formally declared the movement’s ceasefire with Israel over on 14 December.
Over and above this political coordination, Hizballah must have helped Hamas ready itself for such an Israeli operation by providing weapons and training, as well as through joint military planning. Hizballah officials’ strong confidence in Hamas’ military performance appears to stem from an intimate knowledge of the organization’s capabilities. This conclusion reveals itself in the assertion made by the head of Hizballah’s parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, who claimed on 2 January that “the enemy will be surprised by the range of rockets found in the resistance’s arsenal in Gaza.” This argument is further bolstered by Nasrallah’s admission in March 2002 that the three Hizballah officials whom Jordan had captured as they were trying to smuggle weapons into the West Bank, did in fact belong to the movement, as well as his declaration at the time that “to supply arms to the Palestinians is a duty … it is shameful to consider such an act as a crime.”
Hamas’ fighting style also seems to bear the hallmarks of the military tactics Hizballah used during the July War such as its use of underground bunkers and tunnel networks, as well as adopting similar rocket tactics, all of which suggest Hizballah’s extensive training of Hamas’ military forces. Nasrallah came close to admitting as much when he claimed on 31 December that “the resistance in Gaza benefitted more from these lessons [from the July War] than the Israelis.” More than simply receiving military training, Hamas’s military strategy appears to conform to the “new school of fighting” founded by Hizballah’s assassinated military leader, Imad Mughniyeh (himself rumored to have personally trained and equipped several Palestinian groups over the years), which combines conventional and non-conventional, guerilla warfare that functions not only to liberate occupied territory, but to defend it from aggression.
Hizballah’s strategy vis-a-vis Egypt
Not only did Hizballah coordinate its activity on the Gaza crisis with Hamas, but also with Iran. One such indication of this coordination was the fact that the Iranian campaign against Egypt’s closure of the Rafah crossing was launched several days in advance of the one kicked off by Nasrallah, prompting Cairo to recall its diplomatic envoy from Tehran. On 12 December, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a member of the Assembly of Experts with strong ties to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Imam Khamenei, disparaged Arab regimes in language reminiscent of Khomeini’s revolutionary discourse of the 1980s: “Forget about silence. They are cooperating with Israel.” Referring to Egypt by name, in light of its cooperation with Israel on the Gaza siege, Khatami asked: “where has your Islam gone, where has your humanity gone?” In a similar vein, in his 28 December speech Nasrallah denied the existence of an Arab “silence,” insisting that it was an Arab “partnership” with Israel. Like Khatami, Nasrallah also singled out Egypt by name, warning it that if did not open the crossing then it too would be “partners to the crime, partners to the murders and partners to the Palestinian tragedy.” To that end, the Hizballah leader called on “millions” of Egyptians to brave government repression and take to the streets to express their outrage, similarly urging the Egyptian armed forces to apply pressure on the regime to open the crossing.
While many have dismissed Nasrallah’s verbal barrage on the Mubarak regime as little more than a diversionary or compensatory tactic designed to divert attention from or compensate for Hizballah’s inaction, such a view fails to appreciate the unprecedented nature of this attack, as well as the wider strategy underpinning it. Not since the 1980s has Hizballah adopted such an inflammatory discourse against an Arab regime, or even singled out any one for attack. Not even during the July War, when Arab complicity with Israel was at its peak, did Nasrallah call on the Arab masses to exert pressure on their governments, nor did Hizballah’s relations with those regimes take a turn for the worse thereafter. At the time, Hizballah clearly did not want to burn its bridges with Arab regimes or provide them with ammunition to invoke the Shiite scarecrow and stoke Sunni-Shiite tensions. In Gaza though, Hizballah has not found any such room for diplomacy and self-restraint. In his 7 January speech, Nasrallah warned that although Hizballah did not make enemies of those who had betrayed it during the July War, “we will make those who collaborate against Gaza and its people our enemies.”
Hizballah’s policy shift and its coordination with Iran on this matter signal a joint Iranian-Hizballah strategy of exposing the Mubarak regime’s collusion with Israel and pressuring it to lift its siege of Gaza. These goals also fulfill the grander objective of shaking the foundations of the Egyptian-Israeli alliance which, in turn, would serve to weaken Israel’s regional position. A strategy of this kind is deemed necessary given Egypt’s “public embrace” of Israel, as one Israeli journalist put it (Haaretz, 9 January). In contrast to the July War when Egypt and other moderate regimes confined their collaborative role to blaming Hizballah for Israel’s aggression, this time round Egypt has not even bothered to feign neutrality while secretly trying to benefit from Israel’s campaign against Hamas. In this war, Egypt cannot even play the role of conspiring mediator because it is in fact, a party to the conflict. Egypt’s foreknowledge of Israel’s operation — some would even argue, its demand that Israel launch such an operation — is now common knowledge, as is the false sense of security it lulled Hamas into prior to the Israeli assault.
But the most palpable indication of Egypt’s shared war aims with Israel is in its siege of Gaza and its ardent refusal to lift it. Hizballah and its allies view the opening of the Rafah crossing as being key to the outcome of the conflict. As Nasrallah explained on 28 December: “today the Egyptian stand is the cornerstone of what is going on in Gaza. If the crossing is opened, and water, food, medicine, and money, and even arms reach our people in Gaza, the epic victory in Lebanon will be repeated.” Hizballah’s wartime experiences demonstrate this fact only too well. Syria’s opening of its border crossing with Lebanon, permitting the movement of weapons, goods and refugees, was pivotal to Hizballah’s military success in 2006. In the case of Rafah, the opening of the border crossing is deemed even more indispensable for the Palestinians considering that it is not merely a supply line for Hamas, but a lifeline for Gaza’s population who are besieged from all sides.
While Nasrallah’s strategy has failed to persuade Mubarak to open the crossing, it did serve to greatly embarrass his domestic and regional standing and reduce his regime’s role to a purely defensive one, preoccupied with formulating lamentable counter-arguments to the Hizballah chief’s accusations, and rallying its moderate allies to its defense. Furthermore, to cover up for its moral bankruptcy the Egyptian regime has now formulated a ceasefire initiative in the vain hope that it can somehow restore its lost regional role. For the Palestinians though (not to mention the vast majority of Egyptians and Arabs), no action on Egypt’s part can compensate for the opening of the Rafah border crossing. Moreover, the initiative itself serves Israel’s interests and military objectives, as well as as those of Mahmoud Abbas, in so far as it merely seeks to reinstate the Fatah-Israel agreement of 2005 which called for the supervision of the border by Fatah security men and European monitors. Although Hizballah has yet to comment on the initiative, Hamas has expressed “major reservations” about it, while Iran has rejected it outright. It can be therefore surmised that Hizballah’s and Iran’s forthcoming strategy will be to ensure that Hamas is not pressured to accept the Egyptian proposal, which would weaken it politically and militarily. Hizballah and its allies will strongly back Hamas’ refusal to become the Islamist equivalent of Fatah.
Hizballah’s readiness to intervene militarily
While some commentators have suggested that a rift has emerged within Hizballah over the circumstances under which it should assist Hamas militarily, such assumptions seem implausible. As mentioned earlier, Israel’s offensive against Gaza could not have taken Hizballah by surprise and it is therefore highly unlikely that the party’s leadership was caught off guard and has suddenly found itself subject to internal pressures to take immediate action. As one of the pillars of Hizballah’s ideology and strategic vision, defending Hamas and the Palestinians from Israel, is by necessity an issue which enjoys a party consensus.
Moreover, the party leadership has not publicly committed itself to a policy of restraint, nor is it likely that it has done so behind the scenes as some Lebanese officials in the rival March 14 camp have been claiming. When Lebanese parliament majority leader Saad Hariri announced earlier this month that he had received assurances from Saeed Jalili, the head of Iran’s National Security Council, while the latter visited Beirut that Hizballah would not respond to the Israeli assault on Gaza, Nasrallah lambasted him for granting “free assurances” to Israel. In fact, upon contacting a reliable source at the Iranian embassy in Lebanon, this author was informed that no such assurances were given to Hariri on Jalili’s part.
The reason then for Hizballah’s constructive ambiguity, whereby it neither confirms nor denies its intent to join the conflict, is clear: although its resistance has so far remained on the sidelines of the conflict, it is highly improbable that it would continue to do so if Hamas were on the verge of collapse. Based on the centrality of the Palestinian cause to Hizballah and its strategic role in confronting the US-Israeli project, it cannot allow Hamas to be crushed militarily on the battlefield or politically, by means of a humiliating ceasefire arrangement that would weaken the movement. It is in this context that we should read Hizballah’s recent pledges to “never abandon” the Palestinian cause. In another indication of the resistance movement’s readiness to militarily support Hamas, Nasrallah made an underreported request to his followers in one of his addresses on 29 December marking the Muslim holy day of Ashura: “I hope that you who gather in this place … will always be ready to respond to any call, position and decision.” While this can be construed to mean that Hizballah’s followers were merely being asked to support its right to defend itself in case of an Israeli attack on Lebanon, it could be argued that Hizballah hardly needs to ask the party faithful who have more than proven their loyalty to the resistance movement to support its right to self-defense. Besides, Hizballah does not formulate positions or decisions on self-defense, which is considered not merely a non-negotiable right but a duty that is incumbent upon it.
Scenarios of intervention
Although an armed intervention on Hizbullah’s part would incur the wrath of Israel, rallying popular Shiite support for such a strategy would not prove too difficult if Hizballah depicted it not so much as opening a new front but as legitimate self-defense. Israel has provided the resistance movement with more than enough provocations of which it can avail itself and thereby use to ignite a war with the Zionist state. Aside from Israel’s continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms and Ghajar, which the Lebanese government has thus far been unable to liberate through diplomatic means, Israel routinely abducts Lebanese civilians from the Lebanese side of the Blue Line, most recently in December 2008.
More frequently still, Israeli planes violate Lebanese airspace on a daily basis in violation of UN Resolution 1701. In fact, Hizballah issued a statement in July 2008 decrying the incursions as “provocative, unacceptable and condemned,” urging the Lebanese government and relevant UN bodies to take necessary measures to end the violations. On 31 July 2008, Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper, considered close to the movement, also reported that Hizballah was planning to take “practical measures” in response to the violations. Around the same time, several reports emerged in Arab media of the planned deployment of anti-aircraft missile launchers in the Lebanese mountains for the purpose of shooting down Israeli planes. But irrespective of the veracity of such reports, Hizballah would not even have to down any jets to protest the overflights, but could settle for firing anti-aircraft guns that “accidently” fall on northern Israeli settlements as it has done in the past.
Retaliating for Israel’s assassination of Mughniyeh would also enable Hizballah to spark a war with Israel. That Hizballah will respond to the assassination is almost a certainty considering his political and military significance to the movement and recalling Nasrallah’s 14 February declaration to engage in an “open war” with Israel, as well as the oath he made on 22 February to avenge his death: “Oh Hajj Imad, I swear by God that your blood will not go in vain.” Perhaps Hizballah has reserved its right to respond for such a time when it would serve a much wider strategic purpose than mere tit-for-tat. What better purpose than to save the Palestinian cause from possible collapse?
Whichever scenario unfolds, Hizballah would still have to explain the timing of any defensive measure it takes. The movement would be fully justified in presenting its attack as a preemptive one and could legitimately argue that it lies next in the line of fire by an emboldened Israel that had succeeded in finishing off Hamas politically or militarily. As warned by Nasrallah on 28 December and again on 7 January, the possibility of an impending Israeli attack on Lebanon remained a very real one which Hizballah was more than ready to confront. As a matter of fact, Israel’s threats against Lebanon did not commence with the war on Gaza but have been a persistent feature of its official discourse for well over a year now.
Hizballah’s readiness for war
Hizballah began to respond to those threats not only with counter-threats but with a new discourse emphasizing the eradication of Israel as a Zionist state by means of “destroying its army.” The linkage between Israel’s survival as a state and its deterrence capability was not a new one for Hizballah, but as Nasrallah explained on 22 February 2008, the notion of destroying its “remaining deterrence” once and for all was. On Hizballah’s first July War anniversary on 14 August 2007, Nasrallah stunned his supporters and Israel alike when he “promised” a “big surprise” in any upcoming war with Israel “that could change the course of the war and the fate of the region,” and which would enable Hizballah to score “a historic and decisive victory.” Not only would Hizballah decisively eliminate Israel’s remaining deterrence, but it would do so quickly: “Any new war will be swift and the victory shall be fast” Nasrallah stated on 24 August 2008.
While many have conjectured that Nasrallah’s threats suggest Hizballah’s acquisition of advanced weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles, an equally valid conclusion (and one that doesn’t rule out the former) would be that it has developed a new method or strategy of warfare involving a much larger number of fighters than has been used in the past. As declared by Nasrallah on 14 February 2008: “In any coming war, not just one Imad Mughniyeh will be waiting for you, and not just a few thousand fighters. Imad Mughniyeh has left behind him tens of thousands of trained, equipped and ready-for-martyrdom fighters.” These fighters would display “an unprecedented method of fighting” which Israel had supposedly “never seen since its establishment,” Nasrallah stated on 24 August 2008.
Regardless of Hizballah’s readiness for war, and its potential to destroy Israel’s military deterrence, what is certain is that for the movement and many of its supporters and allies, destroying the Zionist regime in Israel is no longer confined to the ideological realm but has entered the realm of strategic interests as well. Regional security requires that the perpetual threat that Israel poses to its neighbors be neutralized once and for all. While such logic may seem like a throw back to the 1950s and 1960s, the new thinking shares more in common with the American notion of “regime change” and one-state solution proposals rather than with “throwing the Jews into the sea.” If the war against Gaza has achieved anything, it is that it has succeeded in drumming this logic in the Arab and Muslim political consciousness.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb is a Lebanese political scientist, scholar and analyst who teaches at Lebanese American University, and author of book Hizbullah: Politics and Religion. She is currently working on a book on Iran’s regional alliances with Hizballah, Hamas and Syria for IB Taurus which is due to be published in 2010.
Unless Hizbullah has great new capabilities that have been hidden, it should not. No one should ever enter war, however justified, if he cannot win it.
And victory will no longer be defined as surviving. It will not even be defined as besting the IDF in ground engagements. It will be defined as forcing Israel to accept much worse ceasefire terms in Gaza than it ever would have otherwise.
Like any strategic planner, Hizb has to ask itself;
1)What is the objective? Is it to force an end to the Gaza offensive? To put pressure on Egypt’s government? Rally the Arab/Muslim world?
2) Is the objective obtainable? Can Hizb inflict so much pain on Israel that it will sue for peace? The arsenal used in 2006 will ***NOT*** be enough to do that. Can it pressure Mubarak’s government in a meaningful way? Perhaps, but that is an unknowable. The Egyptian government is bound to fall eventually but no won can predict when. Security states can last a long time. So you can’t count on a popular uprising.
3)How will the objective be reached? A constant missile barrage until Israel submits? Capturing a large number of prisoners? Luring the IDF into a trap? Unless they have a very detailed plan that has their confidence, They should not try.
4) What are the costs to Lebanon and Hizb? Perhaps the most important thing to consider. Israel will have no qualms about devastating Lebanon, including power plants, water treatment, all imaginable infrastructure and the world will all say its Hizb’s fault.
5) What is the “exit strategy?” If Israel will not relent, Hizb cannot launch a ground operation. It will have to look for a face saving way out and there may not be one.
And while Hizb will survive the onslaught, it may be politically so weakened that it wont survive the public’s anger in Lebanon and the ensuing U.S./E.U./Israeli schemes to disarm it.
Also, it has to be emphasized that Hizb is the ONLY fighting force the resistance has and so it must be used very sparingly and only in the greatest need. Churchill (I hate using him as an example) did not throw away the RAF in a vain attempt to save France.
However, I trust the judgment of the Hizb leadership. I’m sure they will weigh all factors before making any decision.
Finally, its a great article by a very astute but critical observer of Hizb.I agree ****COMPLETELY**** with this;
“Regardless of Hizballah’s readiness for war, and its potential to destroy Israel’s military deterrence, what is certain is that for the movement and many of its supporters and allies, destroying the Zionist regime in Israel is no longer confined to the ideological realm but has entered the realm of strategic interests as well. Regional security requires that the perpetual threat that Israel poses to its neighbors be neutralized once and for all. While such logic may seem like a throw back to the 1950s and 1960s, the new thinking shares more in common with the American notion of “regime change” and one-state solution proposals rather than with “throwing the Jews into the sea.” If the war against Gaza has achieved anything, it is that it has succeeded in drumming this logic in the Arab and Muslim political consciousness.”
True Lys, but does it concern u that israeli chiks r hotter & more avail than arab women? just speakin as a guy w a passport – that ‘fascist’ chik wuz hot!
To Anonymous;
Hello Hasbara Boy!
The web is full of porn sites that might be more your taste than all this political stuff.
@Lysander: you have a military background? I like the way you think and I fully agree with you. With the elements I am aware of I would also urge Hezbollah *not* to intervene, essentially for all the reasons you mention. Still, as you say, there might be developments which we are not aware of. Finally, and most importantly, I absolutely agree with you when you say:
However, I trust the judgment of the Hizb leadership. I’m sure they will weigh all factors before making any decision.
I have yet to see Hezbollah make a mistake. The Hezbollah council and Nasrallah are, in my opinion, the single most astute, strategically thinking and careful political force in the Middle-East.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb logic is predicated on the idea that Hezbollah will under no circumstances allow Hamas to collapse or be destroyed by Israel. I am not so sure about that. For all the pro-Palestinian rhetoric surely Hezbollah realizes that Hamas is one expression of the Palestinian people, but not THE Palestinian people. There have been many symbols of the Palestinian identity – FLPL, PLO, Fatah, heck, even that cretin Saddam was considered a hero by many Palestinians. I don’t think that the Palestinian nation can be reduced to Hamas. I do see that what is going on in Gaza today is crucial and I see that if Israel wins this one it will push back the cause of the liberation of Palestine by many years. But I also believe that from the ashes of Hamas an even more powerful Palestinian force could arise.
It is thus a judgement call for Hezbollah. Is Hamas future in Gaza worth a major and inherently open-ended confrontation with Israel?
I don’t know the answer to this one.
Also, I think that if Hezbollah attacks from the north the Israeli Jews will totally freak out fearing that this might be the end of them. Hence, they will fight much much harder than in 2006. Many Israelis will fight a second front with the belief that they are fighting for their lives, their families, their homes, their cities and their country. Does Hezbollah really want to push them into that corner?
I think that the best possible outcome if for Hamas to prevail ON ITS OWN. That would also be a huge boost for the Palestinian collective self-image. The next best option is a draw in which Israel gets some and Hamas gets some. That would not be a disaster though it would be disappointing for me. And if Hamas decides to capitulate this would beg the question whether they are worth a huge sacrifice.
Any way you put it, this is not, I think, in Hamas’ hands. They need to survive and prevail ON THEIR OWN. Just as the Palestinian people need to prevail ON THEIR OWN.
Look at the lame protests in the West Bank: Hamas’ Haniyeh calls for an intifada and what do we see? 100 peopel in Nablus. What a disgrace! Should Hezbollah really shoulder the burden of saving Hamas when the Palestinians on the West Bank can’t even organize a real protest?!
I don’t think so.
Again, there are many things we don’t know, but my sincere hope is that Hezbollah would stay out of this one.
My 2cts.
VS
great discussion.
Saker,
I have no military background at all.
I agree that Hizb and Iran will survive without Hamas in control of Gaza. And even if the loss of Gaza is a huge blow, if there’s nothing they can do about it then nothing is exactly what they should do.
But I am not hard on Hamas. They are in a horrible situation and even if they gave up now, I could hardly blame them. And it is lead by men who know they are likely to die. They have kept Gaza going despite a blockade, and despite the target sign Israel and the U.S. put on them since winning the election.
Hizb will be in a much better situation if Israel starts a war. Unlike a regular army, it does not have airbases and major nodes for the enemy to hit. It can afford to let Israel strike first. (I think)
@everybody:
I feel that I should add something here. Since I am neither Arab nor Muslim, much less so Palestinian, I look at Hezbollah from somewhat of a different perspective. For me Hezbollah is the “crown jewel” of the worldwide Resistance against the USraelien Empire. What makes it so unique is in its amazing, awe-inspiring, capability to correctly understand the nature of the struggle and the means to wage it. I also admire Hezbollah for its steadfastness. Frankly, and sadly, I think that Russia, Iran or Venezuela can be bought off if the price is right. I have no illusions about the nature of politics in these countries. But Hezbollah is, I sincerely believe, absolutely incorruptible and un-cooptible. Small as it is, this is why I see Hezbollah as the “bleeding edge” of the world wide Resistance against the Empire and this is why I don’t want to “loose” it for Hamas in an open-ended confrontation with Israel. As I wrote many times before, I hope to see Hamas “graduate” to the Hezbollah league (same hope, though much fainter, for Muqtada Sadr in Iraq).
God willing, Hezbollah’s example will be emulated in Palestine and in the rest of the world, but for that Hezbollah needs to *survive*.
That is why I hope that Hezbollah will stay out of this war over Gaza. 2006 is NOT an indicator of how the Israelis will fight if they believe that they are fighting for their survival and it would be foolish to underestimate not only their courage but also the immense amount of misery their racist hateful ideology will heap upon the entire Middle-East before they go down,
The time is not right for the ‘Big One”. Not only that, but the Zionist regime will have to be “eliminated from the pages of time” (as Khomenei and Ahmadinejad correctly said) with the support of at least a plurality of Israeli Jews.
Israelis Jews need to be convinced of the futility of living only by terror and lies, but they should not be cornered either. This is a fine line to walk.
Even if Hezbollah has some major surprise up its sleeve, Hezbollah should not force the Israeli Jews into a fight for their lives. This would be tactically misguided and morally wrong.
If Israeli succeeded in defeating Hamas this would be a disaster for the Palestinian people. But if the Israelis succeeded in defeating Hezbollah this would be a disaster for the entire planet. And if Hezbollah militarily defeats the Israeli Jews it could push them into destroying the entire Middle-East.
I therefore think that Hezbollah should stay out of it.
But yes, I still trust Nasrallah and the Hezbollah council to know what to do.
My 1 ct.
VS
I just want to say I love your view on Hezbollah, VS.
@assiL: the weird thing is that I literally “bumped” into Hezbollah quite by chance. My geographic area of expertise has always been Russia and not the Middle-East. But a colleague of mine had just returned from a mission in South Lebanon and he was the first one to tell me about Hezbollah. To put it simply: my colleague was absolutely *awed* by Hezbollah. I decided to look into this movement and, something like 20 years of “Hezbollah studies” later I have become something of a “Hezbollah groupie” (-: I have been called that one – correctly I would add :-)
Hezbollah combines a deep religiosity and piety, with a acute political sensitivity and organization, with what might well be the most sophisticated guerrilla force on the planet and possibly the most effective intelligence capability of the entire Middle-East, and a far reaching and extremely sophisticated strategic vision about how to defeat what is without doubt the most evil regime on the planet.
There are, I think, very few moments in history when a force appears combining all those qualities.
Even though Hezbollah is numerically very small, I think that it has the potential to defeat Israel and, in the process, the entire American Empire. I can’t think of something more interesting and inspiring to observe then the struggle of such a small group of resisters against an imperial hyperpower which divided the entire planet into “commands” and which projects its power through a network of 700 military bases spread around the world.
Hopefully the ideologies of imperialism and racism will then finally be discredited once and for all.
I am Lebanese from the South, so I was born and raised with the resistance mentality and all, but what I really admire about your stance is your ability to see the truth and discover it for yourself. That’s really hard for a lot of people, to get out of their comfort zone and what they are taught to believe on tv their whole lives and search for truth and righteousness.
Malcolm X once said, “I am for truth, no matter who tells it. I am for justice, no matter who it is for or against. I am a human being first and foremost, and as such I’m for whoever and whatever benefits humanity as a whole.”
I see that mirrored in your beliefs.
Forget the Arab world, Turkey is the only country today who can achieve peace between Hamas and the Zionists.
You see they are 2 actors in Turkey – public and the army. Regarding Hiz and Iran, this is a trap set by the USA and Israel, the time is not right at this point. Hamas has the time the Zionist not.
I feel that ghorayeb’s analysis was based more on wishful thinking than anything else. Of course, she has studied Hizballah for many years, and has excellent contacts in the movement, but I still can’t see how the advantages of getting involved in this war would outweigh the disadvantages as for as the Hizb is concerned. Whether they are correct in sitting this one out – as both lysander and saker seem to think – is something about which I have yet to be convinced.
@assiL: your words touch me very, very deeply, more than you can imagine. I do consider the uncompromising search for the truth one the highest possible commandments for my life and I am deeply honored by the fact that you would see this virtue in me.
I am an Orthodox Christian (Rum, *not* Franj) and I try to live by the words of Christ Who said:
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, For they shall be filled.
[The word ‘righteousness’ (dikaiosune in Greek) can also be translated as “truth” (although the primary word for truth in Greek is alethea).]
Christ also said:
ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free
Thus the uncompromising and passionate search for the truth is one of the highest goals of a pious Christian life, and that is the principle by which I try to my life.
I am also touched by your reference to Malcolm X whom I deeply admire and respect. I did not know the quote you refer to and I thank you for it!
assiL, I would like to get in contact with you. Would you mind dropping me an email at vineyardsaker@gmail.com?
@Irish Eyes: you mention that you find my arguments and the arguments of Lysander unconvincing. I am more than willing to be convinced otherwise, so could you please share with us the rationale for your opinion that Hezbollah should intervene in this war?
Kind regards,
The Saker
I didn’t neccessarily mean that your arguments were unconvincing – just that I remain to be convinced, if that makes any sense! You may both very well be right here, and the Hizb might well be better advised to stay out of this one. However, on the other hand, when the Palestinian resistance faces possible annihilation in Gaza, surely any and all help Hizb could give would be of some value? Israel is using classic bully boy tactics in Gaza – beating up Hamas simply because they can. It’s perfectly obvious that this campaign has thus far been well nigh cost-free for the Israelis, at least in their short-term mindset. It is, however, unclear that Hamas have enough in their arsenal – literally and figuratively – to inflict real pain on Israel. So it could well happen that, in a matter of days, Hamas may be forced to consider a humiliating ceasefire. An intervention by the Hizb, which at the very least would provide a huge diversion for the army, neccessitating the call up of hundreds more reservists, and making it clear to Israelis that they cannot fight the Palestinian resistance without paying a price. As War Nerd has said, the huge weakness at the heart of the Israeli war machine is that, despite all the bravado, they have a low tolerance for (Israeli) casualties. This was why Israel left Lebanon in defeat, not once but twice.
That said, I can see the validity of your arguments, but still can see a case where the Hizb might intervene. As I say, I’ve yet to be convinced either way.
@ Irish Eyes,
If Hizb has a real plan, then they might intervene. But honestly they would have to have a MUCH heavier punch than before. A means to shoot down IAF planes in substantial numbers, and missiles that are long range, carry a sizable payload and are accurate to hit infrastructure. And they have to be survivable during bombing.
I’m no expert, but I don’t believe Hizb has these things.
And even if they could seriously hurt them, Israel may simply accelerate its destruction of Gaza just to prove that it is not deterred.
No, I’m worried that the whole destruction of Gaza, taking place in slow motion, is a trap to lure Hizb into a war for which they can be blamed. I mean blamed by people within Lebanon. The MSM in the west will blame them no matter what.
The Israelis are like a sniper deliberately wounding a victim hoping to lure his friends out so he can shoot the too.
As painful as this is to watch, if hizb can’t help, then it shouldn’t try.
But if Hizb attacked and succeded!!!!!! Now that would change the middle east forever!
“If Hizb has a real plan, then they might intervene. But honestly they would have to have a MUCH heavier punch than before.”
Would they though? Assuming that Hizb has maintained most, if not all of its pre 2006 capacity, it could inflict significant damage on Israel. Remember the fact that the Israeli public – while having a seemingly infinite tolerance for Arab casualties – just can’t stomach more than a handful of Israeli casualties. Any double figure losses of Israelis might well cause the public to press their government to sue for peace.
“No, I’m worried that the whole destruction of Gaza, taking place in slow motion, is a trap to lure Hizb into a war for which they can be blamed.”
This may very well be true, as many of us have suspected since the start of this onslaught.
“But if Hizb attacked and succeded!!!!!! Now that would change the middle east forever!”
Absolutely. Maybe it’s a risk worth taking, or maybe not. I’m watching this one very carefully.
Saker,
I think you need a wider view of imperialism before saying that Hezbollah cannot be “bought off”.
If you look at the economic program of neoliberalism in Lebanon, Hezbollah has supported many reactionary policies, including the World Bank agenda.
Not that Hezbollah is an unqualified supporter of neoliberalism, but it HAS made comprises on the economic agenda of imperialism.
Chavez, by way of contrast, is actively trying to socialize the economy in order to build a way out of capitalism and the imperialist system.
Hezbollah has an unrivalled capacity to fight the political-military dimension of the new imperialism in the Middle East.
But it presents nothing in terms of creating an alternative future beyond capitalism. In fact, it has a petit-bourgeois, quasi-Keynesian, quasi-Kropotkinist program of mutual aid and moderate state regulation…
And, on the domestic scene, it still has not been able to transcend the fundamental sectarian problems in Lebanon.
These are real limitations in the “anti-imperialism” of Hizballah.
Plus, they’re are allied to Iran, which is still a murderous, anti-worker, anti-union, patriarchal police state with a fair-weather commitment to anti-imperialism (recall Iran-Contra…)
but, i agree with your comments on the political-military capacities of hizballah, and their connection to the people.
@lysander
“Hasbara Boy”
Do you think everyone who disagrees with you or thinks comments about “regime change” and Israel are ridiculous, is Jewish?
The Israelis need to come to terms with their neighbors, but apocalyptic fantasy rhetoric about Hizb somehow conquering Israel also needs to be put aside.
Anonymous,
I’m happy to see a counteratgument but your last post regarding where are the prettier women really didn’t seem relavent.
Cheers
Peace,
Hizbullah cannot intervene openly in this war. There might be weaponary being sent to the Hamas fighters but even that will be limited in regards to counter the attack by the Israeli forces.
However, I dont know if you guys have heard or not that for the last two days there has been some rockets firing into Israel from the Golan Heights and from Lebanon. Whether Hizbullah had a hand in that remains to be seen. One thing which would be interesting to note is that in the 2006 conflict started with Hamas capturing an Israeli soldier followed by Hizbullah. That scenario could be repeated but Hizbullah has not done so yet.
One thing is for sure that in South Lebanon they will be fired up especially after the commerations of Ashura.
Regards
@EVERYBODY:
Ok. as somebody with training in defensive warfare in an environment not unlike the one in Lebanon I can tell you that Lysander is correct: defending in 2006 is HUGELY different from attacking in 2009. Keep the following in mind
1) In 2006 Hezbollah made *very* extensive preparations of the battlefield in the real of supplies, communications, bunkers & tunnels, etc. etc. etc.
2) Hezbollah’s operators were mostly local militiamen. Please remember that in the context of the Hezbollah warfighting doctrine being ‘local’ and ‘militia’ is a big advantage over full time soliders.
3) since all combat was essentially local Hezbollah did not have to maneuver at all (except at the squad level) and thus force projection was not an issue.
4) Hezbollah had in effect countered the Israeli Air Force by denying it a target (camouflage/deception) and it denied the IDF the use of its Merkava MBT by a select use of advanced Russian long range anti-tank weapons.
NONE OF THAT would apply in a Hezbollah attack on Israel, at least not any type of infantry attack (Hezbollah does not have mechanized, armored or air forces).
What does this leave? Rockets.
I very much doubt that Hezbollah has many advanced rockets that would really tip the balance in case of a new war. Sure, they have the same set of ‘short’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘long’ range rockets as in 2006, but keep in mind that in the proper military nomenclature these are ALL considered *short* range systems and while these are adequate to force the Israelis to hunker down in shelters these are not really effective weapons to use against the Israeli military.
Better warheads?
Ok. let’s give Hezbollah Russian Tochka-U (120km range) with fuel-air or cluster munitions. And then what? The Israelis are potentially capable of fighting Syria which already has a full brigade of these and that did not deter Israel one second from bombing the alledged “nuclear facility” in the Syrian desert. Clearly, the Israelis do not fear such (comparatively advanced) missile systems and associated warheads.
Anti-air missiles? Yes, that is possible, but not long-range (and therefore large) ones because if Hezbollah had acquired large systems Israel would know about it (same for advanced missiles).
Lastly, finding and destroying Hezbollah tactical missiles or air defense missiles is something which the Israeli Air Force can do very rapidly.
So even “2006 equivalent +” capabilities are not even close to being what it takes to meaningfully threaten Israel with an attack.
No, the only weapon which would make one big whopper of a difference would be a nuclear warhead of some kind but even the threat to use a nuke on Israel would be political suicide for Hezbollah.
All this is to say that I don’t buy the “Hezbollah has a magic weapon” thing at all, at least not in an offensive operation against Israel.
On the defense there are PLENTY of things Hezbollah could keep up its sleeve which could painfully surprise the Israelis, but such surprises are much more likely to be of a tactical nature than a technological one.
Saker,
I think I’ve asked this before, but is there any kind of practical guidance system for these short range rockets?
I’m not talking about pinpoint accuracy here, just accurate to withing 200 meters or so. At least this would offer Lebanon the capability to hit large targets such as oil refineries, power plants, etc.
The purpose of those is not to use them, but to have them as a deterrent. Israel will be much more selective in its targeting if it knows Hizb has such an arsenal.
Anti aircraft weapons; I understand large systems are impractical. But does a good man portable weapon (or something that can be placed on a pickup truck) exist? To be useful, it doesn’t have to down lots-or even any-F-16s, but if it forces the IAF to be cautious, that would be an advantage.
In June, pro Hizbullah parties are likely to win the election. Do you think this will offer Hizb a chance to acquire more advanced weapons through official purchases of the Government?
Thanx
@lysander:
I think I’ve asked this before, but is there any kind of practical guidance system for these short range rockets?
No, at least none in the kind of arsenal Hezbollah has.
Anti aircraft weapons; I understand large systems are impractical. But does a good man portable weapon (or something that can be placed on a pickup truck) exist?
Yes, they do. For example, there is a real good dual launcher version for the Russian “Strela” and “Igla” MANPADS which can be carried by a group of people or in a truck. But these are still limited by the flight envelope (range/speed/angle/turn rate) of the missile. As long as the Israelis stay outside this “flight envelope” (say above 4 km) they would be ok. But yes, getting modern MANPADS to Hezbollah would be a huge plus for the Resistance
In June, pro Hizbullah parties are likely to win the election. Do you think this will offer Hizb a chance to acquire more advanced weapons through official purchases of the Government?
I don’t really know, but I doubt it. Hezbollah can get what it needs from Iran so why involve a government structure which is heavily infiltrated by American agents.
Of course, a good chunk of the Lebanese Army is composed of Shia who are very favorable to Hezbollah so some weapons might well end up in Hezbollah hands. But since Hezbollah is a far more potent force than the Lebanese military, this just does not make much of a difference.