by Haider Geoanalyst for The Saker Blog
Several sources in the past several days have analyzed the Iranian missile strikes on US forces at the Ayn Al Asad Airbase which took place more than two weeks ago on the 8th of January 2020 as a retaliation for the US assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Sulaimani. The reports have focused on several topics and methods ranging from satellite image interpretation, videos of missile launches and incoming missile strikes to analysis of on-site photos of (unexploded) Iranian missiles in and around the targeted airbases in Iraq.
In this analysis we will look closer at the satellite imagery to give us more insight on what happened at the Ayn Al Asad Airbase and to help us answer some questions like what kind of missiles did the Iranians use, what kind of targets did the Iranians aim for (or destroy) and what kind of information can we derive in terms of accuracy of the Iranian missiles.
It is clear, even prior to conducting any analysis, that the Iranian missiles obviously targeted individual structures with a high rate of accuracy. In this analysis we look at accuracy in terms of how far the missiles landed from their targets. Since the Iranians did not make public the targets they wanted to hit or destroy, we will have to assume that the individual missiles were targeting the actual structures they destroyed or the nearest structures to their impact locations. Another possibility is that the Iranians deliberately struck areas near or outside some of the targets. We will consider both scenarios.
A term often used in precision guided munitions (artillery shells, smart-bombs, missiles, etc.) is the circular error probability (CEP). This is when a circle is drawn around 50 % of the targets that land on a single aim point. This value is not derived from actual warfare statistics but from weapons testing or claims from the weapons manufacturer. Also important to note is that the CEP accuracy is tested by firing the same type of missile many times at a single target instead of directing the same type of missile at multiple independent targets. We will attempt to derive our own statistics from the small sample size of missile strikes at the airbase. This analysis is also a follow up on the very interesting article posted by The Saker which also assessed the initial satellite images made available online of the Ayn Al Asad Airbase strikes, see here https://10.16.86.131/the-anglozionist-empire-vs-iran-a-discussion-of-the-recent-events/ .
As geospatial experts with experience in aerial and satellite image interpretation, our eyes are trained, through formal training, education and on the job experience, to look for patterns, colors and contrasts among many other techniques to describe and interpret what we are actually looking at. We also apply image classification techniques and manipulate remotely sensed data (orthophotos, multi-spectral, hyper-spectral, thermal, LiDAR, Radar, etc.) to capture more information in order to help us further interpret the situation. Most of us are specialized in a certain field within the spatial related sciences like forestry, energy, transport, geology, archeology or urban planning. I must mention that since I am not a trained expert in the intelligence or military field like several of my colleagues in this branch, there could be short comings in my analysis and in the used terminology. Having said that, I have been regularly interpreting military related imagery on and off in my free time in the past several years.
Introduction to Ayn Al Asad Airbase
The US occupation forces between 2003 and 2005 changed the name of the airbase from its original 1980s name of Qadisiyah Airbase to the name of Ayn Al Asad, which in Arabic literally either means “Eye of the Lion” or in this case “Lion spring” due to the hydrological spring which is now located within the perimeter of the airbase. This spring feeds the Wadi al Asadi stream valley located in the northern part of the air base and flows eastwards into the Euphrates River as one of its tributaries. The main part of the base originally had a perimeter length of 21 km, not including other secondary or auxiliary bases located in the surrounding areas. The perimeter was expanded by the Americans to 34 km (Figure 1), giving the base a total area size of approximately 63 km2 and making it the largest military base in Iraq by area size. For comparison, this is almost twice the size of the New York City metropolitan area.
Figure 1 Satellite imagery of the Ayn Al Asad Airbase with the original airbase perimeter in blue and the extended perimeter in red. The two paved runways are indicated by the light blue rectangles. (Sources: © HERE, DigitalGlobe, Navteq, Planet Labs Inc.)
The base consists of two major runways (a third runway is unpaved), several taxiways, a variety of different facilities and buildings for personnel, equipment, communications, including sports and leisure centers with theaters and swimming pools. The base further has soft and hardened aircraft shelters (hangars). The trapezoidal shaped hardened aircraft hangers were built by Yugoslavian companies across many bases in Iraq in the 80s and are nicknamed “Yugos” by the Iraqis. The two hardened runways have a length of approximately 3,990 m. This is almost 1 km shorter than Iraq’s longest aircraft runway of 4,800 m located at Erbil airport, which is also one of the longest in the world. For further historical and general information on the Ayn Al Asad Airbase, see the following websites here ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Asad_Airbase ), here ( https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/al-asad.htm ) and here ( https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/al-asad-airbase-iraq/ ).
Reports indicate that around 15 to 16 missiles were fired from multiple locations inside Iran, with at least 10 missiles fired from bases in the Kermanshah area. If this is indeed the case and assuming a straight line flight path, the missiles could have traveled a distance of approximately 425 km from Kermanshah until reaching the Ayn Al Asad Airbase (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Distance between Kermanshah and the Ayn Al Assad Airbase (Sources: National Geographic, Esri, Garmin, HERE, UNEP-WCMC, USGS, NASA, ESA, METI, NRCAN, GEBCO, NOAA, INCREMENT P, DigitalGlobe, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, GeoEye, USDA FSA, USGS, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, and the GIS User Community)
Airbase missile strike overview
In recent days, analysts have identified a total of nine separate missile impact strikes within the Ayn Al Assad Airbase perimeter. This does not exclude the possibility of other missile impact sites within the base’s perimeter which have not been identified or published online. Figure 3 shows the location of the nine impact sites which we will look at in more detail. Seven strikes (number 1 to 7) are found at the facilities located just above the northern taxiway and runway, which according to the imagery, houses a variety of drones and aircraft, including V-22 Ospreys, MQ-1 Predator drones, UH-60 Black Hawks and even (K)C-130 Hercules aircraft for transport and refueling. Another missile impact (number 8) is located on the taxiway between the two paved runways and impact number 9 is found on a taxiway in the southeastern complex of hardened aircraft hangars.
Figure 3 Satellite imagery of the Ayn Al Asad Airbase showing the nine missile strike locations where Iranian missiles landed. (Sources: Planet Labs Inc.)
Site number 1 and 2
Strikes number 1 and 2 are approximately 110 m apart. Crater impact nr. 1 is 28 m away from the destroyed soft non reinforced target (possibly a tent structure). Nr. 1 has a small circular blast followed by a secondary semi-circle pattern. The secondary pattern towards the west also gives away the eastern incoming missile direction. Impact nr. 1 is peculiar since it is not a direct hit, but landed 28 m next to the nearest structure. The question is if the Iranians intentionally targeted this point or is it an accuracy issue (off by 28 m) ? We can consider both scenarios for now and later discuss which is more likely when we compare other missile impact locations.
Strike nr. 2 has a similar sized crater and blast pattern as nr. 1 (approx. 27 to 28 m). So it is highly possible that both strikes were conducted using the same missile, with strike nr. 2 having a more obvious blast circle due to it landing exactly in the middle of a series of built soft structures (possible tents). From the measurements we can conclude that strike nr. 2 is more or less dead center on the 5 soft like tent structures and there is no substantial accuracy error.
Site number 3
Site nr. 3 contains two soft structures (possible tents). The missile’s crater and circular blast pattern is located almost in the center of the left building. We estimated that if this building was deliberately targeted, the error is no more than 3 m. For comparison, this is the average accuracy of a handheld GNSS (GPS) device or a current smartphone, which is very impressive for a warhead landing at more than 2000 km/h (terminal velocity).
Site number 4 and 5
Sites 4 and 5 are two building (soft structures) next to one-another each hit with what seems to be similar type of missiles with primary blast radius of 8 to 9 m and secondary circles of around 20 to 22 m. If we assume that the middle of buildings were targeted, we find accuracy errors of 6 and 14 m for site 4 and 5, respectively. Again, we do not know if the Iranians deliberately targeted a certain part of the structures.
Site number 6
Strike 6 is located on the left side of a long metal roof soft structure, similar to a steel open warehouse. The left half of the building shows a primary blast circle of approximately 17 m in radius, with an overall damage radius of approximately 25 m. If we assume that the center of the building was the actual target, then we find an error of 51 m. Again, the question is whether the left side of this building was deliberately struck instead of the central part. We speculate that it is likely that the Iranians intentionally targeted the western side of the building, having prior knowledge the blast radius of their missiles and the importance of the western side of the building.
Site number 7
Strike number 7 is the most easterly impact site and is found near the end of the northern runway. The impact is located almost exactly in the middle of four soft aircraft shelters. The post-strike image (taken a few hours after the event) shows V-22 Ospreys and MQ-1 predator drones parked just south of the shelters. The first circular blast pattern has a 15 m radius. The incoming direction of the missile caused the complete destruction of the adjacent shelter just left of the impact point, while the shelter to the right was lightly damaged. If we assume the Iranians were targeting the middle point of the second shelter (taken from left to right) than the accuracy error would be about 18 m. However, it is highly likely that the four soft shelters were targeted as a single unit. If that is the case, then the missile was only 7 m off (accuracy error) from the middle point.
Site number 8
If we assume that the Iranians are not randomly lobbing missiles inside the airbase with CEP errors of 100 to 500 m as some of the so called “think tank” experts presume (or have previously presumed in recent years), then we can assume that site nr. 8 was targeting the taxiway located between the two paved runways as previously shown in Figure 3. In the images below we can see an impact crater hitting the side of the taxiway. The impact is 23 m from the center of the taxiway pavement and we use this distance as a measure of accuracy. A clear circular blast pattern is visible and a directional blast cone indicates the incoming missile direction.
Site number 9
Strike nr. 9 is the second strike on a taxiway and is the most southern impact site situated in a hardened hangar complex. The impact crater is located almost exactly on one of the corner points of a paved T-junction. If the Iranians purposely targeted this exact point, then the accuracy error could possibly be no more than 2 meters. However, if the target was the actual center of the T-junction, then the error is approximately 11 m. Like in site nr. 8, we see a circular blast with a cone like fan shaped pattern giving the incoming missile direction.
Assessment and conclusions
There are different ways to assess the accuracy of these strikes based on the fact that we do not have the exact coordinates the Iranians wanted (intended) to target. It is not very realistic to assume that the Iranians were perfectly able to target the exact coordinates they intended to hit with perfect accuracy. There is however uncertainty in whether the Iranians intentionally missed some of their targets. We say “some” because our observations clearly show a pattern of very accurate strikes on individually targeted buildings/structures. So we have two most likely scenarios:
- The Iranians intentionally targeted and destroyed some targets. Accuracy errors occurred causing some missiles to miss the exact center point of their targets, with other targets being completely missed.
- The Iranians intentionally destroyed some targets and intentionally missed some others.
I personally believe that the Iranians had no reason to destroy entire series of tents and soft sheltered facilities, causing many injuries according to reports that have come out in recent days, while intentionally missing the taxiways. This would make the first scenario the most likely event.
The table below shows the estimated range in accuracy for each of the 9 strike locations based on our observations and interpretation. The green numbers are the most likely errors in meters, while red numbers indicating the less likely errors based on our assumptions of what the Iranians intended to target. We find an average missile target accuracy of 11 m that is based on what we assume are the most likely intended targets (or in other words the most likely scenario). The statistical spread of this small sample size (of only 9 strikes) is 8.5 m. So the lower and upper limits of the accuracy, based on the standard deviation, is estimated to range between 2.5 and 19.5 m. The median value, which is somewhat comparable to the CEP, is 7 m. This means that half of the strikes landed within 7 m. Finally, the average blast (damage) circle is estimated at 21 m.
So let’s visualize these numbers and assume (a big assumption by the way) that these numbers can be used in circles. The figure below shows a MQ-1 predator drone theoretically being targeted. The yellow line indicates the 11 m mean accuracy value. This is where missiles will land on average. The red line gives the 7 m median value where 50 % of the strikes are found inside this circle. The subsequent figure also includes examples of blast circle (average radius of 21 m) locations in respect to the target.
Assuming our estimation of the intended targets and measurements are realistic, an Iranian missile accuracy ranging on average between 2.5 and 19.5 m is very impressive to say the least and indicates the use of advanced terminal guidance technology (guiding a missile in its terminal phase). Reports have suggested that the Fateh-313 tactical short range ballistic missile (SRBM) was used in the Ayn Al Asad Airbase attack, with other reports suggesting that the Qiam 1 was also used in the attack, including on Erbil Airport. The Fateh-313 is an upgraded Fateh-110, with an increased missile range up to 500 km. Terminally guidance technologies could possibly have been combined, including inertial guidance systems (INS), GPS and possibly electro-optical guidance. Since I am not a military or weapons expert, and my knowledge on sensors is limited to remote sensing for image acquisition, I will leave this part of the assessment to experts like the Saker and his colleagues. I have to say that guiding projectiles traveling at three times the speed of sound within a few meters of their target is pretty amazing if not mind boggling. After all, it is not called “rocket science” for nothing!
Reports have suggested that the Fateh-313 tactical short range ballistic missile (SRBM) was used in the Ayn Al Asad Airbase attack, with other reports suggesting that the Qiam 1 was also used in the attack, including on Erbil Airport.
Are either of these the type than can separate the missile fuel body, spent anyway & only giving a big signature for any missile interceptor to find in the final 15-30 sec to free-fall (not to mention the fiery plume), from the warhead which has a steerable vane system for those final seconds?
Any reason to suspect Iran targeted this specific base because they either knew it had a few anti-missile batteries, which they figured they may as well test how awake & active they are, or knew it did not have any?
Even more important and perhaps missed by the author is that expanded area appears to contain a dammed lake that could produce hydro electric energy. If the aim was to disable the infrustructure the dam would be a good starting point. If the objective is to run the opposition out of town and reoccupy it, strong blasts would be an incentive to accomplish that. If the Americans do have to pull out by force, they would most likely destroy the power plant and call it pretty much what they are claiming by words recently, which can be widely, or wildly interpreted, and we have heard much of this to date. Just some thought on the current situation on the ground.
The missile hits as described in the article demonstrated capability. The further implications might well have been imparted informally, by phone call or message.
Thus the Iranians could have said, “We could easily have hit the dam, but we chose not to. Please take this gentle hint and leave quietly, or we may be forced to show what we can really do. You would not like it”.
Trump probably has 40 red hot phones in the middle east and one for Russia at the ready to instantly quell any disturbance, what a guy.
Thank You for posting this – a serious analysis was overdue. Well done.
However, without wishing to dampen an otherwise excellent analysis, I must however point out some significant issues which even experts seem to be overlooking.
Firstly – 3 sites were similtaneously targeted with a variety of very carefully chosen missiles for specific effects against specific targets – this is increasingly being forgotten / overlooked.
Due to the way modern psyops work, how many people, even readers of this blog have already ‘forgotten’ about the other 2 sites hit.
The techniques of the psyops used are similar to the “x2 planes taking down x3 buildings on 9/11”, – no one noticed, and if they did they made up there own cognitive reason how this could be so.
So stay vigilent or you will miss the pieces of the puzzle required to build up a big picture.
Secondly – The missiles used by Iran were not randomly chosen, or chosen simply because of respect ranges – they all had specific characteristics and capabilities beyond simple range and launch mode. How and why they were used seems to have gone over the heads of most analyists (with respect).
Thirdly – The primary targets of the Iranian missile attacks were not US Military Personnel or assets.
This really should be obvious to all by now. Indeed, I and many other people commented on the very day of the attacks that it was the assets and facilities / infrastructure of ‘Civillian’ agencies and contractors using US Military bases which were specifically targeted and hit (with sub 1 metre CEP accuracy too by the way).
Remember, some missles using specialised explosive or pressure effects are more effective landing in front of a door than on top of a hardened or buried roof.
Other warheads, such as those used to cut buried fibre optic cables or satellite links would appear to have hit the dirt near to a building, thereby appearing to have ‘missed’ a target to untrained eyes.
The devil is in the detail here – that is why the US, the Uk, and Israel have been very quiet about this – we mere mortals are not supposed to notice.
Ok, with that said,
Questions people should really be asking include:
1) What did the missiles ‘really’ hit?
I will give a few clues – look at the holes in the ground and where assets important to Civillian agencies were, including the exact runway used by a certain type of drone, and be mindful that a fibre optic comms cable or sever power and network node is just as important a target as a piece of runway.
Remember also – all Civillian (spook) facilities are networked with each other and most link back to the infamous joint CIA/MI6/MOSSAD command centre at RAF Croughton in England: http://www.fraw.org.uk/frn/cw/cw-about.html
Croughton was involved in ways most people are unaware of (assuming they even knew Croughton existed).
2) Why / How have people ‘forgotten’ about the two other sites targeted by Iranian missiles at the same time as Al-Assad (and where did the civillians from the Erbil command centre go after the attack there)?
I will gove you a clue why you may have forgotten – very powerful and sophisticated Psyops cause people to be misdirected / overloaded and focus elswhere (such as Al-Assad).
Finally –
3) Why have over a dozen joint CIA/MI6/MOSSAD targets been hit in the last 2 weeks, yet the media has been silent? However, the latest was so public – the CIA plane shot down in Afghanistan earlier today – that even the Jerusalem Post is not hiding that one: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iranian-media-CIA-agent-behind-Soleimani-killing-shot-down-in-Afghanistan-615652
Peace to all
“Why have over a dozen joint CIA/MI6/MOSSAD targets been hit in the last 2 weeks, yet the media has been silent?”
what are the sources for this intelligence?
Katherine
@ Katherine,
It does not work like that.
These things are invariably self directed and require some background knowledge (low level ‘intel’) and an appreciation of how the game is played by these ‘Civillian Warriors’.
Firstly you need to know where the main (or sub) centres of operations are and keep an eye on them.
Most are well hidden from casual view and protected inside bases (like the hit points at Al-Assad) and others inside Embassies and even hotels and offices. But with a bit of research they can be easily identified.
Next thing to do is look out for any strange ‘fire’ at one of these centres, or a ‘stray Katusia’ hit on the edge of an air base written off as a miss but is nothing of the sort. Some are indeed nothing, but some could (‘could’ being the key word – as investigation is required).
The MSM will never discuss such things unless to distract, confuse, missdirect, or lie.
The targeted hit of a well know CIA, nick name ‘fat guy’ (see if you can get his real name – it vanished strangely) eating in the US Embassy restaurant was written off as a random Katusha hit – with no deaths, Hmmmmm. Then when the targeting was shown to be precise the Katusaha became a (very well placed) mortar round.
The CIA/MI6/MOSSAD will never reveal a ‘hit’ at one of thier facilities, or a take down of an agent or two (unless it cannot be hidden then a cover such as an ‘accident’ or ‘fire’, or crash, or whatever is used.
They will even ignore massive damage such as the destruction of a command centre with casulaties – this has happened at least twice – when Russia dropped a bunker buster on one in Syria, and recently when Iran dropped at least 5 missiles on them in Erbil.
Even the CIA plane ‘crash’ in Afghanistan was beginning to be covered up, until dozens of phone videos appeared on the internet. But even then the MSM attempted to right off the death of at least x6 CIA agents and crew as ‘conspiracy theory’.
If you rely on bloggers or news sites to reveal so called intel, you will miss very big pieces of the very active war between Iran and the US / UK / Israeli deep state. This is a puzzle where you have to find the pieces yourself before you can begin to put it together.
Hope that helps.
Peace and best wishes.
One fact that stands out a mile is that, with modern missiles being capable of packing huge punches, the Iranian missiles caused hardly more damage than could be accounted for by their own momentum.
Presumably quite small warheads were used. I have no idea how large a warhead could be delivered by the missiles Iran has, but I suspect they could have done far greater damage.
Thank you for your very informative comment Mr. Carim. It looks as if the Iranians showed that they can hit every type of physical asset on that American base, without necessarily using full loads of explosive, just to make the point. Maybe they also hit the morale of the American troops there. Elsewhere I have seen the suggestion that most of those troops are of very low moral quality, and that some have taken the opportunity to try to get out of the military by claiming shell-shock.
Could it be that, particularly if they have now killed D’Andrea, the CIA responsible for organising the murder of Gen. Solomeini, the Iranians are working their way up the chain of command? Maybe Trump and his generals looked so shaken at their recent media appearance because they realise they may not be safe even after they retire.
On the other hand, is there independent evidence that the Iranians actually fired any rockets? Might the diplomatic agreement via the Swiss have been that the Americans would destroy a few huts and tents and cause other minor damage to their own base, to avoid the Iranians wasting any rockets and to prevent the embarrassment to the Americans of revealing they have no effective anti-missile defence?
Thank you for a very important perspective. It dissolves a few puzzles that had been rattling around in my head regarding the “retaliation”.
Perhaps that’s why the House is suddenly, and otherwise inexplicably trying to repeal the 2002 AUMF, and Trump was just as inexplicably making kissy-kissy.
@ Hassan Carim
any infos regarding the Erbil base hitted by 5 missiles?
I heard rumours the command centre was pulverized with many casualties (Mossad, Cia..?)
and also rumours of about 300 IDF stationed there..curious how many of them were hit
Why did they waste one missile for the taxiway? The airfield remains fully operational.
Either all taxiways, and runways should have been hit – which still only slows down an airfield for a few hours until dozers have filled the hole with gravel (for Russian, Swedish and A-10’s planes, F-35 probably needs something cleaner). Supposedly there were more missiles launched though?
To make a point perhaps? To show pinpoint accuracy at the intersection of a narrow taxiway rather than anywhere on a longer and much wider runway. Damage to runways/taxiways would at best cause only temporary inconvenience before repair. Useful preemptively before a surprise attack -which this wasn’t.
As I pointed out before, the warheads employed must have been quite small. Had a runway or taxiway been hit with a maximum warhead, it would not be a quick or simple matter to repair.
But of course it would be far more effective to destroy the fragile aircraft themselves.
May be communication cables were exactly where the missile hit…
…well…
All that I can write is a BIG “…Thank You..!”, to “Mr. Haider Geoanalyst”…
Because now I can understand why “the f***ing gringos let their asses touched that way” (…I need to explain, here in Argentina, is a VERY offensive gesture “to touch the ass” to somebody, especially if the “victim” is a man…), and DO NOTHING after this Iranian “demonstration of warfare skills”.
I´m really happy..!
(((they))) will pay for their crimes, sooner or later.
Kind regards, dear Saker and Mr.Haider, sincerely.
Mikhail.-
A very useful, measured analysis, intelligently planned and executed.
Haider, we thank you for this technical analysis.
News of the missiles’ damage to US troops:
https://sputniknews.com/military/202001281078166838-number-of-us-troops-with-traumatic-brain-injuries-from-iran-missile-attack-increases-to-50–/
The total grows to 50 with serious damage to their brains.
There is a possibility the brain damage was there before the Iranian missile strike. Afterall, they did sign up for a stint in the u.s. military…
I wonder if the damage to the brain was made by the missiles,
or if they have it congenital from before…
Taking into account how ‘muricans are.
As usual, SehSha is washing the dead and wounded. Even though there was advance warning of the attack and in theory, and according to SehSha, ‘no one was injured’, it’s a good opportunity to wash wounded and dead from most any conflict in the general AO. Which they are doing, for instance the several airframes lost in Afghan in the last few days will have to be washed and attributed to another area of conflict. So here we have a herd of ballistic missiles, sans warheads, hitting the ground and starting a week later there are various ‘concusive’ injuries? Sure, and I believe in the tooth fairy, too.
Auslander
https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/eleven-us-troops-flown-to-hospitals-from-al-asad-air-base-in-days-after-iran-missile-attack-1.615158
Bit of a crater here …..
If you look at crater 1, and then the before image you’ll see a tent-structure was indeed hit…..
An analysis of Iran’s attack was done by Byron King back on January 11, 2020. He makes many of the points of the above author. Byron is lawyer Andrew an ex-Navy pilot who has written/edited “Whiskey & Gunpowder” for the Agora group off and on for the last 15+ years; he knows the military. I do know that he reads the Saker; don’t know if he has ever contacted or sent in comments. (I get the feeling he might feel doing so would conflict with his day job. Still, a very good guy, and an astute analyst.)
https://stpaulresearch.com/2020/01/11/the-real-target-of-irans-missiles-revealed-hint-it-was-a-direct-hit/
@ Butte Bill,
Thanks for that link.
That was a superb analysis by the ‘Whiskey & Gunpowder’ guy. I agree totally with it, and he said it all much more comprehensively and eloquently than I ever could (my rather poorly written comment above is somewhat embarrasing in comparison).
I shall follow that writer from today on.
Thanks.
Good thorough report on the damage known to date. The first thing that struck me when looking at the early photos was that the missiles were very accurate, but either were fitted with dummy (test) warheads or were very small missiles as the craters were so small. A Scud or WW II V2 with a one ton warhead would take out a city block and make a crater three metres deep and 15 or more metres wide while these appear to be about a metre deep and three metres across. It appears they were intended to show an ability to hit any US base in the region rather than kill US troops or do serious structural damage. For instance the ones landing in a group of four or five tents only destroyed the single tent they landed on, with some damage to the two adjacent ones.
This seems to have been designed as a warning shot across the bow of the US military which allowed Trump to dismiss it as having caused no significant harm without feeling boxed in so he had to retaliate with a major escalation to avoid losing face.
Exactly so! The fact that Mr Trump was enabled to brush off the attacks is probably good for everyone, as it avoids any escalation or need for US chest beating.
But the people to whom the “message” was addressed – those in the Pentagon, the CIA and Tel Aviv – will have got it loud and clear.
Could you please clarify your definition of CEP:
“This is when a circle is drawn around 50 % of the targets that land on a single aim point.”
I’m not sure what that’s supposed to mean?
Replace missiles with dart arrows. Throw a hundred at the dart board. Then draw a circle around the 50 arrows closest to the bull. That would be your personal CEP in dart.
Due to the inclined incoming trajectory, it is also common to account for an elliptical target precision defined as the ellipse centered the aim point and surrounding 50% of the hits.
Been busy as a one armed man in a paper hanging contest of late, but finally have a little time to really look at the missile attack. The missiles that hit the several targets in different areas did not have a warhead. Period. There is no warhead blast area, a finite destruction field with everything in the field flattened and shredded. Having been on the receiving end of various size mortar and arty rounds, the damage seen from this barrage was the splatter effect from relatively heavy metal objects hitting the ground at high velocity. A fifty kilo warhead would have left a bit of a crater and the blast area would have been considerably larger than what is shown, and by crater I mean something you could lose a couple tanks in without trying. That kind of blast area is definitely not shown in the images I’ve seen, and methinks those missiles carry a bit more than a fifty kilo explosive warhead, ergo I stand firm in saying the missiles were sans explosive warhead.
In my opinion Iran sent a very clear message that they can flatten anything within a circle from Tel Aviv east to Tehran and do it with pinpoint accuracy. In my opinion you will see few if any ‘hostile’ warships of any size anywhere near Hormuz or within 600 or so kilometers of the straights. This is a game changer. Here is ‘backward’ Iran, the victim of massive sanctions and punitive actions by Foggy Bottom for years and according to the always faithful and truthful ‘west media’ imploding from ‘dire economic circumstances’, and here Iran has shown what it can do.
So, Iran sent the message and I’m sure the halls of Five Points, Langley and Foggy Bottom itself were abuzz with consternation and seething anger but I’m also certain the message came through loud and clear. The reply to the message was Foggy Bottom assets shot down another airframe and killed a lot of innocent people in Tehran, just like they did in DNR. To be kind, they have no shame, but a word to the wise. You reap what you sow.
Auslander
Author
Never The Last One, paper back edition. https://www.amazon.com/dp/1521849056 A deep look in to Russia, her culture and her Armed Forces, in essence a look at the emergence of Russian Federation.
An Incident On Simonka paperback edition. https://www.amazon.com/dp/1696160715 NATO Is Invited To Leave Sevastopol, One Way Or The Other.
Auslander, my friend,
What caused the shock wave in the bunkers that hurt the troops?
How do you explain that effect without the use of a kinetic explosion?
I can’t. Things just don’t add up on this one, either that or the imagery we’re getting and I’m getting is not correct.
Possibly other EM-Laser weapons was used and the dsiplay fireworks is just for the coverstory?
In November of 66′ my unit took terrible casualties in Viet Nam; 30-40 killed and many wounded in ONE fight at Dau Tieng. Stars and Stripes fed the casualties out over a month to lessen the impact in the media. My Captain, Robert Foley and his RTO earned the Medal of Honor for that engagement. I was wounded the following March 67″. It’s been written elsewhere that the “concussion injuries” attributed to the Iranian missile attack were actually from other actions. THAT makes sense to me.
Auslander; I too have endured personally indirect fire on my position. An 82mm mortar impact 10′ from my exposed position got my attention to say the least. The 3′ crater and the cone of fire was blunted by the dirt in front of my hole. Yeah, the Iranian missiles had little or no warhead and the “message” was sent to the appropriate Swamp Creatures”.
Meanwhile another US Spec Ops plane, this time a C-27J Spartan, bites the dust in Anbar province, Iraq.
Once is an accident, twice is coincidence, three times is enemy action.
https://z5h64q92x9.net/proxy_u/ru-en.en/https/colonelcassad.livejournal.com/5602350.html
Interesting. Casad makes three thoughts available to us. The third one is particularly interesting, which he says could be an internal job to explain the deaths after Iranian missile attack. Mind you, he says “if it happened”.
Someone suggested similar scenario regarding the plane in Afganistan, this time to cover up the disappearance of the main spook, who may or may not have died in that event.
Haider, excellent article, thank you for sharing your expertise.
Just a small addition regarding the accuracy of the missiles. I’m just adding this for the many commentators who may have missed your — very pertinent — assumptions about intended targets.
I like to watch biathlons whenever I can catch them on TV, which is not often and there’s little chance of my watching a biathlon live out here in the tropics. Anyway, the thing about the sport that grabs my attention is the shooting part. The camera zooms in on the targets and it’s gripping to watch the targets falling (or not) after the shot especially when scores are close.
My point is, the spectator can make judgements about the shooter’s accuracy because he knows prior to the shooting what the shooter is aiming at.
In our case, we don’t know for sure what the Iranians were aiming for. Only they know. The target is a large area with a perimeter of 24 km. It contains many objects of various kinds. A salvo of nine or ten missiles has a pretty good chance of hitting something other than the earth. If it does, the question arises if it was intentional or not. And as I’ve said, therein lies the problem — we just can’t be sure. To my mind making conclusions about the accuracy and precision of Iranian rocketry at this point in the same vein as, for example, “Whiskey & Gunpowder” (link in Butte Bill’s comment above) is unsound.
This is not to say that the Iranians are incapable of making accurate missiles — they most likely are capable. But we should not make unwarranted conclusions about the accuracy of their missiles based on this attack. We can only say that they are capable of attacking, with some precision, area targets the distance between them and the targets in Iraq.
Is this situation a good or a bad thing? Well, it depends. From the Iranian point of view, it is good. Iran had a chance to fire missiles at real, presumably defended, targets and an opportunity to fine-tune their systems — there must have been a forward observer assessing battle damage there somewhere, perhaps with recce drones; it is an important base for the Empire after all. But the attack had more a political rather than a military aim as alluded to by many of the commentators here. True, looking at the increasing number of reported casualties Iran may have bloodied the Empire’s nose in the process but military-wise the damage was not that great. The Empire is still left guessing as to the real capabilities of Iranian missile-making, there’s an increment in uncertainty, further contributing to the so-called ‘fog of war.’
Operation Martyr Soleimani
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Iranian_attack_on_U.S._forces_in_Iraq
Some of the comments here about the Iranian missiles using inert warheads, presumably to limit casualties, is not consistent with the photographic images of the post attack damages. Non exploding missiles would simply bury themselves, like a bullit in an outdoor shooting range, and not cause the extensive blast areas shown in the photos. Look up some images of missile or rocket duds, they cause very limited local damage and mostly just bury themselves.
What I have not seen discussed here, in the lead article or the comments, is the likelihood the Iranian missiles were set to explode not on ground or hard target impact, but at a certain distance above the ground. In a missile targeting an unreinforced above ground structure, an airburst right above the target, or just inside is ideal. A warhead explosion after impact with the ground has a smaller blast radius. During WW2, it was noted that the explosive destruction caused by a german v-1 cruise missile was greater than the v-2 ballistic missile. This was because the v-2 missiles, impacting at much higher velocities, tended to bury themselves in the ground before exploding. The surrounding dirt absorbing some of the explosive energy and reducing the overall size of the area affected by the explosion.
The photos in the article clearly showing a directional aspect to the warhead explosion damage, with the author noting this specifically, could be further evidence the warheads exploded either above, or just as they came into contact with their intended targets.
What this could mean is not only are the Iranian missiles demonstrating a very accurate cep technology, they are also very advanced in their fusing tech, as well. This latter, getting a warhead to explode consistently a certain level above ground, is also difficult to achieve. This would show that Iranian missile tech is even much more advanced than the cep accuracy showed.
In a Persian Market
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6P-0kEv08O0
Sheikh’s Reponse To US Killing Of Soleimani & Iran’s Retaliatory Missile Strikes Against US Bases
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6eKAafePFo&feature=emb_logo
Yam Tahira’s comment:
Trump is surrounded by Israeli agents. Netanyahu was very happy when US killed Solumani because
general Solumani had tried to make secret peace deal with Saudi Arabia through the Iraqi PM..Its clear America and Israel doesn’t want peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Second Iran and Malaysia signed a deal of gold reserve for trading instead using Petrodollars…Turkey,
Iran, Qatar and Malaysia are creating an economic alliance that seeks to use gold as a way to trade
and free themselves from what they claim are sanctions that target “Muslim” countries..
Russia and China also want to leave from the Petrodollars monetary system .
Tom Luongo is saying Russia gave then their Glonast system and that is why they were so accurate in the targeting.
Fascinating article, and comments too. Hopefully Mr. Haider can dig up more info on the warheads used.
The Iranians almost certainly did not use blanks or retrofit a few warheads with a lighter charge just for this strike. They also seemed very confident about inflicting a large number of U.S. casualties.
Despite seemingly having made empty boasts of “80 Americans dead” at first, U.S. brain trauma casualties have turned out to be quite high. These injuries are usually reported by IED survivors whose armoured vehicles keptt hem in one piece, but left lingering traumatic injury throughout the body and especially the brain.
This suggests, Iran was using warheads that can deliver enhanced concussive force.
Perhaps something like a hybrid conventional high explosive-thermobaric “vacuum bomb”, capable of delivering concussive force even through the bunkers the U.S. troops were in. Thermobaric weapons are the ‘poor man’s’ nuclear weapon.
Images of the strikes did not seem to indicate thermobarics, and their actual use on the Syrian battlefield has not really lived up to the ‘poor man’s nuke’ theory. However, its possible Iran tweaked the concept for use as close airburst munitions without a significant telltale thermobaric cloud. Not relying on shrapnel, but a sharp, intense explosion delivering high concussive forces would allow a lighter missile and warhead.
Iran has surprised with simple ingenuity before; their bunker ‘super concrete’ added fibreglass, for example.
I have a letter, it may be a forgery. There again it may be genuine, someone who says that he worked at the Pentagon, says that it looks as though it might be genuine. It looks authentic. Furthermore, the damage it describes, fits much better with the photos taken by AFP and CNN of the aftermath of the Iranian attack on Ain Al Assad Airbase than does Trumps airy “”No damage!” or even the subsequent 11-20-30-50-64 cases of “concussion”. In fact even the western correspondents who photographed the damage described such claims as “incredible!” Anyway, here it is:The real casualties in Iraq.
https://static.hypercomments.com/data/images2/9483823/1579175432328668
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
9010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC, 20301-9010
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, House of Representatives
242 Rayburn Building
Washington DC, 20515-2402
Dear Congressman Thompson,
In response to your January 10. Freedom of Information act (FOI) appeal, concerning Iran’s missile strike on US airbase Ain Al Assad in Iraq, on January 8 and its subsequent damages and casualtie
Following detailed examination of US Ain Al Assad air base by DOD Special investigative team, concluding estimates are as follows:
Total number of casualties 285 (139 dead 146 injured)
Extensive damage to 15 helicopters including 1 Black Hawk, 2 cargo aircrafts and 3 MQ-1 Predator Drones.
Extensive damage to Base Command Center. 3 barracks, 3 hangars and 10 military tents.
Relative damage to base’s Air Traffic Control Tower and base’s runway.
Initial assessments indicate mentioned damages will cause total impairment of Ain Al Assad air base activities for at least three weeks.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
James P. Hogan
I wondering what the size of the warhead. I was in photo intelligence in the Navy and have seen what a 2000 lbs. warhead can do or even 1000 lb. war head. From what I have seen the war heads where not very big and the craters where not that deep nor the blast radius that large compared to the 2000 or 1000 lb. warhead. The damage seems to be no more than what the rocket made with no explosive warhead.