Hizballah Has Missiles for Downing Israeli Warplanes One Year after Lebanon War
One year ago to the day, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist Hizballah sent a unit across the border into Israel and ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing eight of its members and kidnapping two. The raid, followed by a Katyusha rocket attack on northern Israel sparked the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and a 34-day war.
Today, DEBKAfile’s military sources report that Hizballah is in better military shape than ever before. its sponsors, Iran and Syria, have not only replenished the rocket stocks depleted by daily barrages against Israeli towns and villages, but topped them up by 50%. Whereas Hizballah started the 2006 war with 12,000 rockets of different types, today the Lebanese Shiite terror group has accumulated 18,000 in its arsenal.
Drawing lessons of that war, Hizballah has doubled the number of teams trained to launch rockets and given them a fleet of all-terrain vehicles and motorbikes for speedy movement between firing locations.
Hizballah’s long-range rocket force, designated “Planning Unit,” is stationed in northern Lebanon in the Hermel district. Most of the new rocket supplies, including hundreds of Zilzal-2, Zilzal-3, and Fatah-110, which has a range of 250 km (reaching Tel Aviv and points south), are stored in large emergency depots on the Syrian side of the border with Lebanon to keep them out of sight of UN peacekeepers and out of the way of the Israeli Air Force in a flare-up of hostilities.
Hizballah plans to delay hauling the rockets into Lebanon until the last moment before they are fired.
Hizballah’s short-range rocket unit, designated the “Nasr Unit”, is stationed in the Tyre region of the South and its command center in the village of Maarub. They are positioned for striking the northern Israeli towns of Haifa, Kiryat Shemona, Tiberias, Safed, Acre and Nahariya.
To stay out of sight of UN peacekeepers policing in the South, this brigade keeps a low profile, reactivating only very few of the bunkers which served them in the war. the bulk have been cleared out, restocked with ammunition and combat rations, prepared for military use and kept closed.
This enables the Lebanese government and, less willingly, the Israel high command, to maintain that a lot has changed for the better since the war and Hizballah is no longer deployed right up to the border but at a distance.
This is only a half-truth. The fact is that the Shiite terrorists are back in the South, albeit well hidden in the Shiite villages. Consequently, Israeli policy-makers can continue to spin illusions, like those the Olmert government fed the public and the media before the last war.
Hizballah has tripled its shore-to-sea C-802 missiles, one of which crippled an Israeli missile ship in July, 2006. With 25-30 of these weapons, the Shiite militia is capable of menacing any of the warships cruising Mediterranean waters opposite the Lebanese coast, be they Israeli missile boats, the American Sixth Fleet or the European flotilla attached to UNIFIL.
Several dozen more are concealed across the Syrian border, ready for transfer at short notice.
Hidden there too is double the number of anti-tank missiles in service with the Hizballah in 2006, of types which caused heavy damage and casualties to Israeli tank crews. Syria has upgraded this stock with a large supply of “Third Generation” missiles bought in Russia with Iranian funding.
Another major difference between then and now is that Hizballah has established its first air defense unit armed with ground-to-air shoulder-borne Strela-7 missiles and the mobile Rapier 2s.
Last year, Hizballah fielded 1,600 well-trained commandos, the backbone of its fighting force, and lost 750 in combat with the Israeli army. Since then, 1,200 fresh fighters have been recruited and are undergoing commando training at a special facility near Tehran.
Each course of three to four months has an intake of 300 to 400 Hizballah recruits. The third course went into training in July. By the end of the year, Hizballah will have some 2,000 elite troops, 400-500 more than its number at the outset of the last war.
Hizballah’s secretary-general, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, presents a charismatic, powerful image. However, since the war, Iran and the movement’s leadership have reduced his mandate to internal Lebanese politics in opposition to prime minister Fouad Siniora and the rest of Lebanon’s anti-Syrian political bloc, headed by Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt.
The militia’s present war chief, special operations planner and liaison with Iran, Syria and al Qaeda, is the veteran Hizballah super-terrorist and kidnapper, Imad Mughniyeh.
Serving under him as chief of staff is Ibrahim Aqil.
Number 3 in the movement’s military hierarchy is Hajj Khalil Harb, commander of Unit No. 1800, which kidnapped the Israeli soldiers Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev in its cross-border raid of July 12, 2006, and is responsible for special operations in Israel, the Palestinian territories and Iraq.
Members of this elite unit are deployed in the Gaza Strip in support of Hamas.
In Iraq, they cooperate with Sunni and Shiite terrorists fighting US troops.
Unit No. 1800 has a permanent complement of 5,000 trained men and a partially-trained reserve force of 9,000 on standby.
The militia’s fighting manpower, including its special intelligence and security agencies, totals between 15,000 and 16,000.
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(Note: DEBKAfile is not the most reliable source out there, that’s putting it kindly, but it does have connections to the Israeli establishment and it often airs official “leaks”. This article might be an attempt of some circles inside Israel to prevent another war. I would add that I have no independent confirmation of the existence of a Hezbollah “unit 1800”. There have been claims made by Israeli and Neocon pundits about the existence of this unit, but no independent source have, to my knowledge, ever confirmed this. Please let me know if you come across any information about this “unit 1800”. Lastly, the overall numbers of Hezbollah fighters in this article are clearly inflated. The actual number of fighters is probably below the 2000 mentioned in this article. VS)
Vineyard,
What a great blog. Just discovered it. The post on Iran’s options was one of the best post I’ve ever read. This one’s as useful. Debka has bee leaking stories about Lebanon all summer, mostly from an uLtra-hawk POV. Col. Lang over at Sic Semper Tyrannis has postulated that he thinks war in the Golan is coming, with an Israeli false flag provocation kicking off a war with Syria so as to allow a left hook into Lebanon, so as to hit the Hizbollah defense belts from behind.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2007/07/build-up-in-leb.html
Debka has been running all kinds of stories about Syria that fit Lang’s hunch perfectly. This one might or it might reflect what I’ve seen in Ha’aretz and the Jerusalem Post that the IDF has cold feet.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1184162942886&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Anyhow, time will tell. Smells like something’s up to me.
Dear John,
Thanks for your words of encouragement for my new blog. I really appreciate them.
Debka is really a weird case. On one hand the are clearly careful affabulators (is that English?) but on the other they are also careful leakers so I keep an eye on them.
I don’t think that Hezbollah’s defenses are linear and have much of a “behind” to strike. These defenses are built ASSUMING that the IDF will by-pass them first and only then gradually encircle and destroy them. Nor do I put much faith in the IDF’s willingness to start a war with Syria, much less to take on Syria and then Hezbollah.
There are, no doubt, idiot politicians like Olmert who have bruised feelings over what happened last summer and need a “victory” of some kind, but I cannot image the IDF command agreeing to such a crazy plan. The only good thing for the Olmert administration in case of a way with Syria or Lebanon is that it could serve as a media-redirecting cover which would allow them to massacre anybody linked to Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. You know – something a la Jenin operation. Just to get back at Hamas for kicking Fatah out of Gaza.
Anway – time will tell.
Please do come back and post your reactions to the articles I repost and to the original contents I will keep on writing from time to time. I really value the inputs of my visitors. Oh, and let others know about my work here.
Thanks!
VS
Vineyard,
The flanking story made no sense to me either, as it implies a turning movement short of Damascus, since if the IDF tried to take Damascus, they’d be there for all time and with most of their troops. Urban warfare ain’t quick. But if they don’t take Damascus then it would be hard up against their LOC into Lebanon and Merkavas look like they’re thirsty beasts and POL convoys are real easy targets. But, hell, nothing coming out of the Middle East passes any kind of common sense test right now. A general movie western bar fight to the north might allow Lukkudnik hot heads to “discover” Iranian involvement and Steve Clemons had a story a while back about the Israelis were looking for an excuse to lob off sub-launched cruise missiles, apparently at the prompting of our latest incarnation of Gen. Jack D. Ripper, Darth Cheney.
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/002145.php
I personally wouldn’t want go after Hezbollah for revenge if I were an IDF general and I get the sense that the IDF feels the same way but things have gotten way past weird in the last 6 weeks over there.
You keep up the posts and comments will follow.
Steve Clemons had a story a while back about the Israelis were looking for an excuse to lob off sub-launched cruise missiles, apparently at the prompting of our latest incarnation of Gen. Jack D. Ripper, Darth Cheney.
This begs the question ‘at what?’. Cruise missiles are best to hit static AA or C4I positions, none of which Hezbollah has. They can also try to kill Nasrallah with a cruise missile strike, but then f**king it up (again!) with that kind of strike is risky at best (though they would take *any* risk to get Nasrallah even though his #2 – Naim Qassem – is at least as smart, although not as charismatic, as Nasrallah). But then, the Empire has now such a record of doing the dumbest possible thing that I would not put *anything* past these guys…
Oh, the cruise missiles were supposed to be shot off at Natanz with the expectation that it would force our hand to follow up, you know like War Plan R in Doctor Strangelove. That would be somthing, eh?
Oh, the cruise missiles were supposed to be shot off at Natanz with the expectation that it would force our hand to follow up, you know like War Plan R in Doctor Strangelove. That would be something, eh? (Oops, forgot to sign. JS)
the cruise missiles were supposed to be shot off at Natanz
oops, I misunderstood your point. No, Nataz sure is a doable target, but you would need a good package of cruise missiles all on target to get to the buried parts. Besides, that is, I would think, one of the places were the Iranians would put their mobile air defense systems purchased form Russia and these can *easily* shoot down cruise missiles. So they would need to put some electronic warfare planes over Natanz to have a chance to acheive their objective and these planes would, in turn, also be at risk from these Russian systems.
If I was to advise the IDF I would reccommend ballistic missile strikes, not cruise missiles or aircraft. Or let the Americans do the job.
It’s just supposed to start things off, I gathered. Clemons had it that Cheney’s bunch would then get us to follow up. The real work would come from the Stratcom warplan, which according to Col. Lang, is “punishing.”
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/03/whitehouse200703?printable=true¤tPage=all
makes sense, in particular since the real goal of all that would be to werk the Iranian economy and civil society. You know – do to them what the Israelis did to Lebanon last summer.
Great blog. I just discovered it a few days ago through M of A. I had a couple of questions if you don’t mind;
Is there *ANY* MANPAD that can take down an f-16?? Would Hizbullah get any?
Would Israel consider a mass invasion of Lebanon (i.e. with greater than 100k troops) ala 1982 and then turn on Damascus from the west? If they bypass Hizb positions, how vulnerable would their supply lines be?
Do you have a reasonable guess abour what Hizbullah’s casualties really were? The 750 debka claims doesn’t seem plausable. Hizb did ts best fighting in the last 2 days of the war and I don’t see how if they had greater than 50% KIA…not to mention wounded.
Thanx for a very informative website,
Lysander
Dear Lysander,
First a disclaimer: I do not have access to any classified informaton any more, so what will follow is only my best guess:
Is there *ANY* MANPAD that can take down an f-16?? Would Hizbullah get any?
Actually, this totally depends on what the F-16 is doing. Pretty much any MANPADS exploding near the engine exhaust of an F16 will bring it down. The issue is really speed, altitude and, depending on the MANPADS, the aspect. The F16 being single engined is more susceptible to the relatively small warhead of a MANPADS than other aircraft such as the F15/F18. MANPADS are most effective in an “ambush” to use the Soviet expression for air defence tactics. Also, MANPADS are heat seeking so that limits what they can do and how they can engage a target. Natanz is defended by mobile multimode air defense systems, something Hezbollah does not, as far as I am aware, have.
Would Israel consider a mass invasion of Lebanon (i.e. with greater than 100k troops) ala 1982 and then turn on Damascus from the west? If they bypass Hizb positions, how vulnerable would their supply lines be?
For Israel the issue is never getting somewhere – its getting *out*. They could get to Damascus in any number of ways, but what would be the point? The real danger for Israel is not conventional armies, but decentralized organizations such as Hezbollah. Look how easy it was for the USA to get to Baghdad – but was that a winning stragegy or a loosing one?
Do you have a reasonable guess abour what Hizbullah’s casualties really were? The 750 debka claims doesn’t seem plausable. Hizb did ts best fighting in the last 2 days of the war and I don’t see how if they had greater than 50% KIA…not to mention wounded.
right now, off the top of my head, I cannot tell you since never bothered counting or remebering them. What I can tell you is that Hezbollah ever tried to hide its casualties, quite the opposite – it always makes a big deal of of each martyred combattant. So I would reccommend you simply look up the official Hezbollah statements about this. I am pretty sure the figure would be correct.
HTH (if not, please come back and let me know. It is late right now and I need to run).
Kind regards,
VS