The recent discussion with Lysander, Joe and others about possible Russian actions to prevent a NATO attack on Syria has lead me to conclude that it might be to look into this topic in a separate post. So here is my point of view on what Russia is really up to. As always, I offer that as a basis for discussion and I hope that you guys will contribute your points of view.
Cheers and, as always, many thanks,
The Saker
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Russian national security policies – a tentative list
Following Russian President Medvedev recent TV address to the Russian nation about the US anti-missile system deployment in Europe and Russia’s response to it a lot of commentators have said that a “new Cold War” was possibly returning to the European continent. While not quite wrong, this characterization is dangerously misleading as it leads to associations with the old Soviet Union. That is a highly deceptive choice of words as it misses the single most important conceptual cornerstone of any sound analysis of Russian policies:
==>>Russia is not the Soviet Union<<==
(repeat three times)
(repeat three times)
This seemingly self-evident truism is still fundamentally missed in most analyses of Russian national security policies, and there are good reasons for that. After all, Putin was a KGB intelligence officer, Russia is, in many but not all aspects, a ‘successor state’ to the old Soviet Union, there still is a strong minority of Russians who are nostalgic for the good old days (?) of the Soviet Union and some Soviet era symbols are still seen everywhere in Russia (red stars, even statues of Lenin). But most importantly, the Western propaganda machine is constantly trumpeting that Russia is a “Soviet Union version 2”, that a “resurgent Russia” means a new USSR, that under a thin veneer of change “the Russians are up to their old tricks”, etc. That is, of course, utter nonsense. One need not to be a Putin-supporter to realize that Russia is a qualitatively different entity from the old Soviet Union. I won’t even bother defending that self-evident fact here (if somebody doubts this, please stop reading now).
Saying that Russia is not the “Soviet Union v2” however, begs the question of what Russia really is. What are the Russians really up to? What are the actual national security policies which the “Putin-Medvedev-Putin again” regime has been pursuing since 2000 and s likely to purse on the foreseeable future. I will try to offer a summary of what I believe the national security priorities of Russia currently are in the following list.
Current Russia national security polices aims to:
- show an absolutely determined willingness to fight if Russian vital interests are threatened (08.08.08 war against Georgia)
- de-couple the EU from the US as much as possible by political and economic means (see the huge gas contracts through the north and south pipelines towards Western Europe)
- growl and bare fangs, but not quite bite, when confronted with US imperial hubris and threats (Russian response to NATO anti-missile system in Europe)
- at the UN, insist on a full compliance with international law and UNSC resolutions (that, in itself, is a major annoyance for the USA who would love to have a legal cloak for all its imperial wars)
- develop new international structures and relations (think SCO and CSTO here) to counterbalance US controlled structures
- strengthen bilateral cooperation with independent partners (China, India, Latin America)
- protect the Russian economy from the slow-motion but inexorable crash of the Western capitalist economies, mainly by reducing Russia’s dependence on the West (Putin and Medvedev have done an excellent job in making the Russian economy strong while protecting it from the worst effects of the economic crisis in the West)
- dramatically increase the Russian influence over the Central Asian region and its energy-rich resources (not by sending soldiers, but by participating in the economic development of this region)
- weaken the influence of US-controlled Wahabi insurgencies by supporting the traditional forms of Islam not only in the Caucasus region, but throughout Russia, including Moscow and other big cities and by developing Russian central and regional anti-terrorist capabilities.
- use Russian economic and cultural power to slowly improve relations with the population of countries like the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, or Latvia whose governments have recently (or are still) run by anti-Russian governments, while reaching out to promising political figures (like Nino Burjanadze)
- avoid openly confronting or antagonizing the US Empire, in particular when the latter is engaged in self-defeating policies (war in Afghanistan)
- develop military forces capable of:
- suppressing any insurgency inside Russia
- dealing with one or two simultaneous regional crises on the Russian borders
- project enough power to protect threatened regional allies (Tajikistan? Armenia?)
- execute complex joint operations with key allies (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and, in a second phase, possibly China)
- maintain a strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter the US from any ideas of an attack on Russia
I would submit that this (admittedly non-official) strategy is fundamentally sound. First, in contrast to old Soviet-era policies, this Russian strategy is both doable and sustainable. Second, it is legitimate, in the sense that it is fully compatible with international law and accepted norms of civilized behavior. Third, this strategy does not threaten the legitimate interests of any other country or region. Fourth, these polices enjoy a broad consensus inside the Russian public opinion. Fifth, these policies make Russia an attractive partner for many countries who seek to remain free from US imperial control.
However, there are also some apparent down sides to these policies. The first and most obvious one is that Russia will not get involved in a direct confrontation with the West to defend any third party, be it the Kosovo Serbs, the Iranians or the Syrians. If NATO pushes hard, Russia will back down, unless its direct and vital interests are threatened. The ‘best’ Russia can do for those countries who are threatened by the US empire is, according to point #4 above, is insist on a compliance with international law and UNSC resolutions. Sadly, on at least two recent occasions (Iran, Libya), Russia failed to even do that. My best guess is that in both situations the leaders in the Kremlin were hoping for some quid pro quo from the USA, though I am quite unable to identify anything that the betrayal by Russia of Iran and Libya at the UNSC would have achieved for Russia (any guesses here?).
This leaves a couple of what I think of “exotic things” to explain. What were Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers doing in Venezuela? Why is the Russian Navy conducting anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia? What is the Russian aircraft carrier doing in the Mediterranean off the coast of Syria right now?
The reality is that none of these deployments have a serious military component. These are what the US Navy calls “showing the flag” missions, a demonstration of capabilities to potential allies and adversaries, and a way to show the Russian people that their tax money allows their country to play in the “big leagues”. At no time did any of these deployment represent even a marginal threat to the USA or NATO countries (a pair of Russian attack submarines would be a far greater threat to the US Navy than the current deployment of the Kuznetsov).
Bottom line: the Russian policies will be low-key, unspectacular, gradual, aimed at the long-term, focused but unconfrontational and primarily local and regional. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia does not believe that it is in a global zero-sum game against the USA. The leaders in the Kremlin are under no illusion about the fact that the USA is attempting to establish a world-wide empire and that it’s leaders hate Russia with a passion and that western policies always aim at the eventual dismemberment and demise of Russia; they just don’t believe that the Soviet way to oppose the USA was the correct one.
If there is one thing which the Russian nation has learned from the Mongol invasions is that retreating can be an extremely powerful defensive tactic and the Russians have become masters at this very refined and sophisticated art. Though this has never been mentioned officially, there is a good deal of evidence that the Kremlin has decided that letting the USA over-extend itself in all sorts of military adventures is the best way to weaken and eventually bring down the US empire.
You could say that the Russians are playing chess, while the Americans are playing monopoly.
This is, of course, a delicate, if not dangerous, balancing act. One could reasonably argue that the initial appearance of US ‘success’ in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in the war in Georgia, or that the appearance of ‘success’ in Libya might now result in an attack on Syria. In fact, the one common feature of US and Israel strategic thinking is the systematic conflation of short term/tactical successes with long term/strategic gains. So when the US/Israeli Empire enjoys a short term/tactical victory, it tends to interpret that as a meaningful sign of power which results into a typical “who is next?” kind if mindset.
Russia therefore has to carefully balance letting the US/Israeli Empire over-extend itself against letting the resulting short term imperial hubris threaten important or even vital Russian national interests (see #3 above).
These are my thoughts on this topics and I would be most interested in hearing your reactions.
Many thanks and kind regards,
The Saker
well summarized. the chess player will at some point trap the US and go on the offensive. in chess, this is checkmate, in monopoly — bankruptcy.
The Soviet Union may be dead and is never coming back but Putin is intent on restoring Russian influence in post Soviet space to the point of creating a new Union
http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2011/10/04/translation-putin-on-eurasia/
“First, none of this entails any kind of revival of the Soviet Union. It would be naïve to try to revive or emulate something that has been consigned to history. But these times call for close integration based on new values and a new political and economic foundation.
We suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. This project also implies transitioning to closer coordination in economic and currency policies in the Customs Union and CES and establishing a full-fledged economic union”
@Robert: the key word here is ‘union’. Russian politicians (Putin, Gryzlov, Rogozin and others) have made it absolutely clear that not only do they want a union of *sovereign* states, but that any other project aimed at reducing the sovereignty of any nations would go against Russian national interests.
IMHO there are only two nations with which Russia could consider forming a confederation: Kazakhstan and Belarus. I would even argue that Kazakhstan is a much more interesting ally and possible confederacy partner than Belarus, but that is highly arguable and I won’t make the case for that point of view here.
Other than these two, all the other post-Soviet nations present much more risks and headaches than opportunities for Russia. Russian nationalism notwithstanding, the breakup of the Soviet Union got rid of a lot of costly, and even morbid, ‘fat’ from the now much healthier ‘body’ of Russia. Really, this was a blessing in disguise and Russia is now inheriting the best of both worlds: Russia is now the dominant power in many ex-Soviet republics, but it does not have to shoulder the associated headaches and costs.
What the various anti-Russian nationalists failed to see, blinded as they were by their ideologies, is that Russia did not need them nearly as much as they needed Russia. And now its too late to reverse this.
Good! :-)
A pair of comments:
“there still is a strong minority of Russians who are nostalgic for the good old days (?) of the Soviet Union”
What I noticed when I’ve been in Russia a few months ago is that nostalgia for the USSR seems to be widespread. Most people aren’t communists, but seem to miss the powerful state, the social order and stability, the excelent education and healthcare systems, the simpler life, the industrial economy. I guess in the 90’s people didn’t miss the USSR because they still had fresh memories of all the bad things. Now 20 years have passed, and people remember mostly the good things.
“the breakup of the Soviet Union got rid of a lot of costly, and even morbid, ‘fat’ from the now much healthier ‘body’ of Russia.”
It seems that the only remaining “fat” is the Caucasus, including the independent countries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Not only this is a very unstable and poor region, but corruption is absurdly high even for Russian standards. Did you see the mess of South Ossetian elections this week? Saakashvili must be happy: if South Ossetia doesn’t become a stable, prosper and truly independent (that is, one whose economy doesn’t rely completely on Russian aid) country, its hard-won sovereignity won’t last much. And this is something that the South Ossetian elite seems to be missing.
@Carlo:I guess in the 90’s people didn’t miss the USSR because they still had fresh memories of all the bad things. Now 20 years have passed, and people remember mostly the good things.
Well, its a strange trait of the human nature to remember the good things and forget the bad ones (look at how most men remember boot camp!). There might be some evolutionary mechanism at work here… That, and the fact that there is a steady stream of pro-Soviet propaganda in the mass media.
It seems that the only remaining “fat” is the Caucasus, including the independent countries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
ABSOLUTELY! The problem here is that Russia is stuck. If there is anything which the Chechen wars proved beyond any reasonable doubt is that if these regions are handed over to the locals the first thing the latter do is go on the offensive inside Russia itself. If there was a way for the Russians to get the hell out of there without folks like Dudaev or Saakashvili going crazy and taking on Russia, the Kremlin might consider, but sadly this is not an option. But yes, the Caucasus is a big pain the Russian butt, and this is why the 58th Army is one of the most battle ready of the entire Russian armed forces.
what are your thoughts on the opening sections of medvedev’s speech — where he clearly talks about wanting IN on the American-led system in Europe? he repeats this desire near the end, but insists that russia will defend itself from US/NATO provocations.
@Anonymous:what are your thoughts on the opening sections of medvedev’s speech — where he clearly talks about wanting IN on the American-led system in Europe
Well, the “big secret” that everybody already knows is that any NATO system in which Russia would participate as a full partner becomes quasi useless to the US Empire. Take the anti-missile system: if Russia becomes an equal partner in it, whose missiles will it be defending against? Non-existent missiles from Iran? Of course not.
So if Russia fully joins the NATO anti-missile system in Europe the sole purpose of the system will remain to test, develop and maintain a basically useless structure. It will do some good to the Western and Russian military industries, and some of the lessons learned in the process could be used elsewhere. But as a tool of US and NATO hegemony it would become diluted to the point of being useless.
Letting Russia in is a face-saving option for the West to give up its ambition, and both sides know that.
HTH,
Cheers!
“If there was a way for the Russians to get the hell out of there without folks like Dudaev or Saakashvili going crazy and taking on Russia, the Kremlin might consider, but sadly this is not an option.”
True. The funny thing is that usually we see the explanation that Russia didn’t allow Chechnya to be independent “because of oil”, when in fact the reserves in this region are small. On the other hand, Russia didn’t bother fighting against the independence of Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, which have huge reserves.
Hi Saker,
I think your points are entirely reasonable. Russia SHOULD have a modest foreign policy that ONLY protects it’s interests in the near abroad. Also, Russia does not benefit from massive defense spending or a large military industrial complex.
But given that the west will not respect even Russia’s most important interests close to home, it is best for Russia to “throw the west off balance wherever that is practical.
I would argue that Iran is certainly “near abroad” and that a collapse of the regime and its replacement with an Iranian Mubarak would be a disaster for Russian interests.
A Syrian Mubarak would be a significant set back, but could lead to a collapse of Iran (probably not, but best not to chance it from Russia’s POV)
So I would think it would be in Russia’s interests, and consistent with your points above, to do the following.
1) First assess as best as possible whether Assad is survivable. If not, Russia should not waste any resources to protect him and instead do what it can to maintain close relations with whoever succeeds him.
2) If Assad is survivable, Russia should consider
a) any intel help it can offer to combat fighters armed by the west, whether foreign or Syrian defectors.
b) Any air defense equipment that could that might raise the cost of any ‘no fly zone.’ the western media will scream bloody murder, but Russia can’t let itself be hindered by western media campaigns. I mean, they screamed bloody murder over Georgia. Should Russia have let them attack?
c) Maintain contact with senior officers to dissuade them from any western backed coup (my guess is the Aliwite officers would hang together anyway, for fear of hanging apart later)
d) Russian diplomats should be in Turkey explaining this is a major Russian interest and Turkey would do better to stay out. This may or may not work, but it definitely should be said at every opportunity.
The above would be relatively low cost and risk and might work.
And if they still failed, then Russia would be no worse off, and at least it would have given the west a bloody nose in the process.
Doing nothing will only encourage the west to push harder next time. A coup in Belarus with a missile shield there? (Full disclosure, my wife is Belorussian)
I must add that NONE of this is an endorsement of Assad or the Baathists. But it is an acknowledgment that the only thing worse for Syria than Assad, would be a foreign invasion. So In my view Russia’s actions would not only be in her interests, but would be a perfectly moral thing to do.
Thanks for taking the time to school us on Russian strategic thinking. It is very much appreciated.
@Carlo: true, but nonetheless oil was an important factor in the course of the events. Basically, Dudaev did not want to share as he was expected to. Also, a lot of Russian “businessmen” (i.e., criminal thugs) made a lot of money from the wars in Chechnia. Sure Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan has more oil, but there was still a lot of money to be made from these wars. So an ugly combination of Chechen and Russian thugs, combined with, what else, Western intelligence agencies, Wahabi crackpots, common thugs, corrupt generals and many others turned this entire region into a bloodbath to fill their pockets with money. Even Putin benefited from the chaos in Chechnia as it allowed him to come to power with a strong mandate from the people. Of course, I fully support the Russian crushing of the insurgency there, but I am dismayed at the fact that it took so many innocent lives on all sides, so many horrors, to finally stop it (at least for the time being).
Anyway, I agree that Russia did not fight in Chechia over oil, but I just wanted to stress that a lot of corrupt people on all sides greatly profited from these wars.
@Lysander: the key question is this: are Syria or Iran vital, or even important, to Russian national interests?
I would argue that no, at least not in actuality. Of the two, Iran has the greatest potential, of course, but neither of the two countries has so far concluded that the other is a vital partner. This might be changing though. I hear that there are discussions at the SCO to try to find a way to make Iran a full member. Iran, however, is very different from Syria.
Iran is, IMHO, the most democratic state in the region, with a government and regime which is viable and which most people in the country support (I know, the Western propaganda says otherwise, but I don’t see any reason to trust it). Iran is also a well-integrated regional power. Compare that with Syria, whose government and regime seem to be in quasi total disarray and who lacks any kind of regional clout (Turkey is so much more powerful and credible than Syria!).
I believe that a “Syrian Mubarak” would not be desirable from the Russian point of view, but I don’t believe that it would be a disaster. In fact, I don’t even believe that from the Iranian point of view a collapse of the Assad regime would be a disaster either. A problem – yes, a concern – for sure, but would that such a collapse of the Syrian regime be a disaster for Iran, would it fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic posture? I don’t think so.
Now, an “Iranian Mubarak” would be very bad news for Russia, I agree. Not a strategic disaster, of course, but a major problem.
Basically, Syria is rather small, if strategically located. Iran is bigger than Syria by a full order of magnitude, and Russia is bigger than Iran by another full order of magnitude (again, by “bigger” I don’t mean size, I mean “comprehensive power”). Neither Syria nor Iran are in the Russian “near abroad” and neither of them as had much influence on it (although a US controlled Iran might become a major threat in Central Asia and in the Caucasus). I basically do not see any domino effect of Syria->Iran->Russia happening here.
I believe that Iran can deal with a collapse of the Syrian regime, rather easily in fact. Even Hezbollah can overcome such a development. Now, I have always seen Syria as a most unreliable ally of Iran and Hezbollah. In fact, Assad was in many ways very similar to Mubarak. Do I need to remind you of the most cozy relationship the Assad regime had with the CIA? Finally, should the Assad regime collapse, how big is the threat of a truly pro-US & pro-Israeli regime coming to power?
Dear Saker;
Thank you so much for this Geo-strategic exercise, it’s certainly very helpful to understand the dynamics of Russia’s inner-sanctum…
I also enjoyed Lysander’s point of you, as always…
Suffice it to say that the Syrian Regime must be having some sleepless nights because of their close proximity to the Russians for some time, and they MUST know that their relationship is mostly fragile at best….and cannot be a life saver after all.
Thanks again,
Best,
Joe
Saker;
I would also add the following:
The “stress” to this US/NATO and Russia-relationship is the Russian Parliamentary and Presidential elections. With Putin and Medvedev facing a tough re-election campaign, I now expect them to play the NATO ‘boogeyman” scenario more often in order to stir up their base who are not sympathetic to the West as you say….
Best,
Joe
Saker, in and of itself, a Syrian Mubarak is not much threat to Russia.
But…
1) Since Russia knows that eventually the west will go after it, it’s best to keep as much of their resources tied up elsewhere.
2) An ally in Syria gives Russia a leverage point, if they ever wanted to use it. Namely, for every annoying thing the west die, Russia would provide Syria with a new weapons system.
What are the chances of a Syrian Mubarak? In a democratic Syria, zero. But if it turns out that Saudi money is backing wahabists? Then it is more dicey.
But even a Syria Mubarak is preferable to the outcome I worry about most which is a massive civil war.
Actually, that last state might suite Russia fine, since the west will spend enormous resources over the next 20 years intervening in a Mega-Lebanon.
But that’s a catastrophe for the Syrian people.
@Lysander:that’s a catastrophe for the Syrian people
I don’t disagree, Lysander, even if I think that Assad is already a disaster by himself. What I am saying is that nobody should put any hope on a Russian intervention in the current situation because this is not going to happen because a) Russia cannot intervene and b) Russia does not believe that it should intervene.
Personally, I think that Assad is a HUGE liability to the resistance against the USraeli Empire. My problem is that I don’t know enough about Syria to be able to predict what kind of regime might replace him. I also don’t like the massive Western intervention currently taking place. But I am totally unconvinced that keeping Assad in power in good for Syria.
“@Robert: the key word here is ‘union’. Russian politicians (Putin, Gryzlov, Rogozin and others) have made it absolutely clear that not only do they want a union of *sovereign* states, but that any other project aimed at reducing the sovereignty of any nations would go against Russian national interests.”
I call BS.
What is going on in the Ukraine is the victory of the Russian mafia over the (admittedly pro Western) independent Ukraine forces.
@AmericanGoy: we can all make more or less educated guesses about how sincere Medvedev, Putin & Co. are. So rather than doing that, let’s ask ourselves a few simple questions:
a) has the Russian Mafia ever needed to have Russian sovereignty over any country or territory to infiltrate, influence or even control it? Just look at the Russian Mafia in Latvia, Cyprus, Miami or even Switzerland and the answer is obvious.
b) what would Russia, as a nation, gain from re-incorporating the Ukraine under its sovereignty? The Ukraine is economically wrecked, politically in turmoil, devoid of natural resources, full of angry unemployed and under-employed people. Russia is booming economically. The only thing which Russia needs form the Ukraine is Crimea and that it already has for all practical purposes. Russia does not even need to Ukies for gaz transit :-)
Central Europeans in general, and Ukrainians in particular, have a strong tendency to believe that somehow they and their countries have some kind of magical attraction on Russians, like some mysterious gravitational pull. This is not so. Most Russians look down on central Europeans as voluntary vassals of NATO without much of their own pride. Furthermore, Russians remember the Ukrainian slogan that “тому бідні, що не вільні” (“we are poor because we are not free”). Now they smile and reply “now that our are вільні don’t come crying to us, the evil Moskals, that you are also бідні”.
Frankly, Russians even look at Belarus with a great degree of distrust. Yes, sure, the two nations are really one, but that is also the case with central and East Ukraine (only the Western Ukrainians, the “Западенцы” are really different from the Russians). This is hardly a reason to reunite. The key factors in such decisions are ECONOMIC and the Kremlin is already getting a lot of flack for his economic assistance of Lukashenko.
I basically agree with these sentiments. Let Europe rot in its own mediocrity. The future of Russia is in Central Asia and the Far East. Sure, Russia will sell petrochemicals to Europe and try to have good political and cultural relations, but nobody that I know of wants to “live under the same roof” again. But not a single Russian kopeck should ever be spent again or, even more so, not a single drop of Russian blood should ever be shed in assisting the “near abroad” again. They are abroad? Good. Let them stay there. And if they need something – let them pay for it.
@AmericanGoy: I forgot one important thing here. Warfare has undergone a dramatic change. These are not the times of Napoleon or Hitler. Russia does not need the Ukraine or Eastern Europe as a ‘buffer zone’ or to gain ‘strategic depth’. The fact is that Europe is largely irrelevant militarily and that the only two real opponents here (the USA and Russia) can destroy each-other and most of their armed forces throughout their strategic depth. Guderian, Rommel, Zhukov, Rokossovsky and the rest of them can turn over in their graves and shed rivers of tears over this, but if even the Cold War is long gone, so much more is WWII. If attacked from Western Europe, Russian submarines can strike at ever single target in Europe even from their piers in the far East. Besides, European ground forces are way too small to even consider invading Russia, even unopposed!.
Since there is exactly zero chance of a land invasion of Russia from Europe, and since US aircraft and missiles also can strike anywhere in Russia even from their bases in the US Midwest, the entire rationale for controlling Central Europe is gone once and for all.
I don’t think anybody is going to miss it :-)
Cheers!
“Furthermore, Russians remember the Ukrainian slogan that “тому бідні, що не вільні” (“we are poor because we are not free”). Now they smile and reply “now that our are вільні don’t come crying to us, the evil Moskals, that you are also бідні”.”
Very true. In the late 1980s, the Ukie elite looked at the Soviet price system, observed that Ukraine was subsidizing the rest of the USSR, and concluded that an independent Ukraine would do very nicely indeed.
Then in 1992, they discovered world “free market” prices for energy and raw materials. Ooops!
This has been catastrophic. In 1992 Ukraine had a growing population of ~52 million. It is now ~45 million, and deaths still exceed births by ~250,000/year.
And yes, the Russians don’t want them back.
“Then in 1992, they discovered world “free market” prices for energy and raw materials. Ooops!”
And considering the never-ending “gas wars” between Russian and Ukraine, it seems that even though 20 years have passed, Ukrainians don’t comprehend at all what free market is all about. Or don’t want to. They forget all their rhetorics about sovereignity, and want Russia to continue subsidizing them, just like in the good old times of the USSR, and arrest Timoshenko for signing gas contracts with Russia with similar prizes as those for Europe.
Even the Russophobes regimes of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia behaved like this, as for more than a decade Russia kept subsidizing them, supplying gas and oil to them below market prizes.
Other funny thing. The IMF, the WTO and other international economic bodies pressed Russia to finish subsides for gas, oil, and other raw materials. And when Russia does this for international customers, they accuse them of “using economic weapons”.
Carlo, the West want the Russian government to end subsidies to Russian businesses and consumers.
The West believe that Russian subsidies to Russophobe countries remain highly desirable.
But only until such time as a Western-oriented Russian government sell the Russian energy and raw materials sectors to Western multinational corporations.