Eric Walberg reflects on the reasons for the very different reactions to Egypt’s revolution among North Americans
Western media always welcomes the overthrow of a dictator — great headline news — but this instance was greeted with less than euphoria by Western — especially American — leaders, who tried to soft-peddle it much as did official Egyptian media till the leader fled the palace. Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak was a generously paid ally for the US in its Middle East policy of protecting Israel, and the hesitancy of the Western — especially US — governments in supporting fully what should have been a poster-child of much-touted US ideals was both frustrating and highly instructive.
Canadian government support for Mubarak was even more staunch until vice-president Omar Suleiman’s 20 second resignation speech 11 February, clearly written with a metaphorical gun to one or both of their heads. This craven loyalty to an autocrat reviled by his people was the US-Israeli preferred solution. Much better to cool the passionate revolutionaries, allow the system, so beneficial to Israel, to adjust and survive.
But perhaps more important, much better to continue Egypt’s state-of-emergency laws that allow the regime to keep Israel critics and devout Muslims under raps, and just as important, allow the US to “render” undesirable Muslims there to be tortured. Imagine if the records of these renditions over the past decade by the US (and Canada) to Egypt were to come to light, falling into the hands of the revolutionaries, much like Britain’s secret treaties in WWI fell into the Bolsheviks’ hands?
“They’re not going to put the toothpaste back in the tube,” quipped Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper glumly. He could well be articulating — in his own tasteless way — the sentiments of the Egyptian military establishment, which had no use for a Mubarak dynasty and sided with the rebels, though at a considerable cost. Those now in power, nominally headed by Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Mohammed Tantawi, must push determined demonstrators out of Tahrir Square, get people back to work, shut down further strikes, and keep their US military advisers (not to mention the US president himself) assured that the centrepiece of Egyptian foreign policy remains in place. Truly a messy task.
It is hard to believe now that just a few weeks ago, Mubarak was invincible, his visage gracing at least one page in every newspaper every day, meeting with some Western leader, posing with Israeli notables, confident that he was in control of his desert ship-of-state. After the initial euphoria, and as evidence of his misrule and the perilous state that he left Egypt in pours out of newly liberated media, people are overwhelmed, irritable and depressed. People have undergone a wrenching shift in their thinking in the past three weeks.
Iranian leaders note the eerie coincidence with their own revolution of 11 February 1979 overthrowing the shah (1941-79). A national holiday, more than half the population of Iran was out on the streets celebrating along with Egyptians when Mubarak finally resigned last Friday evening. US commentators prefer to compare the revolution to the overthrow of Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos (1965-87) and Indonesian president Suharto (1968-98). They even suggest it could lead to another Iranian revolution.
Despite the many differences, Iran and Indonesia are the closest parallels: an anti-colonial revolt against a repressive pseudo-Muslim autocrat whose corruption and nepotism undid him. Those revolts triumphed when the army and police gave up supporting the US-backed leader, much as Egypt’s security apparatus did. The long repressed Muslim Brotherhood is the Sunni equivalent of the Iranian clerics. Even if the US can steer Egypt into the secular Indonesian model, it will still have to come to terms with the fact that Indonesia does not recognise Israel, that any future Egyptian government will almost surely renegotiate the 1979 peace agreement with Israel.
It seems that Egypt’s suffering and oppression are something alien to Western experience. But this is far from the truth. As the fervour spread like wildfire during the first few weeks, I recalled how the leftist community in Toronto is just as self-righteous and eager for change, how neoliberalism has left Canadian society with yawning income disparities not much different than those of Egypt. The most obvious difference being that the general standard of living in Canada is higher and the middle class (still) more numerous. But the very idea of such a spectacular event as happened here to address issues of social justice is impossible to imagine there or in the US.
It struck me that the most stark and instructive parallel is not with Indonesia or Iran, but between pre-revolution Egypt and the current US, which, like Egypt, has reached the end of the same gruelling 30-year neoliberal road that Egypt did under Mubarak’s reign, jettisoning any pretense of a just society. The coincidences abound: both the US and Egypt began their ill-fated journeys in that very 1981, with the ascendancy of US president Ronald Reagan and the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat, though El-Sadat had actually pre-empted Reaganomics with his infitah, dismantling of much of Egypt’s socialism.
Each US presidency since then has either embraced or been pressured by the exigencies of capitalism and electoral democracy to enact greater and great tax cuts for the wealthy and corporations, meanwhile cutting social services and increasing spending on so-called defence. Each “new” government has regularly flouted the consensus of the electorate on all major issues, from the environment, social services, jobs, to weapons production, invasions, drug laws and the Cubas and Irans which in defiance dare to flout the empire.
Income disparity is arguably the strongest impulse to revolt. As measured by the Gini coefficient (0 is perfect equality) Egypt stands in a far better light at .34 than the US .45 (Canada is .32).
So why did Egyptians succeed spectacularly where Americans — in even greater need of a revolution — fail spectacularly?
Egyptians seem to be much more politically astute than their American counterparts, more willing to admit that their leaders take bribes, lie, follow policies dictated by business or lobbies and which counter public opinion.
But the key to understanding why a revolution like Egypt’s is impossible in the US is the fact that, unlike Egypt’s army (composed mostly of conscripts), the US has a mercenary (excuse me, professional) army, which would have little compunction to fire on any group threatening the sanctity of the political establishment. Conscription is a vital brick in building a democratic society, an safeguard allowing the society to be dismantled if it turns into a jail or a brothel, a brick which has been lost to the US and its satellites. A brick that Egyptian protesters used to telling effect.
Senator John Kerry said that the Egyptian people “have made clear they will settle for nothing less than greater democracy and more economic opportunities”. So what are Egypt’s prospects of creating a thriving democracy? They would be wise to listen to Kerry and to observe the US system, though not to copy it but on the contrary to learn from its sorry state.
Why would Americans expect a president to be fair and hear them when he must raise a billion dollars from corporations to outspend his equally compromised rival in elections? New York Times analyst Bob Herbert looked enviously at Egyptians’ longing for democracy, comparing the US political system to a “perversion of democracy”, bemoaning that at the very moment Egyptians are discovering it, “Americans are in the mind-bogglingly self-destructive process of letting a real democracy slip away.”
And yet Americans blissfully pledge their allegiance, weep on 4 July and during presidential inaugurations, despite the unassailable evidence of the injustices both domestically and abroad of the system they live under. Egyptians, though just as nationalistic, were able to see through the facade of their pseudo-democracy and rise up to overthrow the guilty parties. They are the heroes of all true democrats in the world. The few people particularly in North America who see through their own quite transparent political facade can only look on wistfully.
What became the anthem of the revolution — “Why?” by Mohamed Munir — was written, presciently, a month before the 25 January spark that burned away (let’s hope) much of the chaff accumulated during 30 years of neoliberal “reforms”. He cries out to his homeland like a spurned lover who vows to take his country back from the usurpers:
If love of you was my choice
My heart would long ago have changed you for another
But I vow I will continue to change your life for the better
Till you are content with me.
How different from the equivalent American song — Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the USA” — self-pitying and hopeless in this, the world’s sole superpower:
You end up like a dog that’s been beat too much
‘Till you spend half your life just covering up.
***
Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ You can reach him at http://ericwalberg.com/
a few months ago there was discussion on this blog about how a future regional war in the ME might play out.
it was suggested by one commentator that HA might try to liberate the Galilee.
and now that seems to be the plan, as hinted at by Nasrallah.
http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=2651&cid=23&fromval=1&frid=23&seccatid=14&s1=1
It was an excellent speech yesterday by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah….
@anonymous: yes, I have read excerpts of it and as soon as I get the transcript I will post it here.
They can hardly invade Israel surely? Hizbollah won the July War because it was on the defensive in territory it knew inside out holed up in bankers. Out in the open Israeli air power would hammer them to bits.
@Robert: They can hardly invade Israel surely? Hizbollah won the July War because it was on the defensive in territory it knew inside out holed up in bankers. Out in the open Israeli air power would hammer them to bits.
My first reaction is to agree with you. However, Hassan Nasrallah might well be the only political figure in the Middle-East who never made and empty threat or who never bragged about something he could not deliver on. So let me think about it a little and get back to you with that, ok?
Cheers!
@Robert: ok. had some time to think about this, and here are some of my musings:
“Invade Israel” and “invade ALL of Israel” are different propositions. So I don’t know exactly what Nasrallah could have had in mind. Did he want Hezbollah to go down and liberate Gaza, or did he just want to infiltrate some forces into northern Israel and bring the war inside Israel’s territory.
If Hezbollah decided to cross into Israel proper, the Israeli Air Force would be useless as Hezbollah does not have the kind of assets which an Air Force could engage. No armor, no vehicles (except maybe cars), no logistical lines which could be cut, no heavy artillery, etc. So we can forget about the Israel Air Force being useful.
If I had to send Hezbollah fighters inside Israel, I would send them in in small groups of 5-7 men, on foot, with mostly sabotage and psyops in mind. I suspect that such an infiltration would results in quite a nice panic (Israelis are cowards, they have shown that over and over again) which, in itself, might be an interesting think to exploit.
The Israeli military is simply too large to beat in a regular kind of war. I don’t think that Hezbollah would ever try to hold on to any terrain inside Israel. But that does not mean that it cannot strike deep. I would not be surprised at all if I learned one day that Hezbollah has Hebrew-speaking units, equipped with IDF uniforms and close to perfect ID cards. Such units could be send into Israeli cities and create chaos. Not only that, but if Hezbollah decided to send it, say, 3 such teams, the Israelis would not know if there are 3 of them or 5 or 20. So, again, Hezbollah could engage in unconventional warfare inside Israel proper without “invading” or, much less so, “occupying” Israel.
I will say that I do not think that the Israelis would be very expert at defending against such a move. It is one thing to terrorize Palestinian civilians, and quite another to being proficient in counter special forces operations. Add to this that the Israeli military is a mediocre infantry force whose skills have been greatly degraded over the years. Finally, the IDF is very afraid to operate inside the Palestinian territories (their soldiers all think about Gilad Shalit or how they got snatched by Hezbollah in 2006). So if the Hezbollah forces stay mostly within the West Bank section which is not controlled by the Israelis, they could be relatively safe.
The biggest danger for any Hezbollah deep infiltration unit would probably be the Israeli settlers themselves who are far more motivated and who would be fighting on their own land at least that is how they would perceive it. I expect that the counter-infiltration capabilities of the settlers to be excellent and their level of vigilance and determination very high. So if I had to send in Hezbollah fighters I would tell them to say away from the settlement as much as possible.
What else?
Paradoxically, IDF units inside Israel are probably rather easy target. I expect that their sentries are bored, their discipline poor, and their skills very mediocre. One the alert is given, IDF units, supported by Shin Bet, Border Guards and various police forces would probably dramatically increase the security of IDF camps, but initially they could be an excellent target.
Still, the most psychologically effective attack would probably inside a city, on a symbolical target. That would result into a good panic which would put pressure on the political leadership. Combine that with rocket strikes and I say that Hezbollah might, for the first time, really bring the fighting inside Israel.
What do you think – does that make sense?
Cheers Saker. Yes that makes sense, although it would be a high risk strategy for Nasrallah. He’s succeeded in his main duty of liberating Lebanon. Operations of this kind might cause havoc, at least to begin with, but they couldn’t inflict serious enough damge on Israel to force them to make concessions on land and settlements. It’s for Nasrallah to decide whether it’s worth sacrificing lives in an operation of this kind.
Remember that the Galilee is majority Arab Palestinian. We are not talking about the West Bank, but northern Israel. The Galilee is also similar to southern Lebanon in terms of having a rocky, hilly terrain ideal for guerrilla warfare or commando activity.
Also keep in mind that HA is not going to be adventuristic.
I would bet that it is waiting for the right moment — when the PA is (finally) dissolved, when the Palestinians in Israel are better mobilized, when the international boycott and sanctions movement is stronger, when Egypt has a better government, etc.
Only when all of these factors are aligned will HA carry through with its plan for the ‘eradication of Israel’ (see angryarab on this).
After the last war, Nasrallah said that his fighters had been begging to go on the offensive because they had done so well in mangling the IDF on the ground.
He also promised that, after a future war, the geography of the conflict would change — ie, the ‘age of victory’ would extend to Palestine.
When the situation is appropriate, HA will likely deploy a military strategy based on the following: massive missile strikes on Israeli cities, airports, and military bases; defensive tactics against conventional land, sea and air attacks; and offensive commando raids into Palestinian villages in Galilee, where they surely have agents already working for them.
So, based on what we observed in 2006, and on what HA has said since then, we can get a sense of how the next war could play out: the goal of the resistance will in fact be the liberation of the land and the end of Israel as a Zionist state.