For several months already, rumors have abounded about the reported conflict between the head of the Russian military intelligence service (GRU), Valentin Korabelnikov, and President Medvedev. Today, the Russian media announced that Korabelnikov had been replaced by one of his deputies, Alexander Shliakhturov.
Of all the intelligence and security services of the former Soviet Union and Russia, the GRU was by far the most secretive. It was also one of the most influential ones, and it is not surprising that many strange events surrounding the GRU have taken place over the past years which were almost never reported (such as the streak of “accidental” deaths of quite a few top GRU officials in Moscow several years ago). This time again, there is little real info on what is going on, but rumors persistently point to what might be a major purge of the GRU and forces subordinated to it.
According to these rumors, the GRU itself might loose its virtual autonomy and become a department of the Ministry of Defense, while most of its cadre would be transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Other rumors claim that several GRU Spetsnaz brigades will be disbanded (along with the 106 Airborne Division). If any of these rumors are true, then what is taking place in Russia is nothing short of a massive breakup, if not breakdown, of the most elite segment of the Russian armed forces.
All this is taking place in the midst of a much-needed (and much delayed!) reform of the Russian armed forces. Thus, these rumors might reflect not so much the real plans of the Kremlin as the worst fears of the top brass of the Ministry of Defense.
Still, for a purely pragmatic point of view, disbanding the GRU or re-subordinating as a department of the Ministry of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. True, the GRU was the least reformed of all the institutions and agencies of the former Soviet Union, and quite of few of its officers were found guilty of a wide range of criminal offences (corruption, racketeering, trafficking, murders, etc.). Furthermore, the GRU was probably a bloated institution in need of streamlining. So the basic principle of reforming the GRU is probably sound. However, what is taking place today appears to be far more than just a shake-up and clean-up operation.
The elimination of one or even two Spetsnaz Brigades, however, is rather bizarre. Frankly, I suspect that what is taking place is a massive reallocation of resources from the military special forces to the special forces of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Keep in mind that the term “Spetsnaz” simply means “special purpose” and does not, in itself, denote any one structure. In the former Soviet Union, both the military and the KGB had special purpose units, but by and large it was the Spetsnaz forces of the GRU which made the word “Spetsnaz” famous. In the years of total anarchy under the presidency of Boris Eltsin, many more units, departments and forces declared themselves to be “Spetsnaz”. I would not be surprised to learn that some construction battalion in the Ural Mountains also claims the “Spetsnaz” status and the fancy badge which comes along (or so they would believe)….
Anyway, along the *real* special forces of the GRU and the KGB, a number of new special purpose units were formed, including in various police departments, the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even in the prison system. Since Putin and, later, Medvedev came to power the Russian media has been filled with not-so-subtle quasi-propaganda reports about the “heroic” “Spetsnaz” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A large number of fancy (and costly!) schools and training camps have now been opened for these forces. The fact that the performance of the MVD units in, for example, Chechnya was less than stellar did not have any negative consequences for their funding. Even more puzzling is that the one type of unit which performed rather well in Chechnya (the rapid reaction “SOBR” forces) were simply disbanded.
So a rather strange dynamic began to take place in the last decades: When real, tough, fighting was called for the Kremlin sent in the Spetsnaz GRU, the KGB special purpose forces “Alpha” and “Vympel”, Paratroopers from the Airborne Forces, Marines from Navy and even Border Guard (many of which were at least as good as any other Spetsnaz forces) units were typically sent in. Then, once the mean and ugly fighting was over, all sorts of police forces were sent in to clear and control the terrain taken by the military. They manned checkpoints, seized suspected insurgents, interrogated prisoners, etc. They were also almost universally disliked by the military who had done the real fighting.
Simply put – Spetsnaz operators are not cops. These two cultures are fundamentally different and deeply antagonistic and what is taking place today in Russia might well be an attempt by the Russian cops to finally get rid of those whom they have always perceived as their main competitors. Likewise, it is quite possible that the former KGB people around Medvedev are now using the reform of the Russian armed forces as a convenient pretext to finally crush the influence of the GRU once and for all.
If so, than this is a potential disaster for Russia. The fact is that if a military is reduced in size or substantially reorganized, its intelligence component must be *strengthened* and not weakened. Simply put, the need for a high quality military intelligence service is inversely proportional to the capabilities of the armed forces: the weaker these forces are, the stronger the military intelligence must be.
While the wars in Chechnya and in Georgia have shown that while the Russian military can prevail – brilliantly in the case of Georgia – there still a dire need to reform these forces before the existing cracks in organization, training, command and control, etc. become insurmountable. The Air Force, for example, is now in truly urgent need of new aircraft and the Ground Forces need a major upgrade of its aging command and control infrastructure.
If the Kremlin is serious about reforming the military then it simply cannot do that while allowing the GRU and the forces subordinated to the GRU to become the victim of a purge. Not only would that eliminate any chance for the creation of the planned “mobile forces” (which have been discussed since at least 20 years now), but it would even transform the much needed reform of the armed forces into a disaster at a time when Russia can least afford it.
Regardless of the specifics behind the military reform plans, it is extremely shortsighted of the Kremlin to push on with this project without making any adjustments to the schedule in light of the financial crisis. All previous attempts in the past twenty years to reform Russia’s military lasted long enough to disrupt and dismantle, at which point they ran out of funding. There is a real possibility that this latest reform will follow the same dynamic.
The GRU reports directly to the President. If I was Russia’s president, the GRU would last on my list of budgetary cutbacks. It is not at all clear to me why Medvedev seems to be supporting plans to dismember the GRU. It appears that Korabelnikov is being replaced by his first deputy and that most of the GRU’s top commanders remain. If Korabelnikov was removed to clear path to reforming his agency, it is unlikely his staff would have remained and his deputy would have taken his job. This may a case of some personal disagreement between Medvedev and Korabelnikov, who is known to be very critical of the military reform plans.
As far as GRU Spetsnaz is concerned, it always operated in close coordination with the Army. The Army command was much more involved in utilizing this resource than GRU itself. On the other hand, I am a proponent of the “if it ain’t broke – don’t fix it” approach. GRU Spetsnaz are the best special forces in Russia, so why try to change this? Especially now, when the federal budget is shrinking with every passing day.
They really need to put this military reform on ice for a year or two, until the economic dust settles. Otherwise, this is not going to end well.
@venik4: It appears that Korabelnikov is being replaced by his first deputy and that most of the GRU’s top commanders remainHi Venik, first, thanks for visiting my blog. I have been a long time admirer of your work and I am delighted that you dropped by.
I have read in one of the Russian articles commenting about the Korabelnikov resignation that most of his deputies *also* offered their resignation. I am not sure where I read this, but I am sure of my recollection of this fact. So I would guess that this is more than just a personality thing between Medvedev and Korabelnikov.
I might be mistaken here, but as far as I know, the GRU does not report to the President and unlike the SVR and FSB people the commander of the GRU does not have daily briefings with the President. Unless something has changed recently, I would guess that the GRU reports to the Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense.
I agree with you that if this is the Kremlin’s idea of “reform” they should just freeze the entire thing until better times…
Cheers!
The Saker
Lt. Gen. Alexander Shlyakhturov is now the head of the GRU. He used to be Korabelnikov’s first deputy. Whether or not he will last on that post remains to be seen.
During the Soviet years, the GRU, while technically part of the General Staff and the Defense Ministry, reported directly to the Politburo. This exclusive status of the GRU remained after the Soviet collapse, and GRU reported to the President, frequently bypassing MO leadership. As far as I know, still GRU has a weekly briefing with the Russian President.
Since 2006, all Army, VVS, and Navy intelligence structures report to the GRU. It is a massive organization that will be extremely difficult to take apart, if that is the plan.
Thanx, Saker. Whenever I hear stories of a power struggle I begin to think along the lines of NWO. Is there any element of this here? You once told us of how Putin lead former KGB agents in a quiet coup against Western backed Oligarchs. Are they now trying to retake Russia through the GRU?
Thanx
@Venik4: thanks for the details. Yes, Shlyakhturov was one of Korabelnikov’s deputies and, at least according to one source (http://www.rg.ru/2009/04/24/shljahturov-anons.html) it was Korabelnikov who suggested him. Dunno if that’s true.
Here is what I suggest: let’s both keep our eyes and ears open and see if we can find out what is going on and then inform eachother.
You can always email me at vineyardsaker@gmail.com and I would appreciate it if you could send me an email for you.
@Lysander: I don’t think that the oligarchs are involved in any of this. The folks behind Putin effectively broke their back. Ditto for any putative “pro-US forces” in Russia. They are all dead and buried (figuratively speaking, of course).
It rather looks to me that the Medvedev/Putin team is taking on the last possible opponent to their rule: the GRU and the forces which are subordinated to it. And no, I do not at all see the oligarchs behind the GRU, quite the opposite in fact. In the bad old days of Eltsin the private security services of the oligarchs actually clashed with the GRU, sometimes violently.
No, I see that as a grand consolidation of power by the ex-KGB (ex PGU) SVR folks pulling the stings behind the Putin/Medvedev team against the one force which they did not succeed in subordinating to them (at least so far).
Time will show, I suppose.
Please check this: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8016371.stm
Why do you worry, Saker? A reform of the army has been announced, to make it more modern and more performing, by reducing its sheer volume and increasing its professionalism, and a high ranking officer opposes it and offers to resign. Now a man for the post has been found, the President has complied.
On the other hand, General Korabelnikov was appointed by Yeltsin. He is one of the few remaining to the period of Yeltsin’s wild capitalism and kleptocracy. It is odd he has remained there so long, especially the army has shown a lot of loopholes throughout these years. And everybody knows its many deficiencies. As for the GRU you are quite right in your analysis: the lack of political control over it was very dangerous, for rogue actions could not be dismissed. Especially if they were operational to blackmail or to embarrass the democratically elected president.
Time for renewal!
What remains to be seen is whether the new man is up to the task!
But we’ll have to wait and see…
Another explanation might be the power struggle between “constitutionalists” and “siloviki” (army/police/intelligence command). The first round, Putin’s succession, was won by what I call the “constitutionalists”, as Putin (who is a “man of state”, with a longer term vision, we should not forget it), first refused to change the constitution on his behalf, and second came up with Medvedev, the Gazprom man, a man willing to assert Russian power through economy and diplomacy, and who will use the army only as ancillary, but able in a case of need to make Russia respected (as it happened in Georgia). The “siloviki”, by losing the succession (either as they failed to keep Putin – in their hands, as Putin’s legitimacy would be questioned, or to elevate Ivanov) may have indulged in destabilizing secret actions: now the constitutionalists are asserting their power, they need to purge part of the military apparatus, in order to avoid provocations or counterproductive pressure.
Enrique
@Enrique: I am all for the reform of the Russian military, no argument here. However, as I have argued before, you cannot reform everything at the same time and the Russian military intelligence is most definitely one of the best and most capable branches of the Russian armed forces. Russian Spetsnaz forces’ contribution to the victories in Chechnia and Georgia cannot be overstated: these forces are – by far – the best forces available to the Russian state.
Likewise, the role of the GRU is currently absolutely crucial. Keep in mind that the US Empire is slowly but surely collapsing, that the Middle-East and Central Asia are simmering with unresolved conflicts which will explode into wars rather sooner than later, that the NATO Alliance is pressing Russia on all sides and that all this makes this a very dangerous situation for Russia. The Russian external intelligence service (SVR) is simply not structured to deal with all these issues at the same time, this is why the current operating budget and human intelligence network of the GRU is actually *higher* than the SVR’s.
Also – world practice has conclusively shown that a civilian/political intelligence agency such as the SVR (or CIA) should be kept separate from a purely military intelligence agency such as the GRU (or DIA). Intelligence agencies have their own cultures, specificity, training, procedures and they cannot be simply mashed into each other.
In other words, I believe that the GRU is a vital national security asset for Russia as a country, a state and a nation.
I have no problem with reforming it and cleaning it up from some of its corrupt elements, but turning the GRU into just a department of the Ministry of Defense or dismantling an entire Spetsnaz brigade is just crazy.
I am not defending Korabelnikov as a person or as a commander. I would not be worried in the least if he was replaced by some other guy. What worries me is that it appears that the reason for his replacement is his refusal to participate in the dismantling of vital GRU assets.
One of the articles I read about the entire business states that besides firing Korabelnikov, Medvedev as also demoted ALL his deputies (besides Shliakhturov) to the status of “acting” deputies – in other words they are also fired but they get to stay there until other candidates are found. That is very serious stuff, just imagine what this does to the morale of the GRU officer corps!
I do not believe that the concepts of “siloviki” versus “constitutionalists” appply to Russia any more. Russia under Putin and Medvedev and Russia under Eltsin are dramatically different realites. The folks in power now have virtually eliminated any “siloviki” or “constitutionalists” or, better, they have *replaced* them with themselves.
Even under Eltsin, the GRU as such did not flex is muscle, if only because the folks behind Eltisn distrusted and feared the military and never let them anywhere near a situation where they could actually make a difference.
For example, I was in Moscow in 1993 during the coup by Eltsin against the Parliament and during the bloody repression against the Parliament and I can tell you that no GRU forces were used. ALl the dirty work was done by various forces perceived by the Kremlin as loyal (Luzhkov’s thugs, the Beitar, and plenty of cops) and only three days after the bloodbath did Spetsnaz GRU forces come in to patrol the streets and maintain order. Even VDV forces from Narofominsk and Tula were not used, even though they were alarted and ready to move in. The fact is that Eltsin and his oligarchs never trused the military (or even the FSB forces).
So to label the GRU as a corrupt and uncontrolled “rogue agency” is, I think, very unfair. The worst that can be said about it is that it is in bad need of some “house cleaning” as various scandals involving *individual* officers have shown.
Some pro-Western reporters in Russia are now saying that Medvedev wants to transform the GRU into something like the US Special Operations Command. But think about it – is that a desirable goal for Russia?
If this means organized an inter-services special ops command with air, naval and land assets training together I am all for it. But there is no need to disband any Spetsnaz Bridage to acheive this goal.
But if that means turning the GRU forces into something like the US Special Ops forces than, no, I pass. For all their fancy gear and top-notch PR and propaganda, the US simply does not have forces which could compare to the Spetsnaz GRU (or even Russian Airborne Forces). WHile US special forces are adequate to train Comumbian death squads, they could never take a city like Grozny or operate in the Caucasus mountains.
Aping the USA has never been a good solution for Russia.
Anyway, I can only conclude that what is taking place in Russia is Medvedev/Putin & Co. using their powers to get rid of a potential adversary and if that undermines the security of Russia – so be it! These guys seem to care more about their power over Russia than the power of Russia. I would expect no less from these ex-KGB guys.
Sad, but that is how I see it.
Cheers,
VS
“These guys seem to care more about their power over Russia than the power of Russia. I would expect no less from these ex-KGB guys.”
I strongly disagree here. One of the reasons Putin is so immensely popular in Russia is that he increased his own power by increasing his country’s power. Russia is in a much better situation now than 10 years ago, in all aspects: military power, social conditions, security, economy. The financial crisis has affected Russia, of course, but didn’t produce (at least not yet) the disasters that Other Russia and many in the West were expecting and wishing. And it seems that economic recovery is already beginning, though it will take long to completely overcome the crisis.
Anyway, I don’t think Putin would accept to risk the security of his country, specially considering all he has done in the last 9 years to consolidate Russian power.
If there is a purge going on in the Russian intelligence, and why it is happening, I can’t answer, I know nothing on the issue. But I wouldn’t be so pessimistic on this issue.
I think Carlo is right, I don’t mistrust Putin/Medevedev so much. And then under Putin’s rule Russia has experienced amazing wonders…
The whole file is of a lot of complexity, and highly difficult to comment. By definition, since we are talking about secret services!!!
For me the replacement may have an easier reason: the general was appointed by Yeltsin, and the current leaders would like people more of their line. As for the reform of the army, I think it is quite apparent it is in a big need for it! Even the war on Georgia showed off a lot of loopholes. In a last analysis, re-reading comments from the summer, many observers pointed out the Russian army needed to be revamped…
As for the details of the reform I’m quite unawares. I hope both the President and his PM know what they are doing. Apparently the GRU’s command was out of step. For all the big work in Chechnya and Georgia, it left a lot to be desired. And Chechnya turned out to collect a quick success rather for political reasons, as the more powerful Chechen clans had had enough with the Islamists, and Putin was able to capitalize it…
@Carlo & Enrique: One of the reasons Putin is so immensely popular in Russia is that he increased his own power by increasing his country’s power. Russia is in a much better situation now than 10 years ago, in all aspects: military power, social conditions, security, economyOh, but I very much agree with this. However, the fact that Putin & Medvedev succeeded in a quasi-miraculous recovery of Russia does not change the fact that they are rather ruthless folks who will do whatever it takes to control the country. At least this is what I think.
Please check out this:
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2007/11/putins-legacy-and-new-russia.html
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2008/08/real-meaning-of-south-ossetian-war.html
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2008/08/real-meaning-of-south-ossetian-war-part.html
and you will see that I am by no means a Putin basher. But neither do I want to be naive about their idealism or “service” for “Mother Russia”.
In this case (the GRU purge), I see Putin and Medvedev placing their own interests over the interests of the country. That does not mean that they don’t care about Russia, but only that they do not always place the welfare of Russia as the top priority.
BY THE WAY – NEWS UPDATE:
The commander of the Russian Airborne Forces has just been releaved from his position. However, in this case rumor has it that General Shamanov, an extremely competent commander, will be the next C-in-C of the Airborne Forces. If true, that would be an excellent choice.
Cheers!
Ruthless? I wouldn’t say so, but rather determined and efficient. And clever, as in 2000 Russia was on the brink of disaster, and the corridors of power were overcrowded by oligarchs and the corrupt “family”.
Putin needed a lot of intelligence and decisiveness to change all that.
I think we in the West have lost the idea of a leader with a historic project. We are used to petty thieves and opportunists, and we have forgotten what a real man of state means. Putin is that, I don’t mean he is a dreamer for the mother Russia, but he has a project for his country, and it is succeeding! Just imagine how difficult it was and it is, and how many contradictory forces he had to deal with. If you pause for a minute, you may grasp it has been all along a titanic struggle. In retrospective, in comparing the tissue of power and its social and economic results between 2000, when Putin steps in, and 2008, when he steps down for respect to the Constitution, it is as if it were two different countries!
As for “rogue actions”, I don’t mean GRU or any other service, was indulging in them. But it is highly suspicious that certain high-profile deaths would happen at the very moment they could embarrass Putin all the more…
Was it a provocation from “rogue” service? We don’t know. Perhaps the reform is bound to finish off political lack of control of “force” structures…
@Enrique: everything you say might be true. We do not have the hard facts to acertain the issue either way. But explain to me, how in the world can it be a good idea to simply dissolve a Spetsnaz brigade?! Or dissolving the GRU between the SVR and the Ministry of Defense?! Granted, only the former has already occured, but still – can you find any logical “statesman” explanation for the dismemberment of one of Russia’s most capable brigades?!
I don’t know, Saker. I don’t have the information. And I don’t know whatever may have been the problems between the Kremlin and the Brigade and the GRU. Restructuring the army is sometimes necessary to make it more efficient, or to protect the civil government, in a democratic context.
On the other hand, I don’t know either the details and the quality of the reform. It sounds like too technical. But politically the question is: is the civilian executive to trust? In Russia, for the time being, and unlike in Yeltsin’s era, I think we may trust them.
Another question is also the economic and financial crisis. How far may this explain the military revamping?
One thing which attracts my attention is that the removal of the old staff has been made before having the new officers in charge. Usually people are removed and others take their post. Here they are dismissed, but they stay because there is nobody yet available! This suggests it wasn’t a “purge”, but rather the need for modernization what was stressed…
@Enrique: please consider that the difference between military and civilian does not really apply to Russia (yet). Make no mistake, the oligarchs were ALL civilians, and the guys who booted them were mostly KGB, hardly my idea of a civilian. Now, I don’t mean to say that being ex-KGB is an unforgivable sin, at least not any more than being a member of the organization which the KGB served and protected, the CPSU. But being in the KGB is definitely a culture.
I met quite a few KGB guys, including quite a few from the PGU, and some even became friends of mine, and I can assure you that these are not “civilians” in any sense of the word.
Thus the entire concept of military intelligence folks reporting to their civilian leadership simply does not apply to Russia, at least not since Putin came to power.
On a social/cultural level what you have in Rusisa is “groups” for a lack of a better expression, competing for power and pushing their candidates into the *fictional* role of “democratically elected civilian leaders”. That aping of the Western terminology is just a rather basic camouflaging and legitimation of the rule of the group in power.
I would add that the culture of the military and the ex-KGB are not as fundamentally different as some people would have it. However, the GRU – being virtually independent – could well be a different case. I have never met a GRU officer in my life, at least not one willing to identify himself as such (well, I met a Soviet deputy military attache once, but that is a special case). I am also quite sure that I meant plenty of GRU officers who did not identify themselves as such, but that does not count I think.
Anyway, it seems to me that it is reasonable to assume that the GRU and the ex-KGB folks have little love for each other for many reasons, not least historical ones. The two organizations are also objectively competing with each other, even though their mandates are formally rather distinct.
All this is to say that when faced with the choice of choosing between the two scenarii
a) military reform
b) inter service rivalry
I pick the second one as more likely.
Also, does the idea of having ex-KGB officers making a miltary reform against the best judgement of the military make sense to you?
Countrary to what a lot of people say, the Russia military has always been very innovative in its thinking. For example, there were articles in the journal “Military Though” describing the rationale for creating mobile forces as early as in the late 1980s! Some of these articles even presented full diagrams of the proposed structure. Very good stuff indeed, I assure you. No, the military is not what impeeded the reforms for all these years. What happened is that under Eltsin and the oligarchs the Kremlin was basically busy destroying the Russian armed forces (and Russia itself, I would argue) and after Eltins the economic priorities did not make a reform possible either since reforming the armed forces takes A LOT of money.
So now is, indeed, not a bad time to reform the military but, alas, the US economic collapse triggered such a worldwide crisis that even Russia is becoming affected. Still, Medvedev is pushing ahead with this, which is a very good idea, but he seems to be doing it against the best advice of Russia’s best military officers, which is a bad idea.
I had hoped that the military and ex-KGB folks would find a way to work together, in fact I even wrote about that in my article about Putin’s legacy. I am now becoming fearful that this is not what is happening.
As always, time will show.
VS
Indeed, Saker, time will show. Yet I’m not so convinced to place the conflict, if any, between KGB and the military. Maybe you are right, I’m not trying to disavow you, only to explore other possibilities. When I spoke of “constitutionalists” (sort of), I meant that people like Medvedev could rise instead of Ivanov, for instance. Now Medvedev can hardly be described as a KGB officer, his career has rather gone through state business, and he is a lawyer.
Like Putin, incidentally. It is true though that Putin was a colonel with the KGB, but his rank and post were quite low. He wasn’t a general, he was serving in Dresden, where certainly the elite wouldn’t go. And the fact of being abroad kept him away from Soviet politics. On top of that, he left the service and went to work with Sobchak, the reformist mayor of St-Petersburg, and a democratic rival of Yeltsin. So I’m not quite sure his rise to power came through the KGB, I think there is a lot of simplicity there. I hardly see him as a man of the KGB apparatus: there were loads of officers with far more contacts and better position than him…
My point is that the power reality in Russia is more complex, but that somehow the civil structure may have collided with the military establishment. And for me Medvedev is a civilian, so is Putin, who is a politician. Whereas active military officers are military… Although I agree that the army doesn’t have a putchist tradition, and has always submitted to the “civil” power…
At the end of the day we have an elected leadership, and the question is whether the Russian people trust them or not. I think they do, and this reform will be welcome.
@Enrique: small point: Putin was an officer in the PGU, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, which was taksed with external intelligence collection. That was an elite even inside the KGB, and elite within elite so to speak, and I can assure you, having personally known quite a few PGUshniks myself, that these are big time “non-civilians”. You cannot compare say a Captain in, say, a Motor-Rifle or Tank unit with a Captain of the PGU, if only because the latter will have received an education which is infinitely higher than that regular, armed forces, capitain.
So do not be fooled by Putin’s “low rank” in the PGU. He was, for all practical purposes, an officer within an extremely elite organization whose entire structure and ethos was militarized from top to bottom.
And being a Lieutenant-Colonel in the PGU KGB SSSR was by no means a “low rank”. Being based in East-Germany is not trivial either. East Germany was the frontline of the Cold War, literally.
Lastly, Putin is one thing, but the folks behind him, the people who chose, coopted and promoted him are quite something different. These are the folks who crushed the oligarchs – heavy hitters by any standard.
As for Medvedev, being a non-KGB lawyer and civilian. Maybe. Maybe not. His career is atypical and I don’t really know what to make of it.
Cheers!
“Lastly, Putin is one thing, but the folks behind him, the people who chose, coopted and promoted him are quite something different. These are the folks who crushed the oligarchs – heavy hitters by any standard.”
Bravo! Which is why the Russian people trust them, and the West hates them!
OK, Saker, I wll take your point about Putin, as otherwise our discussion may turn a bit bizantine… If he received support and was able to move around those corridors, not bad. Especially since his project was to take Russia back from the abyss!
As for Medvedev, he made his career all along with Putin, whose support was not only from “siloviki” but also from state (civilian) finance. Medvedev was the pilot for economic redeployment, whereas Putin led the political process. A redoubtable duo, as we see now that Medvedev came out from the shadow!
Now is that the best leadership Russia could have? Considering the alternatives (Khodorkovski, Berezovski, Zhuganov, Kasparov…), I think it is.
And as compared with the Western governments, not bad at all!
@Enrique: Now is that the best leadership Russia could have? Considering the alternatives (Khodorkovski, Berezovski, Zhuganov, Kasparov…), I think it is.
And as compared with the Western governments, not bad at all!I *totally* agree with this. I just hope that this stays true.
Cheers!
We shall live! As the Russians say…